Gibson v. Imperial Council of Order of United Friends

• Decision Date: 21 May 1897
• Citation: 47 N.E. 101,168 Mass. 391
• Parties: GIBSON v. IMPERIAL COUNCIL OF ORDER OF UNITED FRIENDS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

168 Mass. 391

47 N.E. 101

GIBSON v. IMPERIAL COUNCIL OF ORDER OF UNITED FRIENDS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 21, 1897

COUNSEL

Linius M. Child, for plaintiff.

Hollis R. Bailey and D.F. Kimball, for defendant Mary E. Southwick.

OPINION

FIELD C.J.

As the association is ready to pay the sum of money named in the benefit certificate to the person whom the court shall adjudge to be entitled to it, the principal question is whether or not Mary E. Southwick, the beneficiary designated in the certificate, is entitled to it. Mary E. Southwick is a stranger in blood to Emma L. Gibson, and was not dependent upon her. The association is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New York, and had a place of business in Massachusetts, and Mary E. Southwick was and is a resident of Massachusetts. The certificate was issued on December 15, 1882, in Massachusetts, to Emma L. Gibson, who was a resident of Massachusetts. The justice who heard the case has found as a fact that the designation of Mary E. Southwick as the person to whom the sum should be paid on the death of Emma L. Gibson "was valid by New York law, and under the laws of the corporation"; and this is, in effect, admitted. The contention is that as, at the time when the certificate was issued, such a designation in the certificate of a Massachusetts fraternal benefit association was invalid, the same law governs in this case as the certificate was issued in Massachusetts to a resident citizen thereof. Pub.St. c. 115, § 8. The association on October 17, 1888, appointed the insurance commissioner of this commonwealth its attorney upon whom all processes might be served, pursuant to St.1888, c. 429, § 13; and it made reports to the insurance commissioner annually, "with a few omissions," as required by sections 11, 12 Id. We are of opinion that the question of law raised in this case was, in effect, decided in United Order of the Golden Cross v. Merrick, 165 Mass. 421, 43 N.E. 127.

It is contended by the plaintiff's counsel that the association was authorized under the laws of New York to do what is considered in Massachusetts an accident and life insurance business, as well as the business done by fraternal benefit associations, and that the contract shown in this case is one of life insurance. But, even if this certificate should be regarded as a policy of life insurance, the contract was valid at the...