GIGAx v. Ralston Purina Co.

• Decision Date: 15 October 1982
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Larry A. GIGAX, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RALSTON PURINA COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 24455.

Page 395

186 Cal.Rptr. 395

136 Cal.App.3d 591

Larry A. GIGAX, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RALSTON PURINA COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 24455.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Oct. 15, 1982.

Hearing Denied December 22, 1982.

Kennedy, Crockett, Dougherty & Hildre, Clyde C. Crockett and Thomas G. Gilmore, San Diego, for plaintiff and appellant

McInnis, Fitzgerald, Rees, Sharkey & McIntyre, Thomas E. Sharkey and William R. Warhurst, San Diego, for defendant and respondent.

STANIFORTH, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff Larry A. Gigax seeks reversal of a summary judgment granted in favor of defendant Ralston Purina Company (Ralston). Gigax's complaint sought money damages for personal injuries based on theories of products liability, negligence and wanton and reckless misconduct. Gigax was employed as a laborer for the Van Camp Seafood Company (Van Camp) in San Diego, California. While cleaning a nonoperating hydraulic conveyor belt machine, the machine suddenly started and Gigax's left arm was drawn in and amputated at the elbow. The hydraulic conveyor belt was designed and manufactured by Ralston and Gigax alleges negligent design as a basis for Ralston's liability. Following his injury Gigax pursued his workers' compensation remedy against Van Camp as his statutory employer and obtained compensation and award. He then instituted this common law damage action against Ralston as a third party tortfeasor. (See Lab.Code, §§ 3602, 3852.)

Upon Ralston's factual representation Van Camp was a division of Ralston and not a "subsidiary" corporation, the court found no triable issue of fact existed and determined Ralston, not Van Camp, was Gigax's employer at the time of his injury and therefore immune from tort liability pursuant to the exclusive remedy provisions of Labor Code section 3601, subdivision (a). Upon this basis the court granted summary judgment. Gigax appeals, pointing to factual

issues that must be determined before deciding whether Ralston is the statutory employer immune from a common law tort action.

FACTS

We derive the following facts from the documents and declarations presented to the trial court in connection with Ralston's motion for summary judgment. Van Camp Seafood Company, Inc., was incorporated in California in 1922 and its headquarters are in San Diego. Gigax was employed by Van Camp beginning November 30, 1971. He continued as an employee until April 1, 1978, the date of the accident.

Gigax was originally hired by Phil Reyna, Industrial Relations Manager for Van Camp. He worked under the direction of a Van Camp supervisor. The right to fire Gigax was vested in Roy Thompson, General Manager of Van Camp.

Van Camp maintains its employment records in its San Diego office. It incurred liability on its own account for social security obligations in 1979 for $2,373,890.24. Van Camp incurred withholding tax liability in 1979, federal income tax liability for $2,523,780.53 and a liability for California income tax for $444,323.80. Gigax was reported as an employee on Van Camp's payroll return. Further, Van Camp prepared a profit and loss statement detailing the operation of Van Camp. Van Camp produces cans of tuna and in its sales program prominently displays the words "Van Camp" and its logo, "Chicken of the Sea." The San Diego telephone directory lists Van Camp Seafood Company, not Ralston.

Ralston Purina Company is a Missouri corporation. Ralston asserts it "acquired substantially all of the assets of Van Camp Seafood Company, a California corporation, pursuant to a plan and arrangement of reorganization within the meaning of Internal Revenue Code section 368, subdivision (a)(1)(C)." Pursuant to this plan Van Camp transferred property and assets to Ralston in exchange for delivery to Van Camp of 53/100 of a share of Ralston stock for each share of Van Camp stock and for the assumption of certain liabilities.

It is represented that Van Camp submits monthly financial reports to Ralston as well as its annual budget. But Ralston has refused to answer questions as "not applicable" concerning activities, meetings and minutes of "division officers" of Van Camp. Ralston's answers do not disclose the present corporate status of Van Camp Seafood Company. The nature of Ralston's control over Van Camp since the acquisition of Van Camp stock is presently in an evidentiary limbo awaiting light. ¹

Separate legal and financial departments are employed by Van Camp and deal solely with the Van Camp operations. Van Camp and Ralston are both multinational corporations in scope of activities. Van Camp has a worldwide packing and marketing business.

Gigax brought his petition for workers' compensation award against "Van Camp Seafood" as his employer. The answer before the workers' compensation board designates Van Camp Seafood, self-insured as the employer and Ralston Purina Company as the insurance carrier. This particular document was signed by Ralston's agent on the line designated "employer or insurer carrier." A letter from Jeffrey Trambucco, Ralston's Workers' Compensation Administrator, declared: "As you are aware, this office is handling the workers' compensation claims for Van Camp Seafood." (Italics added.) This letter also designates the employer as Van Camp.

Gigax himself perceived Van Camp--and no one else--to be his employer. He was not aware of any interrelationship between Van Camp and Ralston until it was raised in connection with his bringing Ralston in as a Doe in his amended complaint.

One further set of facts should be noted concerning Van Camp's corporate status. Van Camp has been sued on occasion in the California courts and has responded by filing an answer, and on occasion a cross-complaint as "a California corporation." (See Hays v. Van Camp Seafood Company, San Diego Super.Ct. No. 373165; Mata v. Van Camp Seafood Company, San Diego Super.Ct. No. 409670.)

In sum, the extent and nature of the interrelationship of Ralston to this particular subdivision, division, or subsidiary, or whatever it is legally, has not been detailed in the answers given to interrogatories. However, Ralston repeats this conclusionary phrase: Van Camp is an "operating division" of Ralston, not a subsidiary in a legal corporate sense and on this basis alone contends Van Camp is not a separate corporate entity; therefore it is argued Ralston is the corporate employer, not subject to suit as a third party tortfeasor. Upon this complex yet incomplete factual matrix, the trial court determined Ralston was as a matter of law Gigax's employer and therefore not subject to suit as a third party tortfeasor.

DISCUSSION

I

It is settled principle of law that the summary judgment procedure is a drastic remedy and should be used with extreme caution so that it does not become a substitute for the open trial method of determining facts. (Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal.App.3d 937, 940, 137 Cal.Rptr. 619.) A motion for summary judgment should be denied if the papers submitted show there is a triable issue of fact. (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c; Daugherty Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 14 Cal.App.3d 151, 156, 92 Cal.Rptr. 120.) It is the burden on the party moving for summary judgment to negate the existence of triable issues of fact in a fashion that entitled it to judgment on the issues raised by the pleadings. ( IT Corp. v. Superior Court, 83 Cal.App.3d 443, 451-452, 147 Cal.Rptr. 828.) And if an issue of fact is present, the trial judge abuses his discretion in granting such a motion. (Robinson v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 Cal.App.3d 334, 337, 116 Cal.Rptr. 125.) The function of the trial court is issue finding, not issue determination. (Walsh v. Walsh, 18 Cal.2d 439, 441, 116 P.2d 62.) In examining the papers filed, those of the moving party are to be strictly construed while those of the opposing party are to be liberally construed. (Slobojan v. Western Travelers Life Ins. Co., 70 Cal.2d 432, 437, 74 Cal.Rptr. 895, 450 P.2d 271.) And the moving party cannot depend upon the allegation of his own pleadings to cure a deficiency of fact nor can the adversary do so. However, a party can rely upon the adversary's pleadings to establish facts not contained in his own affidavits. (Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal.App.3d 937, 941, 137 Cal.Rptr. 619.)

The workers' compensation laws were enacted in the early 20th century to provide a system of social insurance to compensate victims of work-related injuries. With the rise of the Industrial Revolution came an unprecedented increase in employee injuries and deaths. Victims of these industrial accidents were faced with formidible barriers to recovery because liability was premised on the concept of fault and the defenses of assumption of the risk, the fellow-servant doctrine and contributory negligence had to be overcome.

Under the workers' compensation scheme, an employee's remedy against an employer for a work-related injury is--as a general rule--exclusively limited to the benefits provided by statute. ² Labor Code section 3601 provides, in relevant part "(a) Where the conditions of compensation exist, the right to recover such compensation pursuant to the provisions of this division is, except as provided in Section 3706 the exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee against the employer or against any other employee of the employer acting within his scope of the employment ...."

However, the employee retains the right to pursue any common law remedies he may have against third party tortfeasors. ³ Labor Code section 3602 provides: "In all cases where the conditions of compensation do not concur, the liability of the employer is the same as if this division had not been enacted." And Labor Code section 3852 reads in pertinent part: "The claim of an employee for compensation does not affect his claim or right of action for all damages proximately resulting from such injury or death against any person other than the employer...." Thus...