Gibson v. Pickett

• Decision Date: 22 July 1974
• Docket Number: No. 74--61,74--61
• Parties: Giles H. GIBSON et al., Appellants, v. Nora Glasgow PICKETT et al., Appellees.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 532

512 S.W.2d 532

256 Ark. 1035

Giles H. GIBSON et al., Appellants, v. Nora Glasgow PICKETT et al., Appellees.

No. 74--61.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

July 22, 1974.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 9, 1974.

Keith, Clegg & Eckert, Magnolia, for appellants.

Woodward & Kinard, Ltd., Magnolia, for appellees.

FOGLEMAN, Justice.

In this 'quiet title' action brought by appellees, there is no dispute about the facts. The lands involved are described as the SW 1/4 of SW 1/4 of Section 24, Township 19 South, Range 24 West in Lafayette County. The basic controversy turns upon the construction of a deed dated May 25, 1944, from Giles H. Gibson and wife to Oce S. Griffin. Appellees based their suit upon their contention that a mineral reservation therein was void because it was too indefinite and uncertain to be effective. On the other hand, appellants contended that the Gibsons reserved all the oil, gas and mineral rights they owned and that no mineral interest passed to Griffin by this deed. The chancellor held that the deed did reserve an undivided 1/2 interest which had not been severed from the surface but not a reversionary interest which the Gibsons owned in a 1/2 'term' mineral interest, expiring in 1950 in the absence of production, conveyed by a prior owner in 1935. It had been stipulated that there had been no production prior to 1950. The chancery court held that Griffin owned the reversionary interest in 1945 when he conveyed to G. B. Pickett, the deceased father of appellees, reserving 1/2 of any mineral interest he (Griffin) owned, so that, when the term interest expired in 1950, a 1/2 mineral interest was owned by Griffin and Pickett equally.

Appellants assert that the chancellor erred in holding that Gibson reserved the 1/2 unsevered mineral interest but not the reversionary interest in the remaining 1/2 interest. Appellees contend that the reservation in the Gibson-Griffin deed should have been declared void for ambiguity and that the court erred in finding that this deed did not convey all mineral rights owned by Gibson. They say that, in any event, no more than 1/2 of the minerals were reserved.

It is essential to an understanding of the issues that the chain of title be set out. Insofar as pertinent, it is as follows:

J. R. Jester was the holder of the fee simple title to the W 1/2 SW 1/4 of Sec. 24.

29 May 1920, mineral deed from J. R. Jester and wife to J. W. Allen, conveying a 1/2 mineral interest in the NW 1/4 SW 1/4 T. 19, S., R. 24 W, filed for record on 16 April 1923.

3 June 1935, warranty deed from J. R. Jester and wife to First Congregational Church, conveying the W 1/2 SW 1/4 of Sec. 24, filed for record on Jan. 13, 1936.

11 Dec. 1935, instrument entitled 'Sale of Mineral Rights' from J. R. Jester to Harry J. Naert, conveying 1/2 mineral interest in SW 1/4 of SW 1/4 having the following habendum clause, 'To Have and To Hold, said described property unto said purchasers their heirs and assigns for a period of Fifteen Years (15) or as long thereafter as oil or gas are produced in paying quantities,' filed for record on Dec. 20, 1935.

4 June 1943, First Congregational Church to J. E. Searcy conveying the W 1/2 SW 1/4 of Sec. 24, containing the following warranty clause: 'And First Congregational Church hereby covenants with the said J. E. Searcy that it will forever warrant and defend the title to said lands against all claims whatever, except as to any mineral rights which the corporation has no title or claim against and except as to rights of the parties in possession.'

7 Aug. 1943, special warranty deed from J. E. Searcy to Giles H. Gibson with warranty 'against all claims or encumbrances done or suffered by us but against none other.'

25 May 1944, warranty deed from Giles H. Gibson to Oce S. Griffin, conveying: 'The West Half (W 1/2) of the Southwest Quarter (SW 1/4) of Section Twenty-four (24), Township Nineteen South (19S) Range Twenty-four West (24) containing in all 80 acres more or less, except a reservation of an undivided One-Half Interest in all Oil, Gas and Mineral Rights, including the Right of Ingress and Egress thereto (being One-Half of the Mineral Rights that were conveyed to the First Congregational Church in a Deed dated June 3rd 1935 and Recorded in Book C_ _, Page 183) which is reserved by the Grantor herein.' The habendum clause reads: 'To Have and To Hold the same unto the said Oce S. Griffin and unto his heirs and assigns forever, with all appurtenances thereunto belonging except as mineral rights mentioned in Deed recorded in Book A--8 at page 205.' The warranty clause reads: 'And we hereby covenant with said Oce S. Griffin that we will forever warrant and defend the title to said lands against all claims whatever, except Mineral Rights.'

16 July 1945, warranty deed from Oce S. Griffin to G. B. Pickett conveying 'The Southwest Quarter (SW 1/4) of the Southwest Quarter (SW 1/4) of Section Twenty-four (24), Township Nineteen (19) South Range Twenty-four (24) West, containing forty (40) acres more or less. The Grantor hereby reserves one-half (1/2) of all Oil, Gas, and Mineral rights that is owned by him on this date; also it is understood, that there exist one or more reservations by previous grantor or grantors. It is intended that the grantee (G. B. Pickett) shall have one-half (1/2) of any and all Oil, Gas, and Mineral rights that is owned by the grantor (Oce S. Griffin) at the time of this sale, including the right of ingress and egress.'

The basic rule to be applied in the construction of deeds, as with other contracts, is to ascertain and give effect to the real intention of the parties, particularly of the grantor, as expressed by the language used when not contrary to settled principles of law and rules of property. Jenkins v. Simmons, 241 Ark. 242, 407 S.W.2d 105, Dent v. Industrial Oil & Gas Co., 197 Ark. 95, 122 S.W.2d 162; Chicago, R.I. & P.R. co. v. Olson, 222 Ark. 828, 262 S.W.2d 882; Coffelt v. Decatur School District, 212 Ark. 743, 208 S.W.2d 1; McBride v. Conyers, 212 Ark. 1034, 208 S.W.2d 1006; Desha v. Erwin, 168 Ark. 555, 270 S.W. 965. The courts will resort to rules of construction, as distinguished from rules of property, only when the meaning of the deed in question or the intention of the parties is ambiguous, uncertain or doubtful. Coffelt v. Decatur School District, supra; see also Jenkins v. Ellis, 111 Ark. 220, 163 S.W. 524; Beasley v. Shinn, 201 Ark. 31, 144 S.W.2d 710; Davis v. Collins, 219 Ark. 948, 245 S.W.2d 571; Doe v. Porter, 3 Ark. 18.

The intention of the parties must be gathered from the four corners of the instrument itself, if that can be done, and when so done, it will control. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Olson, supra; McBride v. Conyers, supra; Luster v. Arnold, 249 Ark. 152, 458 S.W.2d 414; Carter Oil Co. v. Weil, 209 Ark. 653, 192 S.W.2d 215; Luther v. Patman, 200 Ark. 853, 141 S.W.2d 42. See also Cannon v. Owens, 224 Ark. 614, 275 S.W.2d 445. The intention of the parties is to be gathered, not from some particular clause, but from the whole context of the agreement. Schnitt v. McKellar, 244 Ark. 377, 427 S.W.2d 202; Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Murry, 231 Ark. 559, 331 S.W.2d 98; Wilson v. Stearn, 202 Ark. 1197, 149 S.W.2d 571; Dent v. Industrial Oil & Gas Co., supra. It is only in case of an ambiguity that a contract is construed most strongly against the party who prepared it, or the grantor in a deed. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Murry, supra; Jenkins v. Ellis, supra; 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 82, p. 813; 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 140(2), p. 1012. Even then, the rule of last resort to be applied only when all other rules for construing an ambiguous deed fail to lead to a satisfactory clarification of the instrument and is particularly subservient to the paramount rule that the intention of the parties must be given effect, insofar as it may be ascertained, and to the rule that every part of a deed should be harmonized and reconciled so that all may stand together and none be rejected. Wynn v. Sklar & Phillips Oil Co., 254 Ark. 332, 493 S.W.2d 439; 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 140(2), p. 1012. See also Jefferson Square, Inc. v. Hart Shoes, Inc., 239 Ark. 129, 388 S.W.2d 902.

Keeping these well-established rules in mind, we turn to the instrument in question. No difficulty is apparent upon the face of the instrument itself. Yet, we are not only permitted, we are required to examine the instruments to which reference is made in the deed in question because the terms and conditions of those deeds were made a part of the deed to be construed. Doe v. Porter, 3 Ark. 18. See also International Graphics, Inc., v. Bryant, 252 Ark. 1297, 482 S.W.2d 820; Jackson v. Lady, 140 Ark. 512, 216 S.W. 505; Snyder v. Bridewell, 167 Ark. 8, 267 S.W. 561; Dormon Farms Co. v. Stewart, 157 Ark. 194, 247 S.W. 778. When we do, it would appear at first blush that all the mineral rights were purportedly conveyed to the First Congregational Church on June 3, 1935, there having been no exception from the warranty clause. See Maloch v. Pryor, 200 Ark. 380, 129 S.W.2d 51; Osborn v. Texas Oil & Gas Co., 103 Ark. 175, 146 S.W. 122. But the deed was not recorded until January 13, 1936. In the meanwhile, Jester had conveyed 1/2 of the mineral interest in the SW 1/4 of the SW 1/4 to Naert for a period of 15 years. In 1920, he had conveyed 1/2 of the minerals in the NW 1/4 NW 1/4 to J. W. Allen in perpetuity. Consequently, the conveyance to the church appears to have effectively conveyed only 1/2 of all mineral rights in the NW 1/4 SW 1/4 and 1/2 of those rights together with the reversionary interest in the remaining 1/2 interest in the SW 1/4 SW 1/4. Thus, the parenthetical clause as worded, seems ambiguous itself and appears to be inconsistent with a strict interpretation of the general clause which it purportedly modifies, as it refers to more than 1/2 the mineral rights in either event. The habendum clause refers us to the deed from the church to Searcy, in which...