Gil v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 March 2017
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 16–23020–Civ–Scola
• Citation: 242 F.Supp.3d 1315
• Parties: Juan Carlos GIL, Plaintiff v. WINN DIXIE STORES, INC., Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

242 F.Supp.3d 1315

Juan Carlos GIL, Plaintiff

v.WINN DIXIE STORES, INC., Defendant

Civil Action No. 16–23020–Civ–Scola

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

March 15, 2017

Richard Francis Della Fera, Entin & Della Fera, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Scott Richard Dinin, Scott R. Dinin, P.A., Miami, FL, for Plaintiff.

Susan Virginia Warner, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant.

Order on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike

Robert N. Scola, Jr., United States District Judge

The Plaintiff, Juan Carlos Gil, sued Winn–Dixie Stores, Inc. ("Winn–Dixie") for injunctive relief under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 – 12189 (the "ADA"). This matter is before the Court on Winn–Dixie's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (ECF No. 15.) After briefing on Winn–Dixie's motion was completed, the Department of Justice filed a Statement of Interest on behalf of the United States of America (the "Government"). (ECF No. 23.) Winn–Dixie subsequently moved to strike the Government's Statement of Interest. (ECF No. 25.) For the following reasons, the Court denies Winn–Dixie's motion to strike and denies the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

1. Background

Plaintiff Gil is legally blind and suffers from a learning disability; "therefore [he] is substantially limited in performing one or more major life activities ...." (Compl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 1.) In order to access and comprehend information on the internet, Mr. Gil must use screen reader software. (Id. ¶¶ 23–24.) Defendant Winn–Dixie is a grocery and pharmacy store chain. (Id. ¶ 14.) Winn–Dixie operates a website, www.winndixie.com, that allows consumers to locate physical Winn–Dixie store locations, fill and refill prescriptions for in-store pick-up or delivery, learn about Winn–Dixie brand items, access home-cooking recipes, and receive information about product recalls.¹ (Id. ¶¶ 17, 19.)

The Plaintiff alleges that when he attempted to access Winn–Dixie's website, the website did not integrate with his screen reader software, "nor was there any function within [the] website to permit access for [the] visually impaired through other means." (Id. ¶¶ 27–28.) The Plaintiff alleges that due to the website's inaccessibility, the Defendant has not provided full and equal enjoyment of the services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations provided by and through its website. (Id. ¶ 46.) He also claims that, for individuals "who are limited in their ability to travel outside their home, the internet is one of the few available means of access to the goods and services in our society." (Id. ¶ 49.)

On July 12, 2016, the Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit, claiming that Winn–Dixie's website is in violation of the ADA because it is inaccessible to the visually impaired. (ECF No. 1.) On October 24, 2016, the Defendant filed its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, asserting that websites are not places of public accommodation under the ADA, and thus its website could not have violated the ADA as a matter of law. (ECF No. 15.) After the briefing was complete, the United States filed a Statement of Interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517. (ECF No. 23.) Winn–Dixie subsequently moved to strike the Statement of Interest. (ECF No. 25.) The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and the motion to strike are ripe for the Court's review.

2. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a party may move for judgment on the pleadings "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial ...." Judgment on the pleadings is only appropriate if there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Palmer & Cay, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., Inc., 404 F.3d 1297, 1303 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In ruling on the motion, "[a]ll facts alleged in the complaint must be accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Scott v. Taylor, 405 F.3d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

3. Analysis

As an initial matter, the Court must address the Defendant's motion to strike the Government's Statement of Interest. The Defendant asserts that the Court must strike the Statement of Interest because it was untimely and filed without leave of the Court. (ECF No. 25.) However, as the Government explained, 28 U.S.C. § 517, which allows an officer of the Department of Justice ("DOJ") to file a statement of interest, contains no time limitation and does not require the Court's leave. (Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Strike at 1–2, ECF No. 27.) Courts have interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 517 broadly and have generally denied motions to strike statements of interest. See, e.g. , Alvey v. Gualtieri , No. 15-1861, 2016 WL 6071746, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2016) (denying motion to strike United States' statement of interest because it was timely, not redundant, and provided the "valuable perspective" of the DOJ); Ferrand v. Schedler , No. 11-926, 2012 WL 1247215, at *1–2 (E.D. La. April 13, 2012) (denying motion to strike United States' statement of interest and noting that "the United States has broad discretion to attend to any interests of the United States"). Accordingly, the Court denies Winn–Dixie's motion to strike (ECF No. 25) and will proceed to its analysis of whether websites are public accommodations under the ADA.

Title III of the ADA prohibits the owner of a place of public accommodation from discriminating "on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation..." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). The ADA defines a public accommodation as a private entity whose operations affect commerce, and which falls within one of the following twelve categories:

A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment located within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the residence of such proprietor;

B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;

C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment;

D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public gathering;E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment;

F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment;

G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;

H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;

I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;

J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school, or other place of education;

K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption agency, or other social service center establishment; and

L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation.

42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).

The Attorney General has promulgated regulations that further define a public accommodation as "a facility operated by a private entity, whose operations affect commerce and fall within at least one of [ 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)'s twelve categories]." 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. The regulation defines "facility" as "all or any portion of buildings, structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal property, including the site where the building, property, structure, or equipment is located." Id.

Winn–Dixie admits that its physical grocery stores and pharmacies are places of public accommodation. (Answer ¶ 16, ECF No. 7.) However, Winn–Dixie disputes that its website qualifies as a public accommodation under the ADA. The Plaintiff asserts that Winn–Dixie's website is a public accommodation for two reasons. First, the Plaintiff asserts that Winn–Dixie's website is a public accommodation in and of itself because it allows customers to fill or re-fill prescriptions for in-store pick up or for delivery. (Compl. ¶ 21, ECF No. 1.) Therefore, the Plaintiff asserts that this service makes Winn–Dixie's website a sales establishment, which is an enumerated public accommodation pursuant to the ADA. (Id. ) Second, the Plaintiff asserts that the website is "directly connected" to the physical stores and has a "true nexus" to Winn–Dixie's grocery and pharmacy stores. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 20.) In furtherance of this assertion, the Plaintiff alleges that the website "augments" Winn–Dixie's physical store locations by assisting customers in finding physical store locations, educating the public as to the line of Winn–Dixie brand grocery items as well as other grocery items, and providing the public with the ability to fill and re-fill prescriptions from its pharmacy for in-store pick-up and delivery. (Id. ¶ 67.)

Courts are split on whether the ADA limits places of public accommodation to physical spaces. Courts in the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits have found that the ADA can apply to a website independent of any connection between the website and a physical place. See, e.g. , Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., Retirement Plan of the Pillsbury, Co., and others , 268 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted) (stating that "An insurance company can no more refuse to sell a policy to a disabled person over the Internet than a furniture store can refuse to sell furniture to a disabled person who enters the store... The site of the sale is irrelevant to Congress's goal of granting the disabled equal access to sellers of...