Gibson v. Schultz

• Decision Date: 10 December 1990
• Docket Number: 89-2474,Nos. 89-2473,s. 89-2473
• Citation: 919 F.2d 734
• Parties: 31 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1096 Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit. Jo J. GIBSON, v. Stephen Glenn SCHULTZ, Chrysler Credit Corporation, Debbie McLeod, Defendants-Appellees. Floyd A. GIBSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Stephen Glenn SCHULTZ, Chrysler Credit Corporation, Debbie McLeod, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 734

919 F.2d 734

31 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1096

Unpublished Disposition

NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit.

Jo J. GIBSON, v. Stephen Glenn SCHULTZ, Chrysler Credit Corporation, Debbie

McLeod, Defendants-Appellees.

Floyd A. GIBSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Stephen Glenn SCHULTZ, Chrysler Credit Corporation, Debbie

McLeod, Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 89-2473, 89-2474.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 3, 1990.

Decided Dec. 10, 1990.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Joe F. Anderson, Jr., District Judge. (CA-88-3037-17-7)

Floyd A. Gibson, Bell, Seltzer, Park & Gibson, Charlotte, N.C., for appellants.

Dana C. Mitchell, III, Mitchell, Bouton, Yokel & Edwards, Greenville, S.C., Stephen Sanders Wilson, The Ward Law Firm, Spartanburg, S.C., for appellees.

D.S.C.

AFFIRMED.

Before DONALD RUSSELL and K.K. HALL, Circuit Judges, and SAMUEL GRAYSON WILSON, United States District Judge for the Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

Jo J. Gibson instituted an action in federal district court against Debbie McLeod, Stephen Glenn Schultz, and Chrysler Credit Corporation to recover for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Gibson's husband, Floyd A. Gibson, also sued these defendants, for damages to his car and loss of consortium. At trial, the jury found for all of the defendants in both actions. The Gibsons now appeal several rulings made by the court during trial: they maintain that the district court committed error by denying directed verdict and j.n.o.v. motions, by submitting to the jury the sudden emergency defense, and by admitting into evidence the amount of a settlement from a prior accident involving the Gibsons. Finding no merit in these issues, we affirm.

I.

On the evening of February 11, 1987, at approximately 7:40 p.m., defendant Debbie McLeod was driving her car north on Interstate 85 in Spartanburg County, South Carolina. Shortly after passing the junction of I-85 and Pine Street Extension (Interstate 585 and U.S. Highway 176), McLeod, who was travelling in the right-hand lane, noticed an eighteen-wheel truck in front of her applying its brakes. In reaction, McLeod also applied her brakes and proceeded to lose control of her car. McLeod's vehicle spun around, crossed into the left-hand lane of northbound traffic, and came to a stop facing south on the left-hand shoulder of I-85 North with some portion of the car protruding into the left-hand lane.

McLeod was unable to get her car started immediately, and because her car protruded into the road, a truck driver travelling in the left-hand lane stopped his eighteen-wheel vehicle. ¹ Travelling behind this truck in the left-hand lane was plaintiff Jo J. Gibson, who was driving a 1986 BMW 735i automobile owned by her husband, plaintiff Floyd A. Gibson. Mrs. Gibson noticed the truck stopping ahead of her and was able to bring her car to a stop approximately three car lengths behind the truck.

Defendant Stephen Glenn Schultz was also travelling on I-85 North that night. On the way from his office in Greenville, S.C., to his home in Gaffney, S.C., Schultz stopped off at a Hardee's restaurant located on the Hearon Circle in Spartanburg. After purchasing a cup of coffee, Schultz returned to I-85 North to continue his trip. Shortly thereafter, while travelling in the right-hand lane, Schultz overtook an eighteen-wheel truck moving at a slower rate of speed. Schultz moved into the left-hand lane to pass the truck and immediately saw directly in front of him Mrs. Gibson's BMW, which had just stopped. Despite applying the brakes, Schultz's car rear-ended the BMW and pushed it forward a couple of car lengths--both vehicles remained in the left-hand lane and the BMW did not collide into the stationary eighteen-wheeler.

Through diversity of citizenship, Mrs. Gibson instituted a suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina against Debbie McLeod, Stephen Glenn Schultz and Schultz's employer, Chrysler Credit Corporation, ² to recover for personal injuries caused by the accident. Floyd Gibson also sued these defendants for damage to his BMW and loss of consortium.

These actions were consolidated for trial and a jury trial was held on May 9 and 10, 1989. The jury found for all of the defendants in both actions, and the Gibsons appeal several rulings made by the court during and after trial.

II.

The Gibsons maintain that the district court was in error when it denied their motions for a directed verdict and, after trial, a judgment not withstanding the verdict. To receive a directed verdict or a j.n.o.v., one must prove that, even if "viewing the evidence most favorably to the party opposing the motions, a reasonable trier of fact could draw only one conclusion." Walker v. Pettit Construction Co., 605 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir.1979). Despite the Gibsons' argument to the contrary, it appears that a reasonable trier of fact could draw differing conclusions as to what transpired in this case.

That Stephen Glenn Schultz did not act negligently in causing this accident is a proposition which could very easily be adopted by a reasonable trier of fact. Schultz, who was travelling under the posted 55 mile per hour speed limit, got behind a slower moving eighteen-wheel truck and in order to pass the vehicle moved into the left-hand lane. Unfortunately as is the case when one gets behind such a vehicle, the truck blocked Schultz' view of the two stopped vehicles in the left-hand lane. The Gibsons would have the Court find Schultz guilty of negligence per se because a South Carolina traffic statute holds that cars should not be moved from one lane into another "until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety." S.C.Code Ann. Sec. 56-5-1900. Whether Schultz took proper precautions before attempting to pass the slower truck, thus satisfying the requirement of the statute cited by the Gibsons, was, under the testimony, a matter of dispute and thus a matter for jury verdict. A driver is entitled to assume that others using the highway will observe the law and exercise reasonable care, and Stephen Schultz was not necessarily negligent merely because he did not have the foresight to know that others would be suddenly stopping their cars on an interstate highway. The district court was correct in denying the Gibsons' directed verdict and j.n.o.v. motions in respect to Stephen Schultz.

As for Debbie McLeod, the Gibsons claim she was negligent as a matter of law. Concededly, in driving on a highway in a normal situation, one usually does not apply one's brakes so hard as to lose control of the car and cause it to spin around. Yet the exact circumstances which forced McLeod to apply her brakes are unclear, nor is it clear that under the circumstances she was negligent in applying her brakes too hard. This made these issues matters for the jury. There is no evidence that McLeod was necessarily negligent in any other way, and...