Gibson v. Moore

• Decision Date: 01 January 1858
• Citation: 22 Tex. 611
• Parties: JAMES GIBSON v. R. J. MOORE AND WIFE.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

22 Tex. 611

JAMES GIBSON

v.R. J. MOORE AND WIFE.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1858.

Matter which constitutes a defense, of which a party may avail himself in a suit pending against him, cannot be made the ground for an injunction to restrain proceedings in such suit.

Want of jurisdiction in a justice to try an action of forcible entry and detainer, is not ground for an injunction to restrain the plaintiff from proceeding in the case. Ante, 65; 20 Tex. 476, 661;28 Tex. 159.

The distinction between equitable and legal titles and rights, as respects the forum, has no existence in our remedial system.

When, therefore, the subject matter is within the jurisdiction conferred by law upon a justice of the peace, it is his province to take cognizance of and decide the case, in favor of the party who has the right, whether it depend upon the one character of title or the other.

But the justice of the peace, because he is authorized to decide a question of right, depending upon an equitable title or defense, cannot therefore exercise the powers of a chancellor, or any of the extraordinary powers belonging exclusively to a court of chancery.

Where an injunction was improperly granted to stay proceedings in a case pending in a justice's court, on the ground that the party's defense was of an equitable character, and there was, in the petition, no other cause of action, to require that the case, upon the dissolution of the injunction, should stand over as an original bill, the injunction was properly dissolved, and the petition dismissed.

APPEAL from Lampasas. Tried below before the Hon. Ed. H. Vontress.

This was a suit by the appellant, against the appellees, praying for an injunction to restrain the appellees and the justice of the peace, from proceeding in a case instituted by the appellees against him, before the said justice, for an alleged unlawful detainer in respect to certain lands, which he alleged had been leased by him from the appellees. The appellant, in his petition, alleged that his defense to said action was of an equitable character, cognizable alone in a court of chancery, and as to which the said justice of the peace had no jurisdiction; that he went legally and peaceably into possession of the premises sought to be recovered, under a lease for five years, which time had not expired; and that, since going into possession, he had made large and valuable improvements upon the land, worth at least twelve hundred dollars, for which he would be entitled to compensation, if dispossessed of the land. The appellees filed an answer, and moved to dissolve the injunction, and dismiss the petition; which motion was sustained by the court, and the injunction dissolved, and the petition dismissed.

Hancock and West, for appellant. 1st. The court erred in dissolving the injunction, on the special exceptions of the appellees. It was clear, on the face of the petition, that if the averments were true (and by the demurrer they were admitted) the injunction should have been sustained. The petition disclosed a very strong case. It showed a contract, verbal, it is true, in its terms, by which the party had entered upon the land, and complied with all the terms of his lease, and made large improvements. It showed, then, a title to the possession, as against the appellees; void, it is true, in law, but good in equity.

That the title was good in equity, has been decided by our court, and by other courts, and was not disputed in the argument below, and so far as we know, will not be disputed here in this court: the following are the authorities establishing its validity conclusively. Neatherly v. Ripley, decided at Tyler term, 1858; Hayne v. Maltby, 3 Tex. 438; Hearn v. Tomlin, Peake, Cas. 212; Taylor, Landlord and Tenant, p. 18, § 32, ed. of 1852; Jackson v. Pierce, 2 Johns. 221; Kine v. Balfo, 3 Ball & Beat. 343. These decisions, based on the doctrine of part performance, have been repeatedly recognized in our courts in analogous cases arising under the statute of frauds. Dugan v. Colville, 8 Tex. 126;Hunt v. Turner, 9 Id. 385;Ottenhouse v. Burleson, 11 Id. 87; Neatherly v. Ripley, Tyler term, 1858.

That the title was void, in law, is equally plain from the above decisions. If, then, the title or claim of the appellant was not a good legal defense to the action of the appellees, before a justice of the peace, it is clear that his recourse was to a court of equity; and in a court of equity, the injunction should have been made perpetual, instead of being dissolved on a demurrer to the bill. This must be so, unless it will be contended that a justice's court is a court of equity; and this must be the position to which the appellees will be forced, in order to sustain the ruling of the judge on their demurrer. Lane v. Howard, supra, 7. But the law gives only to the district court power to hear cases, “without distinction of law or equity.” Const. of Tex. art. 4, § 10. And it would have been the duty of the justice of the peace, under the law, to have ousted the appellant, because the justice of the peace could not exercise equitable jurisdiction; and it would have been impossible, in his limited jurisdiction, to have adjusted the complicated equities that had grown up between the parties. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 874, 882, 886, 896. For this error, the cause must be reversed, if for no other.

2d. But there is another error, that is too glaring to be avoided, or to require argument--it was the judgment dismissing the bill. On the case disclosed, it was plain that the petition presented a cause of action, and on that account the bill should have been retained for a hearing. The following cases have decided the question so frequently, as almost to leave the court below without a shadow of apology for its error. Fulgham v. Chevallier, 10 Tex. 518;...