Gibbs v. State
| Decision Date | 13 October 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-580A125,2-580A125 |
| Citation | 426 N.E.2d 1150 |
| Parties | Edward T. GIBBS and Arlene E. Larson a/k/a Georgia Larson, Appellants (Defendants Below) v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
John S. Brumfield, Muncie, for appellant Edward T. Gibbs.
Jack Quirk, Muncie, for appellant Arlene E. Larson.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Thomas D. Quigley, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Edward T. Gibbs (Gibbs) and Arlene E. Larson (Larson) were tried by a jury and found guilty of involuntary manslaughter and voluntary manslaughter respectively. They appeal on various grounds, including the sufficiency of the evidence, the denial of their motions for separate trials, and the admission of certain testimony and evidence, including photographs of the decedent and a videotape of the scene of the crime.
We affirm.
The decedent, James F. Buffin (Buffin), was known to have carried at least seven thousand dollars in fifty and one hundred dollar bills during the night of May 19, 1979. The small hours of the following morning, May 20, found him in Gene's Tavern in Muncie. He had been drinking heavily; a subsequent analysis of his blood showed the alcohol content to be in excess of 300 milligrams per deciliter. 1
Arlene Larson, a waitress at Gene's Tavern, took Buffin to the home of her daughter Justina Grueschow (Grueschow), 321 West Weber, Muncie, Indiana. The following persons were staying at the Grueschow home at that time: Grueschow; her mother, Larson; Larson's minor children, Brent and Gina; Larson's brother, Edward Gibbs (Gibbs); and a friend of Gibbs's, Richard Gurnard (Gurnard), who had escaped from a federal halfway house in Seattle, Washington. On the night of May 19-20, Gina Larson was staying with a friend for the night, and Bryan Jarvis, the child of a neighbor, was spending the night at the Grueschow home.
Gibbs and Larson admit that in the early morning of May 20, Buffin and Gibbs got into a violent fist fight in the living room of the Grueschow home during the course of which Larson took a serrated kitchen knife and drove it once into Buffin's shoulder, and again into his back, severing the left renal artery and vein, and causing Buffin to bleed to death. In delivering these blows, Larson's hand slipped on the knife and was cut deeply.
Bryan Jarvis was promptly sent home, and Gina Larson retrieved. Hastily, the entire group fled west, stopping in Iowa to purchase a fresh car for $1,850.00 in cash, paid in bills from which Gina Larson had washed blood.
When Buffin was found on the floor of the living room, it was apparent from the pattern of blood stains that he had lain face down for a time, and then had been laid on his back by bending him at the knees. His pockets contained $1.25 in change. The thousands of dollars he had flashed around the previous evening, and the small leather pouch he kept them in, had been taken.
Larson, Gibbs, and their kin left Iowa and crossed the Canadian border, finally to stay in Winnipeg, Manitoba. Early in the morning of June 5, Gibbs and Gurnard re-entered the United States at Pembina, North Dakota, where they identified themselves, were found to be wanted by the Muncie Police Department, and were arrested. On June 16, Larson and Grueschow returned to the United States by bus, identified themselves, and were arrested by U.S. Customs agents at Blaine, Washington.
Gibbs, Larson, and Grueschow were tried for murder. Grueschow was acquitted; Gibbs was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter, and Larson was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
Included in evidence presented to the jury were four color photographs showing Buffin's body as it was found at the scene of the crime, a thirty-five minute videotape of the scene of the crime, including Buffin's body, and twenty-six color slides depicting salient points in the autopsy of Buffin.
Additionally, the customs officers who first detained the defendants in Washington and North Dakota testified as to how they came to detain Gibbs, Larson, Grueschow, and Gurnard, including the inquiries they made to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) computer, and the responses obtained from NCIC. Howard Lamphere, another son of Larson, who resides in Seattle, Washington, recounted two telephone conversations he had with Larson and Grueschow toward the end of May, in which Larson told him that they had been involved in a stabbing in Muncie. The children, Brent and Gina Larson and Bryan Jarvis, all testified as witnesses for the State. All three defendants testified in their own behalf.
Before trial, all defendants moved for individual trials. These motions were renewed at each stage of the proceedings, and were uniformly denied.
The issues presented by the two defendants are identical. Recast and ordered for more convenient resolution, they are:
1. Was the evidence sufficient to overcome the defendants' motions for directed verdicts and to sustain the verdict?
2. Did the trial court err in admitting the videotape, photographs, and slides, all depicting Buffin's body at the house and during the autopsy?
3. Did the court err in refusing the defendants' claim of privilege against the testimony of the children, Brent and Gina Larson and Bryan Jarvis?
4. Was the testimony of Howard Lamphere impermissible hearsay, did the court err in permitting the prosecutor to impeach Lamphere out of the hearing of the jury, and did the trial court mishandle certain defense motions made in relation to Lamphere's testimony?
5. Did the trial court err in permitting customs officer Howe of Pembina, North Dakota to testify as to the information he had obtained from NCIC, and his reaction to that information?
6. Did the trial court err in excluding defendant's exhibit one, Buffin's wallet?
7. Did the trial court err in refusing the defendants' motions for separate trial?
ISSUE ONE Was the evidence sufficient to overcome the defendants' motions for directed verdicts and to sustain the verdict?
PARTIES' CONTENTIONS The defendants made various motions for dismissal and for judgment on the evidence at various times during the trial, and on appeal they urge error in the denial of those motions; they also assert that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the judgment. These assertions amount to a single issue, since all turn on whether the record discloses evidence of probative value from which the jury could reasonably have inferred that the defendants were guilty. Smith v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 401, 260 N.E.2d 558.
For his own part, Gibbs contends that the evidence shows only that he was engaged in a fist fight with Buffin, which was not lethal behavior. He argues that his sister bears sole responsibility for Buffin's death. He acknowledges that after Buffin was killed, he fled the country along with the rest of his family; but he urges that guilty knowledge is not the only inference to be drawn from such behavior.
CONCLUSION Both convictions were supported by sufficient evidence.
The record unmistakably supports the jury's finding that Arlene Larson was guilty of voluntary manslaughter. We are not permitted to re-weigh the evidence, or to discount any evidence favorable to the verdict. James v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 384, 354 N.E.2d 236. The evidence shows that while her brother and a stranger were fighting in her home, Larson became distraught, obtained a knife from the kitchen, and drove the knife into the back of James Buffin with sufficient force and effectiveness to indicate an intent to kill. Such a knowing or intentional homicide while under sudden heat constitutes voluntary manslaughter. I.C. 35-42-1-3.
Gibbs was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, which is defined thus: "A person who kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit ... battery ... commits involuntary manslaughter, a class C felony." I.C. 35-42-1-4. In essence, Gibbs argues that he cannot be convicted of killing another human being merely because Buffin died while Gibbs was battering him. Gibbs says further that he cannot be convicted as a principal in the death of James Buffin as the evidence at trial points inexorably to the conclusion that Buffin died of a stab wound to the back, and that Arlene Larson alone delivered the fatal blow. Homicide is an element of involuntary manslaughter, and in order to prove homicide, the State must show that the defendant caused an injury to the decedent contributing mediately or immediately to the decedent's death. Reed v. State, (1979) Ind.App., 387 N.E.2d 82, 84, and cases cited therein.
It remains, then, for us to determine whether the evidence supports the conclusion that Gibbs aided Larson in killing Buffin. "A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense ...." IC 35-41-2-4. To be sure, Gibbs was charged with murder, IC 35-42-1-1, and not with aiding. The previous statute IC 35-1-29-1, provided that an aider might "be tried and convicted in the same manner as if he were a principal," which meant that one who was charged as a principal could be convicted as an accessory. E. g. Abrams v. State, (1980) Ind., 403 N.E.2d 345. We have found no discussion of this point under current law, but note that IC 35-41-2-4 provides that one who aids in the commission of an offense commits the offense itself; "aiding" is not a separate offense, but is merely one method of committing an offense. Therefore, a charge of murder, for instance, can still be proved by showing that the defendant aided another in committing murder.
The accessory statute requires that, to be guilty as an accessory, one must:
1. a) knowingly or b) intentionally
2. a) aid or b) induce or c) cause
3. another to commit an offense.
Assuming Gibbs's conviction for involuntary manslaughter was founded on his being an accessory, it follows...
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