Giglio v. Kaplan
| Decision Date | 21 January 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-1623,80-1623 |
| Citation | 392 So.2d 1004 |
| Parties | Carmine John GIGLIO, Petitioner, v. Honorable Stanton S. KAPLAN, as Judge of the Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit, In and For Broward County, Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Alan H. Schreiber, Public Defender, and Robert Julian, Asst. Public Defender, Fort Lauderdale, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Max Rudmann, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent.
Petitioner was arrested on January 18, 1980, for the forgery of a Burdines credit card receipt. In custody, he was read his Miranda 1 rights. During interrogation, petitioner confessed not only to the credit card forgery, but to an automobile burglary which had occurred a day earlier. The credit card had been stolen from the automobile.
Petitioner was not formally charged with the burglary until March 18, 1980, and he was not taken into custody on that charge until April 19. On July 19, petitioner filed a motion for discharge, alleging that the speedy trial rule should have commenced on January 18, the date of his confession. The respondent subsequently denied the motion for discharge and these proceedings followed.
Petitioner's claim is that speedy trial time should have started to run on January 18, when, while he was in custody for a separate offense, he confessed to the burglary. Petitioner claims, in effect, that it is the date from which there is probable cause to charge a defendant, and not the actual date on which a charge is filed or custody secured, which should be dispositive. This is not the law.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(1) provides that the time period provided by the speedy trial rule begins to run when the accused "is taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to the crime charged." It is undisputed here that the petitioner was taken into custody on January 18 solely on the forgery charge. The police were not aware of his participation in the burglary until he confessed thereto. Further, we do not believe the burglary and the forged use of the credit card stolen in the burglary were part of the same criminal episode for purposes of commencement of the time period provided in the speedy trial rule. In our view the speedy trial rule requires the timely prosecution of all charges arising from a single criminal episode. Here, the burglary on January 17 and the subsequent forgery of the...
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Thomas v. State, s. ZZ-3
...relies, are distinguishable. We affirm on the first point. See State v. Stanley, 399 So.2d 371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Giglio v. Kaplan, 392 So.2d 1004 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The second information charged appellant with two counts of grand theft. One of the counts charged appellant with taking f......
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State v. Hanna, 5D03-524.
...(Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (false report of theft to police; false claim of same theft to insurance company four days later); Giglio v. Kaplan, 392 So.2d 1004 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (burglary of auto on day one; forgery of credit card slip next day for card taken in burglary); Jarrell v. State, 756 S......
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State v. Baynham
...they are based on substantially the same acts.” State v. Hanna, 858 So.2d 1248, 1250 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (citing Giglio v. Kaplan, 392 So.2d 1004 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)). The conduct needs to be more than “merely related”—it should be “the same conduct.” Walker v. State, 390 So.2d 411, 412 (Fl......
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State v. Stanley, 79-1918
...all crimes of which it has probable cause or risk dismissal under the speedy trial rule. As stated by the court in Giglio v. Kaplan, 392 So.2d 1004, 1005 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981): Notwithstanding the provisions of the speedy trial rule, the state is not totally free to unreasonably delay the fil......