Gibson v. Henderson
Decision Date | 21 September 1984 |
Citation | 459 So.2d 845 |
Parties | Vera Long GIBSON, Administratrix of the Estate of Bob Carl Long v. Patricia E. HENDERSON. 82-1186. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Michael S. Ballard, Birmingham, for appellant.
Thomas H. Brown and Kaye K. Houser of Sirote, Permutt, Friend, Friedman, Held & Apolinsky, Birmingham, for appellee.
This case arose from the following facts:
Bob Carl Long, the deceased insured in this case, was a retired employee of the Singer Company. While an employee, he took a $22,000 life insurance policy through that company under a group plan with Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, designating his mother, Eva Louise Long, as the beneficiary.
Eva Louise Long died in March of 1980. Thereafter, on June 15, 1980, Bob Long executed a change of beneficiary form of the kind approved by Metropolitan for such purposes. The form designated Patricia E. Henderson as the beneficiary. Although Long filled in and signed the change of beneficiary form and also had it witnessed by his aunt, the plaintiff Vera Gibson, he neither mailed nor otherwise delivered the form to his employer or the insurance company.
Bob Long died on September 5, 1981, fifteen months after executing the change of beneficiary form. The following day, Patricia Henderson, her nephew Jerry Cornelius, and two cousins of the deceased, James D. Long and Jane Frierson, went through his personal effects, looking for a will. A carbon copy of the change of beneficiary form was found in a drawer in Long's desk at his home. Later, the original was also found in the desk. James Long delivered the form to the plaintiff Vera Gibson. Patricia Henderson subsequently requested and received the form from Gibson and thereafter mailed it to the Singer Company.
Metropolitan delayed payment of the proceeds of the insurance policy because of its inability to determine the proper beneficiary under the contract. Patricia Henderson claimed she was entitled to the proceeds as she was the named beneficiary. Vera Gibson claimed the proceeds under the following language in the policy:
Gibson claimed that because the original beneficiary under the policy had died and the change of beneficiary form had not been delivered to the Singer Company either by Bob Long or by someone else acting under his direction, there was no named beneficiary, and Long's estate was the proper recipient of the policy proceeds.
Vera Gibson filed suit on August 16, 1982, naming Henderson and Metropolitan as defendants, and seeking a declaration that Bob Long's estate was entitled to the insurance proceeds. Henderson filed her answer, with a counterclaim and a cross-claim, on September 15, 1982, asserting that the change of beneficiary form was valid even though it was mailed to the Singer Company after Bob Long's death. Metropolitan filed its answer, with a counterclaim and cross-claim for interpleader, on October 29, 1982, seeking to interplead the insurance proceeds into the court. Metropolitan tendered to the court the sum of $23,754.42, which represented the value of the policy plus interest to that date.
Henderson and Gibson each moved for summary judgment, and Metropolitan moved for its discharge from the case. On August 5, 1983, final judgment was entered in the case. The court found that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that Patricia Henderson was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court denied plaintiff Gibson's motion for summary judgment and granted Metropolitan the right to interplead and be discharged. Gibson appealed. We reverse and remand.
Gibson asserts on appeal that the lower court erred in granting Henderson's motion for summary judgment because, based on the undisputed facts in the record, Bob Long had not substantially complied with the policy requirements for changing beneficiaries. This failure to substantially comply, Gibson says, rendered the attempted change of beneficiary ineffective so that Long died with no named beneficiary of his life insurance. Gibson asserts that the policy proceeds rightfully belong to Long's estate and that the grant of summary judgment for Henderson was error.
The issue on this appeal from the summary judgment is whether the evidence adduced in support of Henderson's motion for summary judgment showed conclusively that Bob Long had effected a change of beneficiary of his life insurance policy in favor of Patricia Henderson.
Generally, the designation of the beneficiary of a life insurance policy is governed by the provisions of the policy itself. Williams v. Williams, 438 So.2d 735 (Ala.1983). The policy in this case provides for changes of beneficiary as follows:
Appellee Henderson argues that when Bob Long filled out the change of beneficiary form, signed it, and had Vera Gibson sign as a witness, he initiated the process of strict policy compliance and that that process became complete when the Singer Company ultimately received the form. Henderson states that even though Long neither mailed nor delivered the form to his former employer, the change was nevertheless effective because the policy provides that when the form is received by the employer, the change will relate back and take effect as of the date of the form's execution, whether or not the insured is still alive at that time. In other words, even though Patricia Henderson mailed the form to the Singer Company after Long's death and fifteen months after the form was executed, she says the change of beneficiary is valid.
Appellant Gibson asserts that under the policy language, the employee himself must give notice of a change of beneficiary by mailing or otherwise delivering the form to his employer, and that the relation back provision applies when the insured puts the form in the mail or otherwise sets in motion the form's delivery to the employer, and subsequently dies before the employer receives the form. She agrees that under the policy language the change was to be effective as of the date the form was executed and not the date of receipt of the form by the employer, but says this was true only when the insured himself had initiated the transit of the form.
There are no Alabama cases exactly on point. However, the treatises are instructive, as are cases from other jurisdictions. In 5 Couch on Insurance 2d, we find the following:
5 Couch on Insurance 2d § 28:65 (1960).
5 Couch on Insurance 2d § 28:68 (1960).
"When the insured has done some acts with the object of changing the beneficiary but these acts fall short of mailing or sending a formal application for change to the insurer, it is generally held that no change of beneficiary is effected, the theory being that in the absence of any excusing circumstances, the insured has not done everything in his power to effect a change."
5 Couch on Insurance 2d § 28:76 (1960).
Another prominent treatise, 2 Appleman Insurance Law & Practice, on the issue of compliance regarding changing the beneficiary, states:
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