Gibson v. Alford
| Citation | 132 S.E. 442,161 Ga. 672 |
| Decision Date | 10 February 1926 |
| Docket Number | 4716. |
| Parties | GIBSON v. ALFORD et al. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Rehearing Denied Feb. 24, 1926.
Syllabus by the Court.
The contract between the plaintiff and the defendant Alford is one of bargain and sale, and not one of lease.
Subject to a sufficient showing of mutual mistake, or mistake on one side and fraud on the other, when it appears that a contract of sale was made with reference to a certain designated tract of land, reformation will be decreed of the misdescription in such contract, when it includes more land than ought to be included, or contains less land than the parties agreed upon.
(a) A court of equity will reform a contract of sale of land, when from mutual mistake the contract as written does not express the true agreement of the parties.
(b) Equity will also reform an instrument when there is ignorance or mistake on one side and fraud on the other.
(c) Where a vendor agrees to sell a designated tract of land to another and points out to the latter its boundaries, and the purchaser relies upon the representations of the vendor as to the boundaries, and where such boundaries include lands to which the vendor has no title, in consequence of which the purchaser loses the same, the purchaser, when sued on notes given for the purchase money, can set off at law the value of the portion of the land so lost against the purchase money. This would be true whether the misrepresentations were designedly made by the vendor to deceive the purchaser, or were innocently made, if the vendee relied upon such misrepresentations in making the purchase and was thereby damaged.
(d) But this right will not prevent the purchaser from having the instrument reformed, if he wishes to assert his full rights under the contract when reformed.
In his answer, the defendant alleged that, not knowing the lines or boundaries of the tract of land, he called on the plaintiff to point out the lines, and that said lines were pointed out to him by the agent of the plaintiff. The plaintiff demurred specially to this allegation, upon the ground that the name of said agent was not given. This allegation was open to this special demurrer; but the defendant by an appropriate amendment gave this information. For this reason the court did not err in overruling this ground of special demurrer.
Where the answer alleged that the plaintiff had previously contracted in writing to sell to the defendant and another person this designated tract of land, and had pointed out to the defendant its boundaries, and that thereafter the plaintiff executed her bond for title to such purchasers, and again pointed out the boundaries of the tract, and that subsequently said bond for title was canceled by the defendant, he having become the sole holder of said bond under an assignment to him of the interest of his copurchaser therein, and that the contract sued on was executed in lieu of such canceled bond for title, and was intended to convey the tract designated in the aforesaid contract of purchase and bond for title, such allegation as to the previous pointing out of these boundaries to the defendant was not open to a special demurrer based upon the ground that these previous representations were irrelevant.
Where a party who is entitled to rescind a contract on ground of fraud or false representations, and who has full knowledge of the material circumstances of the case, freely and advisedly does anything which amounts to a recognition of the transaction, or acts in a manner inconsistent with a repudiation of the contract, such conduct amounts to acquiescence, and, though originally impeachable, the contract becomes unimpeachable in equity. If a party to a contract seeks to avoid it on the ground of fraud or mistake he must, upon discovery of the facts, at once announce his purpose and adhere to it; otherwise he cannot avoid or rescind such contract.
The court having erred in overruling the demurrer to the portions of the answer seeking to rescind the contract sued upon, the subsequent trial was nugatory; and it becomes unnecessary to deal with the errors alleged to have been committed during the progress of the trial.
Error from Superior Court, Floyd County; Nathan Harris, Judge pro hac vice.
Suit by Mrs. M. G. Gibson against P. E. Alford and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed.
In vendor's suit for breach of contract to purchase land where answer alleged that vendor had previously contracted to sell the land to defendant and another, and had pointed out boundaries to them, and thereafter executed bond for title to them, again pointing out the boundaries, and subsequently bond was canceled by defendant as sole holder thereof, and that contract sued on was intended to convey land designated in former contract, allegation as to previous pointing out of boundaries, was not open to special demurrer because previous representations were irrelevant.
On October 10, 1923, Mrs. Gibson brought suit against P. E Alford for breach of contract. The pertinent portions of the contract on which the plaintiff sued are as follows: The contract is dated January 11, 1923, and is between Mrs Gibson, party of the first part, and P.E. alford, party of the second part. By it Mrs. Gibson rents and leases unto P. E. Alford for a period of four years "*** that farm in the county of Floyd and state of Georgia on the Etowah river at Bass' Ferry, known as the Hurt farm." Then follows a minute description of the land:
In her petition the plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to clear and have ready for cultivation, by September 15, 1923, all the lands embraced in said contract from which the timber had been cut prior to its date, and that, in consequence of his default, the title to his interest in all crops grown on said lands became her property. She alleged that the crops were fast maturing, and would be gathered and the rents turned over to the defendant. She prayed that the defendant be enjoined from collecting any of the rents; that a receiver be appointed to collect and hold the rents until the final order; that an accounting be had with the defendant; that she have judgment for such sum as may be found due her on account of the rents already paid for the year 1923; and that she have such other relief as may be meet and proper in the premises.
To this suit the defendant filed his answer on December 8, 1923. He alleged that the transaction out of which said contract arose was as follows:
On April 7, 1920, the defendant and F. L. Alford entered into a contract by which the plaintiff agreed to sell to them the lands set forth in said contract. The defendant, not knowing the lines of said land, called upon her to point them out. Said lines were pointed out to him by the agent of the plaintiff, and he went into possession of said lands so pointed out to him. He had no means of ascertaining the true boundary lines of this property. He relied upon the assurance of the plaintiff and her agent that the lines pointed out were the true boundaries of the property, and represented the lines referred to in said contract. On May 8, 1920, in pursuance of said agreement of purchase, a bond for title was executed and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant and F. L. Alford, conditioned to convey the lands so described upon the payment of certain sums of money therein stipulated. F. L. Alford thereafter transferred and assigned his interest in the premises to the defendant, and he took possession thereof. Thereafter he agreed to cancel said bond for title, which was done, and the contract involved in this case was executed and delivered in lieu thereof. Thereafter a suit was instituted by one Mrs. Ellis against him, and he was dispossessed from a portion of said lands, consisting of 110 acres, more or less. Upon an examination of the title to said lands, it was found that the plaintiff had no title to this portion, which was within the boundaries so pointed out to him, and which comprised a part of the lands of which the plaintiff was in possession, and which was pointed out to the defendant as being a part of the land covered by said original contract of purchase, said bond for title, and the contract now in existence.
The defendant cut and removed valuable timber from said 110 acres, and accounted to the plaintiff for the proceeds thereof. Plaintiff demanded from him an accounting for the proceeds of all timber cut on said land, and exercised...
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Construction Law - Brian J. Morrissey and Timothy N. Toler
...Ga. 276, 518 S.E.2d 674 (1999). 50. Id. at 277, 518 S.E.2d at 675. 51. Id. at 278, 518 S.E.2d at 675. 52. Id. (citing Gibson v. Alford, 161 Ga. 672, 685, 132 S.E. 442, 448 (1925)). 53. Id., 518 S.E.2d at 676. 54. Id. at 277, 518 S.E.2d at 675. 55. Id. 56. Id. at 278, 518 S.E.2d at 676. 57. ......