Gibson v. Indus. Bank Of Wash.
| Decision Date | 18 February 1944 |
| Docket Number | No. 157.,157. |
| Citation | 36 A.2d 62 |
| Parties | GIBSON v. INDUSTRIAL BANK OF WASHINGTON et al. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from The Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Division.
Separate actions by Dolly Gibson and by Herman J. Gibson against Industrial Bank of Washington to recover money originally deposited by Robert Gibson, deceased. The actions were consolidated for trial. Judgments were entered for Dolly Gibson and against Herman J. Gibson, and Herman J. Gibson appeals.
Affirmed.
Maurice Friedman, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Charles H. Houston, of Washington, D. C., for appellee Industrial Bank of Washington.
Karl Kindleberger, of Washington, D. C., for appellee Dolly Gibson.
Before RICHARDSON, Chief Judge, and CAYTON and HOOD, Associate Judges.
At the death of Robert Gibson on May 22, 1942, there was a balance of $410.62 on deposit with appellee Bank in a savings account originally opened by him on September 1, 1939 in his own name. On November 17, 1941, the name of Herman J. Gibson, brother of Robert, had been added to the account. During the last illness of Robert, the name of his wife, Dolly Gibson, was added to the account. Shortly after Robert's death, his widow, Dolly, being in possession of the passbook, was permitted by the bank to withdraw the entire balance. She deposited this sum in her own account and made withdrawals against it until the balance in her account was reduced to $300.
Thereafter, apparently because of asserted claims of Herman, the bank refused to permit Dolly to draw further against her account. Thereupon, she brought action against the bank for $300. The bank answered that it was subject to the conflicting claims of Herman and Dolly, offered to pay the sum according to the judgment of the court, and asked for an order requiring Herman and Dolly to interplead. No order of interpleader was entered, but shortly thereafter Herman brought action against the bank for $410.62, the entire balance in the account at Robert's death. The two actions were consolidated for trial.
The cases were tried without a jury and judgment resulted in favor of Dolly in her action and against Herman in his action. Herman brought this appeal.
The showing made by Herman in support of his claim was that Robert originally had a savings account with the bank in the name of himself or his wife, but that due to some differences with his wife Robert opened savings account No. 7794-the account in issue-in his own name; that on November 17, 1941, approxmiately two years after the opening of the account, Robert visited Herman in Baltimore and had Herman sign a signature card for account No. 7794, and thereafter had the bank change its records to place the account in the names of Robert Gibson or Herman J. Gibson. By reason of this transaction Herman claimed that he became a joint depositor in the account with the right of survivorship at the death of his brother. He also attacked the validity of the transaction by which Dolly's name was added to the account and possession of the passbook obtained by her.
Thus, Herman's claim is based solely on the fact that approxmiately six months prior to the death of Robert, Herman's name was added to the savings account. It is conceded that the money in the account was deposited by Robert, that Herman never had possession of the passbook, and never withdrew any sum from the account or exercised or attempted to exercise any dominion over the account during the life of Robert. Examination of the exhibits shows that after November, 1941 the bank's ledger card and the passbook for the account recited that title to the account was in Robert Gibson or Herman J. Gibson, that the signature card for the account carried as authorized signatures the names of Robert Gibson and Herman J. Gibson with the notation ‘either may draw.’ This notation did not appear on either the ledger card or the passbook. The passbook contained rules and regulations regarding withdrawals, including one providing that the passbook must be presented to the bank whenever a withdrawal was made, and that possession of the passbook should be sufficient evidence of ownership to authorize the payment of money from the account. 1
In Garrett v. Keister, 61 App.D.C. 25, 56 F.2d 909, 910, the court said:
‘It is elementary that a joint tenancy may exist in personalty as well as in realty, and that a survivorship may exist in a bank account or in a special account where such is stipulated in the agreement of the parties.’
And in Quigley v. Quigley, 66 App.D.C. 134, 85 F.2d 300, where a building and loan association account read: ‘Marion K. Quigley or Mary E. Quigley pay to the order of either, at the death of either, balance to belong to survivor,’ the court said:
‘There is nothing in this case which would justify the court in invalidating this contract, which clearly expresses an intention on the part of the mother to establish a joint account, with the power in either party to withdraw part or all of the money at any time, and that upon the death of either the balance remaining in the account should belong to the survivor.’
In Matthew v. Moncrief, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 221, 135 F.2d 645, a building and loan account was placed in the names of two persons ‘as joint owners, subject to the order of either, with the balance at the death of either to the survivor.’ The court held that the words of the contract expressed a clear and unequivocal intention in the donor to make the donee a joint owner, with the right of survivorship, and that, in the absence of fraud or mistake, such intention must control and could not be altered by parol testimony.
In the last named case, the court said:
In the present case appellant's name was merely appended to the account, and it cannot be said that there was a contract or writing which clearly expressed an intention on the part of Robert Gibson to establish a joint account with the right of survivorship. 2 Accordingly, this case comes within the language of Matthew v. Moncrief and required extrinsic or parol explanation of the intention of Robert Gibson when he added the name of appellant to the account. 3 The word ‘joint’ was not used; there was merely the appending of the words ‘or Herman J. Gibson.’ The account was completely silent as to right of survivorship.
The only evidence of the intention of Robert Gibson is hart given by his brother, the appellant. He testified that when Robert came to see him in Baltimore, and had him sign the signature card he stated that it was ‘so that he (Herman) could get his money if he (Robert) died.’
The evidence, we think, clearly and overwhelmingly supports the finding of the trial court that Robert had...
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