Gilbert v. West End St. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 06 January 1894
• Citation: 36 N.E. 60,160 Mass. 403
• Parties: GILBERT v. WEST END ST. RY. CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

160 Mass. 403

36 N.E. 60

GILBERT v. WEST END ST. RY. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

January 6, 1894

Plaintiff requested the following rulings of law "(1) That, if it was possible for the defendant to prevent this accident, then defendant was negligent. (2) That the burden of proof is on defendant in this action to prove that it was not negligent, and that it did everything that could have been done to prevent the accident." The court refused to make such rulings, and plaintiff excepted, but waived exception to the second on the argument.

The defendant, among others, asked for certain rulings of law, to which the plaintiff objected, but in respect to which the court instructed the jury as follows: "(1) A common carrier is bound to delay at a station or stopping place only a reasonable length of time for the purpose of allowing passengers to alight, unless those in charge know, or have reason to know, that some passenger has not got off, and is desiring to do so. (2) Passengers on a street car, when at their place of destination, should leave the car with reasonable dispatch; and after the car has stopped a reasonable time for passengers to get off, and as soon as all passengers destined for a particular place, or intending to get off there, have apparently left, and the conductor has no notice that any one else is trying to get off, then the conductor may properly start his car. (3) If the car had stopped a reasonable time, and the plaintiff did not step from the car until after the car had started, and was not, at the time of starting the car, apparently in the act of leaving it, and the conductor did not know, or have any notice, or have reason to know that the plaintiff was intending or desiring to get off there, then there was no negligence on his part in starting the car. (4) If the jury find that the car had waited a reasonable length of time for passengers to alight, and that the plaintiff delayed, and was not apparently in the act of leaving the car when the bell was given for the car to start, and the conductor had no notice or knowledge of the plaintiff's intention or desire to get off, then there was no negligence in starting the car. (5) The conductor was not bound to know that every passenger had left the car that was intending to leave it at that place, in the absence of any sign of such intention; and if, after waiting a reasonable time, he took reasonable means to see whether passengers were at the time leaving the car and no one appeared to be leaving it, and the conductor did not know, or have any reason to know, that the plaintiff was intending to get off, there was no negligence in starting the car."

COUNSEL

Eugene P. Carver and Edward E. Blodgett, for plaintiff.

M.F Dickinson, Jr., and Wm. B. Sprout, for defendant.

OPINION

FIELD C.J.

The plaintiff fell from the running board of an open electric car, and was injured. The principal question of fact in the case was whether the plaintiff stepped from the running board to the ground after the car had started, or whether the conductor caused the car to start while the plaintiff was in the act of stepping off. Some other questions connected with this were whether the conductor caused the car to stop a reasonable length of time for passengers to alight; whether at the time he caused the car to start after having it stopped, he had any notice or knowledge that the plaintiff...