Giddings v. Iowa Savings Bank of Ruthven
| Citation | 74 N.W. 21,104 Iowa 676 |
| Parties | A. E. GIDDINGS AND F. H. GIDDINGS v. THE IOWA SAVINGS BANK OF RUTHVEN, Appellant |
| Decision Date | 10 February 1898 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Appeal from Palo Alto District Court.--HON. W. B. QUARTON, Judge.
ACTION to recover possession of a promissory note and the mortgage securing it. There was a trial by jury. Verdict and judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Soper Allen & Morling and George E. Clarke for appellant.
Carr & Parker and B. E. Kelly for appellees.
I.
The record before us discloses these facts: The plaintiffs are husband and wife. F. H. Giddings, the husband, was for some years the cashier of defendant bank, which is located at Ruthven, in this state. During the time he occupied this position he made loans of the bank's funds to himself and to the firm of Calkins & Giddings, of which he was a member, and also to F. W. Calkins, the senior member of said firm. Some of the loans were without security, and in other cases the security was insufficient. Early in January, 1894 Giddings resigned as cashier, and the president of the bank, with two of the directors, undertook to look over the accounts and make a settlement with him. It is claimed by plaintiff that said bank officers, finding the loans mentioned standing as an existing indebtedness to the bank, wrongfully insisted that he was a defaulter or embezzler, and that he had violated a criminal statute of the state; that they threatened him with criminal prosecution, and put him in fear, and that like threats were made to his wife, and that by such duress the plaintiffs were coerced into giving the promissory note in question, and also the mortgage securing it, which covers plaintiff's homestead in Ruthven, title to which is in the wife. Some months thereafter, to correct a misdescription of the real estate in the mortgage, plaintiffs gave another mortgage, in which the homestead was correctly described. This action was begun January 21, 1896, to recover possession of the note and mortgage, on the ground that they were obtained by duress. We are not attempting in what we say to set out the facts, further than to give an outline of plaintiff's case, sufficient to an understanding of our rulings on certain legal propositions presented for determination. The errors assigned by appellant are numerous, but we shall endeavor in what we say to give consideration to all such as are material.
II. The wife was not present at the interview between the bank officers and Giddings, when the alleged threats were made, but plaintiffs claim that she was told by him what had occurred when he came home in the evening. Both husband and wife were permitted, over defendant's objection, to testify to what was said by the husband to the wife on this occasion. The bank officers, in the interview with Giddings, were demanding a mortgage on his homestead. They knew that this instrument must be signed by the wife. If they unlawfully threatened Giddings in order to procure the mortgage and note, they must have known that to comply with their demands he would be compelled to disclose the facts to his wife. In principle, it is the same as though defendant's officers had requested Giddings to inform his wife of their desire and purpose. The evidence, we think, was rightfully admitted. Schultz v. Catlin, 78 Wis. 611 (47 N.W. 946); Taylor v. Jaques, 106 Mass. 291. The gist of this testimony was simply that the husband told his wife what had been said to him by defendant's officers. Its admission did not contravene section 3642, Code 1873, which forbids husband or wife divulging confidential communications made by one to the other.
III. It is contended by appellant that a claim of duress cannot properly be predicated upon a threat of lawful prosecution or imprisonment; that, if Giddings was in fact guilty of the crime charged, a threat by defendant to prosecute him therefor, unless he secured the bank against loss, would not amount to duress. This states the rule very broadly, but we may, for present purposes, concede it to be true as to Giddings. The instructions of the trial court recognize this rule. But we think a different doctrine prevails in case of the wife. Where the fears or affection of a wife are worked upon through threats made against her husband and she is induced thereby against her will, to convey her property to secure his debt, there is duress as to her, even though the debt was valid, and the threat was of lawful prosecution for a crime that had in fact been committed by the husband. Gohegan v. Leach, 24 Iowa 509; Beindorff v. Kaufman, 41 Neb. 824 (60 N.W. 101); Meech v. Lee, 82 Mich. 274 (46 N.W. 383), and cases cited. Appel...
To continue reading
Request your trial