Gilbertson v. Independent School Dist. No. 1
| Decision Date | 14 June 1940 |
| Docket Number | No. 32496.,32496. |
| Citation | 293 N.W. 129,208 Minn. 51 |
| Parties | GILBERTSON v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1, WILKIN COUNTY. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Wilkin County; S. A. Flaherty, Judge.
Action by S. G. Gilbertson against Independent School District No. 1, Wilkin County, Minn., for alleged breach of contract under which plaintiff was employed as superintendent of schools. From an order denying defendant's alternative motion for amended findings or new trial, defendant appeals.
Order reversed, with directions to enter judgment for defendant.
Leo A. Reuther, of Breckenridge, for appellant.
Oscar Hallam, of St. Paul, for respondent.
Action for breach of contract, tried without a jury. Plaintiff prevailed. Defendant appeals from the order denying its alternative motion for amended findings or new trial.
Plaintiff was employed by defendant under written contract bearing date of April 6, 1938. Thereunder he became superintendent of schools at Breckenridge. His salary was fixed at $2,600. The contract is governed by the general school tenure law, L.1937, c. 161, Mason Minn.St.1940 Supp. § 2903 et seq. It declares that such a contract shall continue
March 30, 1939, at a special meeting of the board called for the purpose of re-electing teachers, a motion was made that plaintiff "be re-elected for the coming year at a salary of $2,600." That motion was lost by a vote of four to two.
All the other members of the board had written notice of that meeting. There is testimony by the secretary that plaintiff had telephone notice of it. Notwithstanding, there is a finding that he "was not notified in any manner of the calling of said meeting, and had no opportunity to be present at said meeting, and was not present at said meeting".
1. The statute, Mason Minn.St. 1940 Supp. § 2807, declares that a superintendent of schools such as plaintiff "shall be ex-officio a member of the board, but not entitled to vote therein". That puts him in an anomalous position, for about the only function of members is to vote at board meetings. In Jensen v. Independent Consolidated School District, 160 Minn. 233, 199 N.W. 911, 912, we held that the superintendent was not a member of the board for purposes of removal. We considered his membership to be a "limited one * * * for advisory purposes".
We pass the obvious impropriety of plaintiff's participating as a member of the board in action pertaining to his own contract. We hold that inasmuch as, in any event, he has no right to vote as a member, the failure to give him notice of the meeting of March 30, 1939, did not affect the validity of its proceedings. At best, his function as member ex officio is limited by statute to that of a counsellor. It was certainly not the intention of the statute that school board meetings could not be held without notice to the superintendent. To hold otherwise to say that absence of such notice would nullify all proceedings of the meeting, would be to reach an absurdity of conclusion such as it can not be supposed the legislature could have intended.
2. We consider unsound the argument that action taken by the board on the question of plaintiff's re-election did not amount to a formal and effective termination of the contract. That action was had and notice thereof given to plaintiff before April 1st. Thereby the contract came to an end.
Members of school boards are laymen. Anyway, they are not lawyers, and it is not permissible to apply to the formal record of their action any standard of legalism so precise and narrow as to thwart a lawfully and clearly expressed purpose.
The proposition put to the board, and acted upon in the negative, was that plaintiff "be re-elected for the coming year at a salary of $2,600". That is, the motion was to re-elect him at the...
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