Gidney v. Chappell

• Decision Date: 12 July 1910
• Docket Number: Case Number: 569
• Citation: 26 Okla. 737,110 P. 1099,1910 OK 216
• Parties: GIDNEY v. CHAPPELL et al.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

1910 OK 216

110 P. 1099

26 Okla. 737

GIDNEY v. CHAPPELL et al.

Case Number: 569

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: July 12, 1910

Syllabus

¶0 1. DEEDS-- Validity--Admissibility of Evidence. In a suit in equity by the sole heir of a deceased person to set aside a conveyance, acquittance, and receipt preliminary to the contest of a will bequeathing the property conveyed to a stranger upon the grounds of want of testamentary capacity on the part of the testatrix and that said will was procured by fraud and undue influence, when it is alleged in the bill that the fraud and undue influence practiced in procuring the will is a link in the chain of fraud whereby the defendant obtained the conveyance, etc., the facts in relation to the execution of the will are material as a matter of evidence.

2. CONTRACTS--Confirmation of Voidable Transaction--Estoppel. If a party originally possessing a remedial right has obtained full knowledge of all the material facts involved in the transaction, and has become fully aware of its imperfections and of his own rights to impeach it, or ought, and might, with reasonable diligence, have become so aware, and all undue influence is wholly removed so that he can give a perfectly free consent, and he acts deliberately, and with the intention of ratifying the voidable transaction, then his confirmation is binding, and his remedial right, defensive, or affirmative, is destroyed. If, on the other hand, the original undue influence still remains, or if the act is simply a continuation of the former transaction, or if the party wrongly supposes that the original contract or transaction is binding, or if he has not full knowledge of all the material facts and of his own rights, no act of confirmation, however formal, is effectual. The voidable nature of the transaction is unaltered.

3. FRAUD--Misrepresentation--Disclosure of Part of Truth. Although a party may keep absolute silence and violate no rule of law or equity, yet, if he volunteers to speak and to convey information which may influence the conduct of the other party, he is bound to discover the whole truth. A partial statement, then, becomes a fraudulent concealment, and even amounts to a false and fraudulent misrepresentation.

4. REFERENCE--Findings--Setting Aside. In a suit in equity, commenced in the courts of the Indian Territory prior to statehood, and by consent referred to a master in chancery to take the evidence and make findings of fact and conclusions of law, it was not error for the district court, as successor of the court wherein said suit was commenced, to set aside the findings and conclusions of the master and make findings of fact and conclusions of law of its own, when the findings of the master are clearly in conflict with the weight of evidence upon which they were made.

5. EQUITY--Pleading--Offer to Do Equity. An allegation in a bill in equity to set aside a conveyance for fraud preliminary to the contest of a will that states, in substance, that if it should be found upon the hearing that the consideration received by said plaintiff for the execution of said conveyance was not money of the testatrix of the will, whose sole heir at law said plaintiff is, but was money of said defendant, said plaintiffs are willing to do equity and will upon the establishment of said fact repay such money with interest to said defendant, and are willing to have the relief awarded made subject to such repayment within a time to be fixed by the court, constitutes a sufficient offer to do equity.

Error from District Court, Muskogee County; R. McMillan, Special Judge.

Action by Sidney C. Chapple and another against Samuel E. Gidney. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error. Modified and affirmed.

Wm. T. Hutchings, Geo. A. Murphy and Wm. P. Z. German, for plaintiff in error.

Lewis & Phillips, N. B. Maxey, W. F. Schurmeyer and Chas. F. Runyan, for defendants in error.

Briefs did not reach the reporter.

KANE, J.

¶1 This was a suit in equity, commenced by the defendants in error, plaintiffs below, against the plaintiff in error, defendant below, to cancel a conveyance by the plaintiff Sidney C. Chapple of all his right, title, and interest in and to his mother's estate to Samuel E. Gidney, the defendant, and a certain release and receipt executed in connection therewith; said suit being preliminary to a contest to set aside the will of Mrs. Sarah C. Rawlings, Chapple's mother, whereby she willed practically all her property to the defendant. After issue joined, it was stipulated by and between the parties that the cause should be referred to the master in chancery of the court wherein the cause was pending, to take testimony and report his findings of fact and conclusions of law, together with the testimony taken. The master made findings of fact favorable to the defendant and conclusions of law, as follows:

"I am therefore of the opinion and conclude that at the time of the execution of the will in question, to-wit, October 23, 1905, and at the time of the execution of the codicil thereto, to-wit, April 13, 1906, the said Sarah Rawlings had sufficient understanding to comprehend the nature of her acts and the nature and extent of her property, the natural objects of her bounty and the persons to whom she desired to give it, without the aid of other persons. I am further of the opinion, and conclude, that the legal presumption of undue influence and fraud which attached to the acts of an attorney who is the principal beneficiary in a will drawn by him for his client is rebutted in this case by the fact that the will as finally executed, together with its codicil, are so far as her son, Sidney C. Chapple, is concerned, substantially in accordance with a determination as to the disposition of her property, reached by the testatrix long before she met the defendant, Gidney, and that the plaintiff Chapple lost nothing by reason of the said defendant becoming the beneficiary in said will, as his practical disinheritance was determined upon by the testatrix long before she met Gidney, and the only conclusion at which I can arrive is that, if Gidney had not been the principal beneficiary under the will, some person other than the plaintiff, son of the testatrix, would have been such principal beneficiary. I am further of the opinion and conclude that the defendant, Gidney, was not guilty of fraud toward, and did not exercise undue influence over, the testatrix in the matter of the making of said will of October 23, 1905, or the codicil thereto dated April 13, 1906. I am further of the opinion and conclude that the defendant, Gidney, did not exercise fraud toward nor undue influence over the plaintiff Sidney C. Chapple in the matter of the execution of the assignment and receipt and acquittance in question in this cause. I am further of the opinion, and conclude, that the execution of said will and the dealings between the defendant and the plaintiff Chapple at the time of the execution of the assignment and acquittance in question in this suit were not a part of any general fraudulent scheme on the part of the defendant, Gidney, to secure for himself the property of said testatrix. I therefore recommend that this cause be dismissed for want of equity, and that the costs thereof be taxed against the plaintiffs."

¶2 Numerous exceptions were filed to this report, all of which were sustained, whereupon the court made findings of fact favorable to the plaintiffs, as follows:

"The court finds that the conveyance and the release executed by the plaintiff Sidney C. Chapple to the defendant, Samuel E. Gidney, on the 22d day of June, 1906, were obtained by the said Gidney by fraudulent representation, and by a failure to disclose knowledge in his possession in relation to the estate of Sarah Rawlings, which was his duty to disclose. The court further finds that the defendant Samuel E. Gidney had at the time of the execution of said instruments been the attorney for Sarah Rawlings, the mother of the plaintiff Sidney C. Chapple, for something like one year; that he had been her attorney and confidential adviser, and has been paid to look after her estate, and had taken trips to Texas for the purpose of ascertaining the status of her estate, and that he had thus obtained knowledge of her said estate and affairs, which was unknown to Sidney C. Chapple at the time of the execution of said instruments, and that the defendant, Samuel E. Gidney, failed to disclose what he knew in relation to said estate to the said Sidney C. Chapple, but withheld information which it was his duty to disclose. The court further finds that the plaintiff Sidney C. Chapple had spent but little time at the home of his mother for the last years of her life, and knew but little of the estate, and that he relied upon Gidney, who had been the attorney for his mother, and was the executor of what purported to be her will, and that he believed what Gidney told him, and acted upon Gidney's representations. The court further finds that taking into consideration the value of said estate, which is worth from $ 10,000 to $ 15,000, that the consideration of $ 510 was totally inadequate when considered in connection with the facts and circumstances under which said instruments were procured. The court further finds that the will executed by Sarah Rawlings on the 23d day of October, 1905, in which she virtually disinherited her son, Sidney Chapple, is void for the reason that the said Sarah Rawlings did not have sufficient testamentary capacity at the time of executing the same to make a fair and intelligent disposition of her estate. The court further finds that the defendant, Gidney, is entitled to a return of the consideration paid by him to the said Sidney C. Chapple for the execution of said instruments, and that the said Sidney C. Chapple shall return the same to him upon the execution by the said Gidney of a good and sufficient conveyance reconveying to him all of the

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