Gibson v. Summers Const. Co., 34108

• Decision Date: 20 April 1955
• Docket Number: No. 34108,34108
• Citation: 56 O.O. 223,163 Ohio St. 220,126 N.E.2d 326
• Parties: , 56 O.O. 223 GIBSON, Appellant, v. SUMMERS CONSTRUCTION CO., Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 220

163 Ohio St. 220

126 N.E.2d 326, 56 O.O. 223

GIBSON, Appellant, v. SUMMERS CONSTRUCTION CO., Appellee.

No. 34108.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

April 20, 1955.

Syllabus by the Court

1. By Section 1901.02, Revised Code, the Euclid Municipal Court has jurisdiction within the corporate limits of the municipal corporation of Euclid; and the fact that the second clause of subdivision (E) of Section 1901.19, Revised Code, purports to confer on a Municipal Court jurisdiction within the limits of the county or counties in which its territory is situated in all civil actions for the recovery of money only, where the amount claimed by the plaintiff exceeds the exclusive jurisdiction of justices of the peace, does not in such cases enlarge or extend the jurisdiction of the Euclid Municipal Court beyond its territorial jurisdiction.

2. The filing of a motion by a defendant to make the petition definite and certain following the overruling of his motion to quash the service of summons in the action does not effect the entering of the appearance of the defendant therein.

3. The reversal of a judgment of a trial court by a reviewing court for the reason that the trial court did not have jurisdiction of the person of the defendant in not a judgment on the merits and is not res judicata as to a future action on the same cause of action.

The plaintiff, a resident of Lake County, filed his petition in the Euclid Municipal Court, located in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, to recover a money judgment in the sum of $300.29 alleged to be due on account of plumbing work and materials furnished by him and installed in premises located in Lake County and owned by the defendant, a resident of that county. Plaintiff caused summons to be issued on the petition and mailed to the defendant in Cleveland, Cuyahoga County at a point outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Euclid Municipal Court. There are no other parties defendant to the suit and no one was served with process within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Thereafter the defendant filed a motion to quash the service of summons, which motion was overruled. The defendant then filed a motion to make the petition definite and certain, which motion was overruled in part and sustained in part. Later, the plaintiff filed an amended petition. The defendant then filed an answer to the amended petition which contains, among other things, an allegation denying the court's jurisdiction of the defendant's person.

At the trial, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and defendant's motion for a new trial was overruled.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court reversed the judgment and entered final judgment for the defendant for lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the defendant, 96 Ohio App. 307, 119 N.E.2d 637.

The cause is now in this court on appeal by reason of the allowance of plaintiff's motion to certify the record. Other facts are stated in the opinion.

Ralph V. Greene, Willoughby, for appellant.

Paul Mancino, Cleveland, for appellee.

HART, Judge.

The plaintiff claims that under the applicable statutes the Euclid Municipal Court has county-wide original jurisdiction in all civil actions for the recovery of money only, 'in those cases where the amount claimed by any party * * * does not exceed two thousand dollars'; and that the court has, in this case, jurisdiction of the person of the defendant who was served with summons by mail within Cuyahoga County but beyond the territorial limits of the court. The defendant denies that the court has such county-wide jurisdiction under the circumstances of the case.

The solution of this problem requires an examination of the applicable statutes conferring the jurisdiction of the Euclid Municipal Court.

Section 1581, General Code, Section 1901.01, Revised Code, establishes by name a number of Municipal Courts in municipal corporations in the state of Ohio, six of which courts are located in municipal corporations in Cuyahoga County. These are the Cleveland, Euclid, South Euclid, Parma, Lakewood and Garfield Heights Municipal Courts. None of these courts are in the list of Municipal Courts in Section 1582, General Code, Section 1901.02, Revised Code, wherein territorial jurisdiction of the courts is extended beyond the limits of the municipal corporation for which each is created. Under the provisions of these sections of the Code, the territorial jurisdiction of the Euclid Municipal Court does not extend beyond the territorial limits of the municipal corporation of Euclid.

Section 1582, General Code, provides:

'The municipal courts, established by section 1581 of the General Code, shall have jurisdiction within the corporate limits of their respective municipal corporations and shall be courts of record.' (Italics supplied.)

Following this provision, Section 1582, General Code, names each separate Municipal Court in the state which is given county-wide jurisdiction or jurisdiction outside the boundaries of the corporation for which it is named. Euclid Municipal Court is not so listed.

Section 1583, General Code, Section 1901.03, Revised Code, defines the term, 'territory,' as used in the Municipal Court Act, as follows:

"Territory' as used in sections 1584 to 1617, inclusive, of the General Code, means the geographical areas within which municipal courts have jurisdiction as provided in sections 1581 and 1582 of the General Code.'

The pertinent parts of Section 1595, General Code, Section 1901.19, Revised Code, are as follows:

'Subject to section 1593 of the General Code [which fixes the monetary jurisdiction of Municipal Courts at $2,000, except that of the Cleveland Municipal Court, which is $5,000] a municipal court shall have jurisdiction within the limits of the county or counties in which its territory is situated:

'(A) To compel attendance of witnesses in any pending action or proceeding, the same as the court of common pleas;

* * *

* * *

'(D) In any civil action or proceeding at law in which the subject matter of the action or proceeding is located within the territory or when the defendant or some one of the defendants resides or is served with summons within the territory;

'(E) In any civil action or proceeding of whatever nature or remedy wherein justices of the peace now have or may hereafter be given jurisdiction coextensive with the county; and in all civil actions for the recovery of money only where the amount claimed by the plaintiff exceeds the exclusive jurisdiction of justices of the peace;

'(F) To issue and enforce any order of attachment;

'(G) In any action or proceeding in the nature of creditors' bills, and in aid of execution to subject the interest of a judgment debtor in personal property to the payment of a judgment of the court;

'(H) In any action for injury to person or property caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, as provided by sections 6308 and 6308-1 of the General Code'. (Italics supplied.)

Subdivision (E) of the foregoing-quoted section gives rise to the controversy in the instant case. The first clause of subdivision (E) confers jurisdiction on the Euclid Municipal Court, as well as on other Municipal Courts, to hear and determine actions which justices of the peace may hear and determine pursuant to Section 10224, General Code, Section 1909.02, Revised Code, which latter section gives justices of the peace jurisdiction within and coextensive with their respective counties to hear certain types of civil actions and to perform other specific functions, i. e., to administer oaths, to take acknowledgments, to solemnize marriages, to issue subpoenas for witnesses, to try actions in forcible entry and detainer (except in Cuyahoga, Mahoning and Franklin Counties where jurisdiction in such cases is limited to the townships from which justices of the peace are elected), to proceed against security for costs and bail, to issue attachments (except in Cuyahoga, Mahoning and Franklin Counties where jurisdiction to issue attachments is coextensive only with the townships from which justices of the peace are elected), to issue executions on certain judgments against constables, to proceed against constables failing to make a return, making a false reture on failing to pay over money collected, to try the right of a claimant to property taken in execution or attachment, to act in the absence of the probate judge in the trial of contested elections of justices of the peace, and to try actions against other justices of the peace for refusing to pay over moneys collected in their official capacity, not in excess of $100.

The sole jurisdictional question in this case is whether the second clause of subdivision (E), above quoted and italicized, gives the Euclid Municipal Court county-wide jurisdiction in civil actions for money only, where the amount claimed is not in excess of $2,000 and is in excess of $100, the maximum exclusive jurisdiction of justices of the peace in the various townships of Cuyahoga County...