Gibson v. Capano
Decision Date | 22 July 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 15514,15514 |
Citation | 699 A.2d 68,241 Conn. 725 |
Parties | Charles G. GIBSON et al., v. John CAPANO et al. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Edward J. Holahan Jr., with whom, on the brief was Kevin J. Gumpper, Fairfield, for appellants (plaintiffs).
Alan R. Spirer, Westport, for appellees (named defendant et al.).
Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT and KATZ, JJ.
This appeal arises from a claim of innocent misrepresentation by the plaintiffs, Charles G. Gibson and Louis Gibson, against the defendants, John Capano and Maria Capano, in connection with the purchase of certain real property located in Norwalk. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment for the plaintiffs on the innocent misrepresentation claim and granted the plaintiffs' petition for certification limited to review of the following question: "In order to impose liability on a seller of real estate for innocent misrepresentation, is specialized knowledge by the seller required?" Gibson v. Capano, 239 Conn. 902, 682 A.2d 1000 (1996). We conclude that we need not address the certified question because we affirm the judgment the Appellate Court upon alternate grounds.
The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant facts that the jury reasonably could have found. 1 Gibson v. Capano, 41 Conn.App. 548, 549-50, 676 A.2d 896 (1996).
The parties signed a contract for the purchase of the property dated January 5, 1987, which provided in part: "The Buyer further agrees that he has examined the premises and that he is fully satisfied with the physical condition thereof and that neither the Seller, nor any representative of the Seller has made any representation upon which the Buyer relies with respect to the condition of the property covered by this agreement, except as hereinbefore expressly set forth." The contract further provided:
The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court claiming, inter alia, 2 that the trial court improperly had denied their motion for a directed verdict regarding the claim of innocent misrepresentation. Id., at 549, 676 A.2d 896. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that the defendants' motion for a directed verdict on the innocent misrepresentation claim should have been granted "because the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence that the defendants possessed a specialized knowledge of termite detection or determining termite damage or the use of pest control chemicals." Id., at 554, 676 A.2d 896. 3 This certified appeal followed.
As a preliminary matter, we note that "[w]hile [t]he only issues we need consider [on appeal] are those squarely raised by the petition for certification, we have recognized that an appellee, in accordance with Practice Book § 3012(a) (now § 4013[a] ), may present alternat[e] grounds upon which the judgment may be affirmed...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hodge, 201 Conn. 379, 382-83, 517 A.2d 621 (1986); see Practice Book § 4140. Accordingly, "we are not limited to the issues presented in the petition if the judgment of the Appellate Court may be affirmed on some other ground...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rametta v. Stella, 214 Conn. 484, 491 n. 6, 572 A.2d 978 (1990). The defendants submit as an alternate ground for affirmance that the contract for the sale of the real property specifically disclaimed any claim of reliance by the plaintiffs on representations made by the defendants that were not contained in the contract. Because we agree with the defendants that the contract language is dispositive of the plaintiffs' claim, we refrain from reaching the certified question.
In Connecticut, a claim of "innocent misrepresentation ... is based on principles of warranty, and ... is not confined to contracts for the sale of goods." Johnson v. Healy, 176 Conn. 97, 102, 405 A.2d 54 (1978); see also Richard v. A. Waldman & Sons, Inc., 155 Conn. 343, 347, 232 A.2d 307 (1967); E. & F. Construction Co. v. Stamford, 114 Conn. 250, 259-60, 158 A. 551 (1932). A person is subject to liability for an innocent misrepresentation if "in a sale, rental or exchange transaction with another, [he or she] makes a representation of a material fact for the purpose of inducing the other to act or to refrain from acting in reliance upon it ... even though it is not made fraudulently or negligently." 3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 552C (1977). We have held that an innocent misrepresentation is "actionable, even though there [is] no allegation of fraud or bad faith, because it [is] false and misleading, in analogy to the right of a vendee to elect to retain goods which are not as warranted, and to recover damages for the breach of warranty...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Healy, supra, at 101, 405 A.2d 54.
Our resolution of the plaintiffs' innocent misrepresentation claim, however, is guided by the general principles governing the construction of contracts. Holly Hill Holdings v. Lowman, 226 Conn. 748, 755-56, 628 A.2d 1298 (1993).
Parties are free to bargain for disclaimer clauses in a contract for the sale of real property. Id. We have held that Holly Hill Holdings v. Lowman, supra, 226 Conn. at 756, 628 A.2d 1298. In addition, in the absence of a claim of mistake, fraud or unconscionability, a clause disclaiming reliance by the buyer on the seller's representations is a valid contract term. See 2 Restatement (Second), Contracts § 196, comment (a) (1981); 4 12 S. Williston, Contracts (3d Ed.1970) § 1511, p. 467 ().
With these principles in mind, we proceed to analyze the plaintiffs' innocent misrepresentation claim in light of the terms of the contract for the sale of the property. Paragraph six of the contract provides in part that "neither the Seller, nor any representative of the Seller has made any representation upon which the...
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...A.2d 1313 (1996) (contracts must be enforced as drafted, not enforced to relieve party from difficulties); see also Gibson v. Capano, 241 Conn. 725, 732, 699 A.2d 68 (1997) (courts do not rewrite contracts for parties). This principle is at its apogee where both the language of the contract......
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