Gilchrist v. State

Decision Date01 September 1992
Docket NumberNo. 1594,1594
Citation627 A.2d 44,97 Md.App. 55
PartiesGary GILCHRIST v. STATE of Maryland. ,
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Nancy M. Cohen, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

David R. Durfee, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Stuart O. Simms, State's Atty. for Baltimore City, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Submitted before WILNER, C.J., BLOOM and JOHNSON, JJ., and G.R. HOVEY, Judge, Specially Assigned.

Opinion by BLOOM, Judge.

In this appeal we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in striking the jury panel and beginning jury selection anew based on a finding that defense counsel had used peremptory strikes for a racially biased purpose. The facts of this case distinguish it from other instances of racial prejudice. We are convinced by the Supreme Court's decisions in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and Georgia v. McCollum, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992), and this Court's decisions in Mejia v. State, 90 Md.App. 31, 599 A.2d 1207, vacated and remanded, 328 Md. 522, 616 A.2d 356 (1992), and Brashear v. State, 90 Md.App. 709, 603 A.2d 901, cert. denied, 327 Md. 523, 610 A.2d 796 (1992), to conclude that the trial court correctly dismissed the jury panel. Accordingly, we affirm the lower court.

Facts

The appellant, Gary Gilchrist, was charged with distribution of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, the Honorable Ellen M. Heller presiding, on August 3rd and 4th of 1992. Appellant was convicted of both charges and sentenced to concurrent terms of five years imprisonment. From this conviction he now appeals.

During the jury selection process, the prosecuting attorney, Ms. McNamara, expressed her concern that defense counsel was exercising the use of her peremptory strikes in a racially biased manner. The following colloquy occurred between the court and counsel:

MS. STEPHENSON: Your Honor, may we approach?

THE COURT: Yes.

(Counsel and the defendant approached the bench, and the following ensued:)

THE COURT: Do you want to try to get that juror back who was just excused? Yes? MS. McNAMARA: I don't know the name of the case, but it is the case that came down after Basso which indicates that there are--there is no right to any racially motivated strikes. And every strike so far exercised by the defense counsel has been of white jurors.

Some of those jurors have not answered questions so it cannot be based on the fact that they gave answers that would indicate--

THE COURT: Which juror are you questioning or do you want to go through a reason for each of them?

MS. McNAMARA: For each one.

THE COURT: All right. That's seven jurors you've struck. They were all white. Let's go through them one by one and give me the reasons you struck them.

Juror number one?

MS. STEPHENSON: She is a victim of a crime, Judge.

THE COURT: What crime?

MS. STEPHENSON: She's the victim of a robbery, a store was held up.

MS. McNAMARA: Excuse me--

THE COURT: Her parents?

MS. STEPHENSON: Right. Parents and grandparents.

MS. McNAMARA: Do you want me to address them as we go through them?

THE COURT: I appreciate it.

MS. McNAMARA: Your Honor, as to Juror Number One, there was no--she was one of many people who indicated that she was the victim of a crime. Also after questioning she indicated that could be fair and there was no request to strike her for cause at the time that we were at the bench initially.

THE COURT: Well, that's right. But what I do for cause is still different from what she does for peremptory. Although I wouldn't see it reason for cause.

I don't think even with the latest decision you need a cause. You just cannot have a racially discriminatory reason for striking someone.

MS. McNAMARA: I'm just putting--

THE COURT: That doesn't mean you can't strike for your own reasons.

MS. McNAMARA: I'm just putting my reasons on the record.

THE COURT: Okay. Until the day they say that we do [away] with peremptories--and we're almost there--I cannot--you strike for your cause as long as it's not a discriminatory, unconstitutional reason. But we'll go through--all right.

MS. STEPHENSON: Can I just ask one question before we go on?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. STEPHENSON: What is the remedy for this, a new panel?

THE COURT: Well, it might be just that.

MS. STEPHENSON: It's really rather interesting.

THE COURT: It is true that of seven jurors you struck, they were all white.

MS. STEPHENSON: I understand that is true.

THE COURT: So let's go through them.

MS. STEPHENSON: But the record should reflect the first three--six--the first six jurors on the first page are all white. The next--and then the next three were black and the next one was white. That's on the first page.

THE COURT: All right. But now that the call has been made, I've got to, in the first instance, make a decision--

MS. STEPHENSON: Okay.

THE COURT: --whether or not your reason was discriminatory because of an individual's race. I mean, that's what the cases say.

MS. STEPHENSON: That's true, Judge. But I want the record to reflect that the majority of the jurors that were presented to me were, in fact, white. There have been very few black jurors that have been called up.

THE COURT: But as I understand the case law, that's [sic] still might have it. The circumstances and the context might explain, but we've got to go through them one by one.

MS. STEPHENSON: Okay.

THE COURT: The next juror in numbers of where they were seated, not the numbers of who you struck, was Juror Number--Summons Number 117, Juror Number Three, you struck.

MS. STEPHENSON: Judge, I personally, by looking at her--I see jurors in the box and I look at the way they relate to each other.

THE COURT: Well, how did she look?

MS. STEPHENSON: She looked--she reminded me of my Catholic school teacher that I didn't particularly like, and I didn't particularly--

THE COURT: I don't find that was a valid reason.

MS. STEPHENSON: Well, that's why I struck her, Judge.

THE COURT: She looked like your Catholic school teacher?

MS. STEPHENSON: Her look in the box at the other people who were in the box.

THE COURT: That's not a satisfactory explanation. Now, let's continue.

MS. STEPHENSON: Well, that's why I struck her.

THE COURT: Did you not like your Catholic school teacher, Ms. Stephenson?

MS. STEPHENSON: Not that particular one she reminded me of.

THE COURT: All right. Let's go through them. The next one I have is Juror Number Five, Summons Number 122.

MS. STEPHENSON: I thought, Judge, he was young. I didn't think particularly he would be a strong juror for my case by looking at him.

THE COURT: And why was that?

MS. STEPHENSON: Because I look at the way he fits into the persons that are on the panel. And what I'm trying to accomplish from the look of him, from the way he sat--

THE COURT: Well, how did he look from the way he was sitting that made you feel he was not good, other than the fact he was white and young?

MS. STEPHENSON: Well, he--number one, most of the jurors would look at my client and look over at the table. He was just sitting there not relating to anything in the room.

THE COURT: Because he wasn't relating to your client?

MS. STEPHENSON: Not relating to anything or anyone in the room. Frankly, I don't think he even wanted to be here.

THE COURT: I don't think that's a satisfactory explanation either. Let's continue. Juror Number Nine who was Summons Number 131 was also struck by you.

MS. STEPHENSON: 131?

THE COURT: Summons 131, Juror Number Nine, was also struck by you.

MS. STEPHENSON: Okay. Her brother--

THE COURT: It was a him. It was Juror--Summons Number 131.

MS. McNAMARA: On the bottom of the first page.

MS. STEPHENSON: 131. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Juror Number Nine.

MS. STEPHENSON: I believe this is the young man who--was it Juror Number Nine?

THE COURT: Juror Number--Summons Nine--Summons 131, Juror Number Nine.

MS. STEPHENSON: Okay. My client looked over at him. He said--my client said he was acting kind of peculiar.

THE COURT: How?

MS. STEPHENSON: I don't know. I didn't.

THE DEFENDANT: He stared at me.

THE COURT: He stared at you?

THE DEFENDANT: He stared at me.

THE COURT: And he made you feel uncomfortable when he stared?

THE DEFENDANT: When he stared at me.

THE COURT: All right. At your client's request then you struck the juror?

MS. STEPHENSON: Yes.

THE COURT: I find that's an acceptable reason. You may continue. Let's go.

Juror Number 137 was also struck by the defense. I don't have the number down of what that juror was in the box.

MS. McNAMARA: 137. He never got to the box.

MS. STEPHENSON: No. He never got to the box.

THE COURT: He never got to the box. He was struck then. All right. Then the next one that got to the box that you struck I believe was 143.

MS. McNAMARA: She did not get to the box either.

MS. STEPHENSON: She was held up at gunpoint.

THE COURT: Oh, she wasn't in the box. I'm trying to--

MS. McNAMARA: Those were all that were in the box.

THE COURT: One--

MS. McNAMARA: Four in the box.

THE COURT: And the others were not in the box?

MS. McNAMARA: Correct.

THE COURT: Well, so let's go through--are you challenging those as well.

MS. McNAMARA: I'm not challenging--I believe there's a basis for striking 143. She was robbed at gunpoint.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let's go through them one by one. Juror Number--

MS. McNAMARA: 137

MS. STEPHENSON: --137 was struck why?

MS. STEPHENSON: By me.

THE COURT: Why?

MS. STEPHENSON: Oh, why? He was--I don't have anything written on here.

THE COURT: Let the record reflect he was a young white male in a navy blazer and khaki slacks.

MS. STEPHENSON: I believe he was--I remember him, Judge, and he was struck for the very [sic] we...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • Davis v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Maryland
    • 1 Septiembre 1992
    ...grounds should ideally lead the Court to ban them entirely from the criminal justice system."); Gilchrist v. State, 97 Md.App. 55, 78, 627 A.2d 44, 55 (1993) (Wilner, C.J., concurring) (stating that, in light of Batson, peremptory challenges should be eliminated as a matter of public policy......
  • Bridges v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 1 Septiembre 1996
    ...peremptories exercised against Whites as surely as we have applied them to those exercised against Blacks. Gilchrist v. State, 97 Md.App. 55, 627 A.2d 44 (1993), aff'd 340 Md. 606, 667 A.2d 876 (1995). Cf. Ball v. Martin, 108 Md.App. 435, 672 A.2d 143 The coverage of Batson was arguably sig......
  • State v. Thomas
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Maryland
    • 10 Mayo 2002
    ...the exercise of peremptory challenges. Davis, 333 Md. at 47, 633 A.2d at 877 (emphasis added); Cf. Gilchrist v. State, 97 Md.App. 55, 78, 627 A.2d 44, 55 (1993)(Wilner, C.J., concurring) (explaining his belief that peremptory challenges should be eliminated as a matter of public policy beca......
  • Gilchrist v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Maryland
    • 1 Septiembre 1993
    ...conviction, the terms to run concurrently. Gilchrist took an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed. Gilchrist v. State, 97 Md.App. 55, 627 A.2d 44 (1993). His principal argument was that the Batson holding was inapplicable to peremptory challenges against white potential ju......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Jury Selection and the Coase Theorem
    • United States
    • Iowa Law Review No. 97-5, July 2012
    • 1 Julio 2012
    ...(Hubbart, J., concurring) (arguing in favor of abolishing peremptory strikes), aff’d , 606 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1993); Gilchrist v. State, 627 A.2d 44, 55–56 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (Wilner, J., concurring) (suggesting reconsideration of peremptory challenges), aff’d , 667 A.2d 876 (Md. 1995)......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT