Walker v. Pettit Const. Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 September 1979
• Docket Number: No. 78-1411,78-1488.,78-1411
• Citation: 605 F.2d 128
• Parties: Morris T. WALKER, Appellee, v. PETTIT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., Appellant. Roy R. FRITH, Appellee, v. EASTERN AIR LINES, INC., Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

605 F.2d 128

Morris T. WALKER, Appellee, v. PETTIT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., Appellant.

Roy R. FRITH, Appellee, v. EASTERN AIR LINES, INC., Appellant.

Nos. 78-1411, 78-1488.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued June 4, 1979.

Decided September 5, 1979.

Rehearing of Denied and Rehearing of Granted December 4, 1979.

William T. Covington, Jr., Charlotte, N. C. (Joseph B. C. Kluttz, Charlotte, N. C., Kennedy, Covington, Lobdell & Hickman, Charlotte, N. C., on brief), for appellant in 78-1488.

Thomas C. Bradley, Jr., Spartanburg, S. C., for appellant in 78-1411.

Daniel T. Stacey, Columbia, S. C. (C. Robert Faucette, Spartanburg, S. C., on brief), for appellee in 78-1411.

Eugene C. Hicks, III, Charlotte, N. C. (Hicks & Harris, Charlotte, N. C., on brief), for appellee in 78-1488.

Before WINTER, BUTZNER and WIDENER, Circuit Judges.

Rehearing of Plaintiff Denied and Rehearing of Defendant Granted December 4, 1979.

WINTER, Circuit Judge:

In each of these age discrimination suits, the defendant employer appeals from the ruling of the district court that damages for pain and suffering or mental anguish are recoverable in a suit brought under § 7 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626. In addition, Pettit Construction Company (Pettit), the defendant in No. 78-1411, appeals from the holding of the district court that punitive damages are recoverable under § 7. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. (Eastern), the defendant in No. 78-1488, asserts various errors committed by the district court in its admission of plaintiff's expert testimony and in its denial of Eastern's motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Because each appeal presented the issue of pain and suffering damages, we consolidated the appeals and deferred further proceedings to await our decision in Slatin v. Stanford Research Institute, 590 F.2d 1292 (4 Cir. 1979). In Slatin, we held that damages for pain and suffering are not recoverable in a § 7 action. To the extent that the district court's orders in the instant cases hold to the contrary, we reverse. In addition, in No. 78-1411, we hold, for reasons similar to those expressed in Slatin, that punitive damages are not recoverable in a § 7 action. In No. 78-1488, however, except for the district court's awarding of damages for pain and suffering, we find no reversible error.

I.

In No. 78-1411, Morris T. Walker filed a complaint alleging that Pettit had unlawfully terminated his employment in violation of the Act. The complaint sought recovery not only of lost wages and liquidated damages, as expressly authorized in § 7(b), but also of $25,000 for pain and suffering and $50,000 in punitive damages. The district court denied Pettit's motion to strike the prayers for pain and suffering damages and for punitive damages, but it certified the issues for an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) which we granted.

In Slatin, we noted that § 7(b) expressly incorporates the enforcement procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, including the provisions for recovery of "unpaid minimum wages," "unpaid overtime compensation," and "liquidated damages" as specified in § 16(b) of that Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Observing that damages for pain and suffering are not recoverable in an action under § 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, we concluded that Congress, by incorporating the remedies of § 16 into § 7 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, had expressed an intent to restrict damages recoverable under § 7 to lost wages and an equal amount in liquidated damages. Thus, following the holdings of three other circuits,^* we held that damages for pain and suffering are not recoverable in an action under § 7.

For similar reasons, we hold that punitive damages are not recoverable under § 7. The conclusion that § 7 permits the recovery of only lost wages and liquidated damages precludes the recovery of punitive damages as well as damages for pain and suffering. The Fair Labor Standards Act, of course, makes no provision for the recovery of punitive damages. King v. J. C. Penney Co., 58 F.R.D. 649 (N.D.Ga.1973). Furthermore, we think that Congress, in providing in § 7(b) for the recovery of an additional amount, equal to lost wages, as "liquidated damages" only in cases of "willful violations" evidenced an intent not to permit additional recovery, beyond liquidated damages, as punitive damages. Our holding that § 7 does not permit the recovery of punitive damages is in accord with the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Dean v. American Security Insurance Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (5 Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066, 98 S.Ct. 1243, 55 L.Ed.2d 767 (1978), upon which we relied in Slatin.

Because damages for pain and suffering and punitive damages are not recoverable under § 7, the district court erred in denying Pettit's motion to strike those elements of recovery from Walker's prayer for relief. The order of the district court is reversed.

II.

Unlike No. 78-1411, the appeal in No. 78-1488 reaches us after a full jury trial and entry of judgment. At the age of forty-nine, Roy R. Frith, Eastern's Supervisor of Departure Services at Douglas Municipal Airport in Charlotte, North Carolina, was demoted to the position of Air Freight Agent. He brought suit against Eastern, claiming that his demotion was based on unlawful age discrimination. In response to special interrogatories, the jury found, first, that Frith had been demoted because of his age, in violation of the Act; second, that he earned $1,113.63 less in his present position than he would have earned without his demotion; third, that he had suffered mental anguish in the amount of $50,000; and fourth, that Eastern's violation of the Act was not willful. The district court entered judgment against Eastern for $51,113.63, in accordance with the jury's verdict, and ordered equitable relief in the form of reinstatement. In light of Slatin, the award of $50,000 for mental anguish must be set aside, and the award of damages therefore reduced to $1,113.63. In all other respects, we affirm.

Eastern contends that the district court erred in denying its motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Such motions may be granted only if, viewing the evidence most favorable to the party opposing the motions, a reasonable trier of fact could draw only one conclusion. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 696, 82 S.Ct. 1404, 8 L.Ed.2d 777 (1962); Brady v. Southern Railway, 320 U.S. 476, 64 S.Ct. 232, 88 L.Ed. 239 (1943).

Eastern's defense was that it demoted Frith as a disciplinary measure in response to complaints from three women under his supervision that he had harassed them with unwelcome sexual propositions. Although Eastern presented a good deal of evidence to support its contention that it demoted Frith for lawful reasons, we agree with the district court that Frith presented sufficient evidence to allow a rational jury to find to the contrary.

Shortly before the complaints of the female employees were filed, Eastern had decided to eliminate three supervisors at Douglas Airport, and it sought voluntary demotions from four supervisors, including Frith, all over the age of forty, even though some supervisors at Douglas were under forty. Frith refused to accept a voluntary demotion. Eastern responded to the complaints of the female employees in a highly expeditious manner, even before the employees had...