Gibson Brands, Inc. v. Armadillo Distribution Enters.
| Decision Date | 06 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 4:19-cv-00358 |
| Parties | GIBSON BRANDS, INC., Plaintiff, v. ARMADILLO DISTRIBUTION ENTERPRISES, INC. and CONCORDIA INVESTMENT PARTNERS, LLC, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Pending before the Court is Defendants' Omnibus Posttrial Motion for Relief (Dkt. #561). Having considered the motion and relevant pleadings, the Court finds that Defendants' Omnibus Posttrial Motion for Relief (Dkt. #561) should be DENIED.
Plaintiff Gibson Brands, Inc. (“Gibson”) sued Defendants Armadillo Distribution Enterprises, Inc. (“Armadillo”) and Concordia Investment Partners LLC (“Concordia”) for trademark infringement. Gibson requested monetary damages and a permanent injunction that Armadillo and Concordia be barred from offering their DEAN V guitar, DEAN Z guitar, DEAN Gran Sport guitar, LUNA Athena 501 guitar, DEAN Evo Headstock, and LUNA Fauna Hummingbird products.
The case proceeded to trial on May 16, 2022. Gibson alleged that Armadillo infringed the following Gibson trademarks: the Flying V Body Shape (U.S. Reg. No. 2051790), the Explorer Body Shape (U.S. Reg. No. 2053805), the SG Body Shape (U.S Reg. No. 2215791), the ES Body Shape (Supp. U.S. Reg. No 2007277), the Dove Wing Headstock Shape (U.S. Reg. No 1020485), the HUMMINGBIRD word mark (U.S. Reg. No. 1931670), and the FLYING V word mark (U.S. Reg. No. 1216644) (collectively, the “Gibson Trademarks”). Gibson asserted claims for trademark infringement and counterfeiting under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a), along with infringement under Texas common law. Gibson also asserted a claim for contributory trademark infringement under the Lanham Act against Concordia.
Armadillo and Concordia denied all of Gibson's claims. Armadillo and Concordia also raised the affirmative defense of laches, asserting that all of Gibson's claims and requested relief were barred in their entirety based on Gibson's excessive and inexcusable delay, which caused Armadillo and Concordia substantial economic and evidentiary prejudice. Additionally, Armadillo and Concordia asserted counterclaims that the ES Body Shape Design, Explorer Body Shape Design, Flying V Body Shape Design, and SG Body Shape Design should be cancelled on the grounds that they are generic.[1]Before the case was submitted to the jury, Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law on several grounds, including that (1) Gibson's claims were barred by laches; (2) Gibson's guitar shapes were unprotectable trademarks because they were generic designs; (3) Gibson's infringement and unfair competition claims were unsupported by adequate evidence because the products differed and there was no likelihood of confusion; (4) Concordia could not be held contributorily liable; and (5) Gibson could not sustain a counterfeiting claim when Armadillo did not use an identical trademark (Dkt. #524 at pp. 2129-32). The Court denied the motion and submitted Gibson's claims to the jury (Dkt. #524 at p. 2132).
The jury returned its verdict on May 27, 2022. The jury found that Armadillo infringed all of the Gibson Trademarks with the exception of the FLYING V word mark, and it found for Gibson on the cancellation counterclaims raised by Defendants. In addition to trademark infringement, the jury found that Armadillo sold or marketed a counterfeit of the following Gibson Trademarks: the Flying V Body Shape, the Explorer Body Shape, the SG Body Shape, and the HUMMINGBIRD word mark. The jury found that Concordia contributed to Armadillo's infringement of the Gibson Trademarks-except for the Flying V Body Shape. However, for the Flying V Body Shape, the Explorer Body Shape, and the Dove Wing Headstock shape, the jury found Gibson inexcusably delayed in asserting its trademark rights, thereby causing undue prejudice to both Armadillo and Concordia. In addition to finding for Defendants on their laches defense for these three shapes, the jury also found that neither Armadillo nor Concordia ever had unclean hands. The jury awarded Gibson $4,000 in statutory damages for its affirmative finding on the counterfeit claim but did not find that Gibson suffered actual damages due to Armadillo's infringement.
On July 28, 2022, the Court entered its Final Judgment, which contained a permanent injunction against both Defendants (Dkt. #547).[2]In relevant part, the injunction states:
(Dkt. #547).
On August 25, 2022, Defendants filed the pending motion, asking for relief on various grounds (Dkt. #561). Defendants request that (1) judgment be entered as a matter of law on Gibson's claims; (2) a new trial be granted in this case; and (3) that the Court alter or amend the Final Judgment. Gibson responded on September 15, 2022 (Dkt. #582). On September 29, 2022, Defendants filed their reply (Dkt. #595), and Gibson provided a sur-reply on October 6, 2022 (Dkt. #599).
Upon a party's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law following a jury verdict, the Court should properly ask whether “the state of proof is such that reasonable and impartial minds could reach the conclusion the jury expressed in its verdict.” Am. Home Assurance Co. v. United Space All., 378 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2004); FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). “A JMOL may only be granted when, ‘viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the court believes that reasonable jurors could not arrive at any contrary conclusion.'” Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Dresser-Rand Co. v. Virtual Automation, Inc., 361 F.3d 831, 838 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Under Fifth Circuit law, a court should be “especially deferential” to a jury's verdict and must not reverse the jury's findings unless substantial evidence does not support the findings. Baisden v. I'm Ready Prods., Inc., 693 F.3d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence is defined as evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions.” Threlkeld v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 211 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 2000). A motion for judgment as a matter of law must be denied “unless the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in the movant's favor that reasonable jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion.” Baisden, 693 F.3d at 498 (citation omitted). However, “[t]here must be more than a mere scintilla of evidence in the record to prevent judgment as a matter of law in favor of the movant.” Arismendez v. Nightingale Home Health Care, Inc., 493 F.3d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 2007).
In evaluating a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a court must “draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict and cannot substitute other inferences that [the court] might regard as more reasonable.” E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Further, “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). “[T]he court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that ‘evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that the evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.'” Id. at 151 (citation omitted).
Under Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a new trial can be granted to any party to a jury trial on any or all issues “for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). “A new trial may be granted, for example, if the district court finds the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages awarded are excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in its course.” Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985). However, Fed.R.Civ.P. 61.
To be entitled to a new trial, the movant must show that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, not merely against the preponderance of the evidence. Taylor v. Seton Healthcare, No. A-10-CV-650, WL 2396880, at *2 (W.D. Tex. June 22, 2012) (citing DresserRand Co. 361 F.3d at 838-39); Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 930 (5th Cir. 1982)). A jury verdict is entitled to great deference. Dresser-Rand Co., 361 F.3d at 838. “Weighing the conflicting evidence and the inferences to be drawn from that evidence, and determining...
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