Gibson v. Metro Community Care Home Inc., No. W2008-02417-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 12/15/2009)
| Decision Date | 15 December 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. W2008-02417-COA-R3-CV.,W2008-02417-COA-R3-CV. |
| Parties | LaFRANCINE GIBSON, as Surviving Relative and Next Friend of GEORGIA JONES, Deceased, v. METRO COMMUNITY CARE HOME, INC., ET AL. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Les Jones, R. Porter Feild and Frank B. Thacher, III, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, LaFrancine Gibson.
Christopher S. Campbell and Michael F. Rafferty, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees, Yellow Cab Company.
Linda J. Mathis, Memphis, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Wassie W. Wassie.
David R. Farmer, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Alan E. Highers, P.J., W.S., and Holly M. Kirby, J., joined.
The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant common carrier, finding that Defendant had no notice that Decedent was mentally incapacitated and holding that Defendant had no duty to assess or probe Decedent in order to discover a latent or non-apparent psychological condition. We affirm.
This is an action for personal injury and wrongful death. Decedent Georgia Jones (Ms. Jones) was an 83-year old resident of Metro Community Care Home ("Metro Care"), an independent living facility located at 1328 Mississippi Boulevard in Memphis. Ms. Jones suffered from dementia and had a history of becoming disoriented and confused. On September 2, 2005, she was transported by ambulance from Metro Care to the Regional Medical Center at Memphis ("the Med") with complaints of abdominal and chest pain. A physical exam performed at the Med revealed that Ms. Jones was "not oriented to place/date/time." She was discharged on September 6. A licensed social worker, Eva Arnold (Ms. Arnold), an employee of the Med, was assigned to coordinate Ms. Jones' discharge.
Ms. Arnold called Yellow Cab Company ("Yellow Cab) to transport Ms. Jones back to Metro Care. Ms. Arnold provided Ms. Jones with a voucher, or third party payer slip, reciting 1328 Mississippi as Ms. Jones' destination and a charge of $7.80. Once inside the taxi, Ms. Jones instructed the cab driver, Mr. Wassie W. Wassie (Mr. Wassie), to take her to 662 Hollywood Street, where she once had lived. Ms. Jones told Mr. Wassie that she did not have a key to 1328 Mississippi; pointed to the house on Hollywood where she wanted to be delivered; and Ms. Jones exited the taxi and walked up to the front door of the home. Mr. Wassie watched Ms. Jones walk up to the front door and drove away after a child opened the front door. Ms. Jones was later found dead on the front porch of the home; the cause of death was determined to be cardiac arrest.
In May 2006, Plaintiff LaFrancine Gibson (Ms. Gibson), acting as Ms. Jones' surviving relative and next friend, filed a complaint for personal injury and wrongful death in the Circuit Court for Shelby County. Ms. Gibson named Metro Community Care Home, Inc.; Shelby County Health Care Corp.; Yellow Cab Company; Checker Cab Company of Memphis; and Dennis Blanker as Defendants. Dennis Blanker was voluntarily dismissed in August 2006, and Mr. Wassie was added as a Defendant by consent. The trial court entered a consent order dismissing Metro Care with prejudice in August 2008. In September 2008, the trial court entered a consent order of compromise, settlement and release as to Shelby County Health Care Corp. d/b/a the Med. Checker Cab also was dismissed by consent order.
Defendants Yellow Cab and Mr. Wassie moved for summary judgment in June 2008. In their motion, Defendants stated that, with respect to them, the lawsuit involved a dispute as to whether Ms. Jones' death was caused by the failure to deliver her to the Mississippi Boulevard address as opposed to the Hollywood address. In their statement of undisputed facts, they asserted that neither Ms. Arnold nor any other employee of the Med or of Metro Care informed Mr. Wassie of Ms. Jones' medical condition or mental capacity, or the lack thereof. They further referenced Mr. Wassie's deposition in support of their assertion that Ms. Jones did not appear confused. In her response, Ms. Gibson asserted that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Defendants "took all practical measures to care for Ms. Jones while in their transit." She asserted that Defendants did not exercise their utmost diligence, skill and foresight considering Ms. Jones' age and infirmity, and that a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether Defendants breached their heightened duty of care to Ms. Jones. Ms. Gibson contended that Defendants' own procedural guidelines required Mr. Wassie to check with the dispatcher before taking Ms. Jones to an address which differed from that on the voucher. She also asserted that Defendants had failed to affirmatively negate the element of proximate cause.
The trial court entered summary judgment in Defendants' favor September 23, 2008. In its order, the trial court stated that Defendants had no notice of Ms. Jones' mental incapacity and had "no duty to assess or probe Ms. Jones to learn of her latent or non-apparent psychological conditions." Ms. Gibson filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.
Ms. Gibson presents the following issues for our review:
1. Did the Lower Court err in defining the duty owed by a common carrier to its passenger?
2. Did the Lower Court err in finding that reasonable minds could not disagree as to whether Defendants breached the duty they owed to Georgia Jones and that Defendants were therefore entitled to summary judgment?
3. Should the trial court have found that Defendants' motion for summary judgment did not affirmatively negate the essential element of causation?
4. Should the trial court have found that reasonable minds could disagree as to whether Defendants' negligence was the proximate cause of injury and death to Georgia Jones?
We review a trial court's award of summary judgment de novo, with no presumption of correctness, reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Martin v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 271 S.W.3d 76, 84 (Tenn. 2008) (citations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate only where the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 83 (quoting Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citations omitted).
After the moving party has made a properly supported motion, the nonmoving party must establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. (citations omitted). To satisfy its burden, the nonmoving party may: (1) point to evidence of over-looked or disregarded material factual disputes; (2) rehabilitate evidence discredited by the moving party; (3) produce additional evidence that establishes the existence of a genuine issue for trial; or (4) submit an affidavit asserting the need for additional discovery pursuant to Rule 56.06 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. (citations omitted). The court must accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true, resolving any doubts regarding the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in that party's favor. Id. (citations omitted). A disputed fact that must be decided to resolve a substantive claim or defense is material, and it presents a genuine issue if it reasonably could be resolved in favor of either one party or the other. Id. (citations omitted).
The trial court in this case awarded summary judgment to Defendants upon determining that Defendants had no notice of Ms. Jones' mental infirmity and that they had no duty to independently assess or probe Ms. Jones in order to determine whether she was mentally competent to direct them to convey her to the Hollywood address rather than the address recited on the voucher. Duty is the first element that must be determined in an action for negligence. White v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County, 860 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)(citations omitted). Duty for the purposes of a negligence claim is the obligation recognized by the law to conform to a particular standard of care in order to protect against an unreasonable risk of harm to another. McClung v. Delta Square Ltd., 937 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tenn. 1996) "It is a reflection of society's contemporary policies and social requirements concerning the right of individuals and the general public to be protected from another's conduct." White, 860 S.W.2d at 51. The determination of the existence of a duty is a question of law. E.g., Draper v. Westerfield, 181 S.W.3d 283, 291 (Tenn. 2005)(citation omitted). We review the trial court's determinations on questions of law de novo, with no presumption of correctness. Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000). Once the court has determined that the defendant in a negligence action owes plaintiff a duty, the question of whether the defendant has breached his duty and thereby caused plaintiff's injury are matters to be determined by the finder of fact. Patterson-Khoury v. Wilson World Hotel-Cherry Road, 139 S.W.3d 281, 285 (Tenn. Ct. App 2003). With this standard of review in mind, we turn to whether the trial court erred by concluding that Defendants "had no duty to assess or probe Ms. Jones to learn of her latent or non-apparent psychological conditions."
In her brief to this Court, Ms. Gibson asserts, "[b]ecause the law recognizes a specific and heightened duty attaches to common carriers by...
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