Gibson v. Riverside Hosp., Inc., 941446

• Decision Date: 09 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. 941446,941446
• Citation: 458 S.E.2d 460,250 Va. 140
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Craig GIBSON, An Infant, etc., et al. v. RIVERSIDE HOSPITAL, INC., etc., et al. Record

Page 460

458 S.E.2d 460

250 Va. 140

Craig GIBSON, An Infant, etc., et al. v. RIVERSIDE HOSPITAL, INC., etc., et al.

Record No. 941446.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

June 9, 1995.

Brenda S. Fisher, Hampton (C. Jerry Franklin, Chandler, Franklin & O'Bryan, on briefs), for appellants.

Carolyn P. Oast, Norfolk (George H. Heilig, Jr., John A. Heilig, Heilig, McKenry, Fraim & Lollar, on brief), for appellees.

Present: All the Justices.

HASSELL, Justice.

In this appeal of a judgment in a medical malpractice action, we consider whether the trial court correctly ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Our decision depends, in part, upon certain provisions in the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act, Code §§ 38.2-5000 through -5021, in effect at the time of the alleged malpractice.

Plaintiffs, Craig Gibson, an infant, by his mother and next friend, Tami (Gibson) Voris, and Tami (Gibson) Voris, individually, filed their motion for judgment against Riverside Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Riverside Regional Medical Center, Dr. Louis E. Nelsen, III, Dr. William H. Woessner, the estate of Dr. Charles W. Nickerson, Sentara Hospital-Norfolk, d/b/a Sentara Norfolk General Hospital, Dr. Matthew Whitted, and Dr. Randall S. Kuhlmann. The plaintiffs alleged that they were injured by the negligent acts and omissions of the defendants.

Certain defendants filed a special plea in bar, in which they asserted that the Act conferred exclusive jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims in the Workers' Compensation Commission. The trial court, relying solely upon the allegations contained in the motion for judgment, granted the defendants' special plea. We awarded the plaintiffs an appeal.

For purposes of this appeal, we assume that the facts in the plaintiffs' motion for judgment and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom are true. Tami (Gibson) Voris sought treatment at the Riverside Hospital after she was injured in an automobile accident on July 13, 1989. Tami was pregnant, and she was concerned that her unborn child might have been injured in the accident. She was admitted as a patient to Riverside Hospital on that date, and she was treated by several health care providers. According to the plaintiffs, "[d]espite indications of fetal distress during monitoring on July 13, 1989, [Tami] was removed from the monitor; and the hospital gave her no definitive treatment."

On July 14, 1989, certain health care providers noted that the unborn child was experiencing fetal distress. Tami was subsequently transported to Sentara Hospital-Norfolk, where a physician performed an emergency caesarean section to deliver her infant, Craig. Craig experienced certain injuries that the plaintiffs claim are related to the defendants' failure to diagnose timely the fetal distress.

The plaintiffs allege in their motion for judgment:

That as direct and proximate cause of the negligence of the defendants, jointly and severally, the Plaintiff, Craig Gibson has spastic diplegia cerebral palsy, delayed mile stones [sic] with resultant developmental delay, obstructive hydrocephalus and short stature with microcephaly. He requires crutches to ambulate and has difficulty with shortening of the hamstrings due to his spastic diplegia and visual difficulties.

That the minor Plaintiff, Craig Gibson, as a direct and proximate result of the joint and several negligence of the defendants, has suffered and will continue to suffer, physical and mental pain and anguish, impairment, disability, humiliation and embarrassment, loss of earning capacity, and he will incur medical, rehabilitation and pharmaceutical expenses in the future.

The plaintiffs argue that Craig did not, and does not, suffer a birth-related neurological injury as defined by the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Compensation Act and, therefore, the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate their claims. The defendants contend, however, that the trial court correctly ruled that Craig suffers from a birth-related...