Gibeau v. Mayo
| Citation | 280 Minn. 170,158 N.W.2d 589 |
| Decision Date | 26 April 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 40759,40759 |
| Parties | Charles GIBEAU, as trustee for heirs of Jean Delores Mayo, decedent, Appellant, v. James MAYO and Arthur C. Jenner, dba Jenner Auto Salvage, Respondents. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
Syllabus by the Court
The question of ownership of an automobile involved in an accident in which plaintiff's decedent met her death is a question of fact where the evidence is conflicting and not conclusive as a matter of law. Determination that title passed from the seller to the buyer-driver prior to the accident turned largely upon the jury's assessment of the relative credibility of witnesses and, having been approved by the trial court, is entitled to be upheld on appeal.
Spellacy, Spellacy & Lano, Grand Rapids, for appellant.
Murphy & Kalar, Grand Rapids, Paul M. Shaw, Deer River, for respondents.
Plaintiff appeals from an order denying an alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
This action was brought to recover damages for the death of Jean Mayo caused by injuries she sustained when a 1961 Pontiac driven at high speed by her husband, defendant James Mayo, missed a curve and left a highway a short distance north of Grand Rapids, Minnesota. The accident occurred on August 8, 1965, 39 days after Mr. and Mrs. Mayo's marriage. This action was instituted by decedent's former husband as trustee for the benefit of the three young children of their marriage, who were living with defendant Mayo and their mother (decedent) at the time of her death. Arthur C. Jenner, a licensed used-car dealer and operator of a salvage yard, was joined as defendant upon plaintiff's claim that he was the owner of the Pontiac which Mayo was permitted to drive while he was negotiating its purchase.
The evidence leaves no doubt that the court was fully justified in finding as a matter of law that defendant Mayo's negligence in operating the automobile caused the accident. Since it was undisputed that, if Jenner owned the Pontiac, Mayo was driving it with his consent, 1 the only questions submitted to the jury on the issue of liability were the ownership of the Pontiac and assumption of risk by decedent. Upon clear instructions pertaining to the question of ownership, alternative general verdicts were submitted permitting the jury to find against Mayo alone or against both defendants if Jenner were found to be the owner. The verdict returned read:
'We the jury in the above entitled action, find for the plaintiff and against defendant, James Mayo, and assess his damages in the sum of Twenty Thousand and no/100 ($20,000.00) Dollars.'
The only significant issue raised on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in not holding as a matter of law that on August 8, 1965, the time of the tragic accident, Jenner was the owner of the Pontiac. Plaintiff's claim is based upon the theory that the relevant evidence on this issue, when considered in conjunction with a policy of liberally construing the Safety Responsibility Act so as to effect ownership in a responsible party, requires this conclusion. He argues that it is 'more than coincidence' that in every case of this type the court has sustained findings of ownership in a dealer or other responsible person rather than in a purchaser. He maintains that these decisions are in furtherance of the policy of the Safety Responsibility Act to impose liability upon financially responsible parties for injuries to innocent third parties whenever it is possible to do so. While it is true that our prior decisions bespeak a liberal policy of suppressing the mischief sought to be avoided by the act referred to, we cannot agree that we are compelled by any decisions of this court to regard the issue of ownership on this record otherwise than as one of fact properly submitted to the jury for a finding either as rendered or against both defendants. It must be emphasized that plaintiff is the one who makes the affirmative claim that Jenner held title. Thus, the burden of proving ownership in Jenner was upon plaintiff. Our refusal to upset the finding made does not result in any deviation from the policy underlying the Safety Responsibility Act, because upon this record it is evident that the jury could have concluded that plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of persuasion upon a disputed fact issue. The evidence was conflicting, not conclusive, and was adequate to support the jury's finding--clearly implicit in the verdict returned--that title has passed from Jenner to Mayo prior to the accident.
The rules governing the transfer of title to an automobile are set out in two recent decisions relied upon by plaintiff and need not be restated. 2 It is sufficient to note that in general, as the court in substance instructed the jury, title passes from the seller to the buyer when the parties themselves intend it to pass and, in ascertaining such intention, 'regard shall be had to the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties, usages of trade and the circumstances of the case.' 3 Title may pass even though the time of payment be postponed.
While there is very little dispute as to the conduct of the parties, the testimony is in irreconcilable conflict concerning their intentions. In July of 1965, shortly after his marriage to decedent, Mayo began to work for Jenner and soon thereafter became interested in buying the Pontiac, which he was thereupon permitted to use without restrictions. Jenner, at this time admittedly the owner, acquired the Pontiac on a trade, and the previous owner merely signed the title card in blank (his signature being unacknowledged under oath) pending resale by Jenner. The Pontiac had a retail value of about $1,200, but Jenner and Mayo negotiated a price of $1,000. Jenner believed he had the car 'mortgaged on a floor plan' but learned this was not correct after the accident. Mayo could not pay cash, and initially Jenner agreed to finance $200 of the price on weekly payments of $10...
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