Gilcoat v. State
Decision Date | 13 November 1922 |
Docket Number | 258 |
Citation | 244 S.W. 723,155 Ark. 455 |
Parties | GILCOAT v. STATE |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Arkansas Circuit Court, Southern District; Georqe W Clark, Judge; reversed.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.
John W. Moncrief, for appellant.
J S. Utley,Attorney General, Elbert Godwin and W. T.Hammock, Assistants, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of grand larceny on an indictment which charged the appellant, in two counts, of the crimes of grand larceny and receiving stolen property.The testimony for the State tended to prove that Wade Langham lived about four miles southwest of Dewitt, Arkansas, in Arkansas County.He owned a number of hogs which ranged about four miles from his home across Mill Bayou.His hogs were marked with a crop off the left ear and a swallow-fork in the right.Langham received information that some hogs that were marked with his mark were in a pen of an old chicken- house in the possession of the appellant.Appellant lived ten miles from Langham and about six miles from where the hogs had usually ranged.Langham, in company with some of his neighbors, went to appellant's home and identified the hogs as his property.Appellant was not at home when Langham first identified the hogs, nor on the day when he went and got them.Appellant lived in the edge of the timber.There was prairie between appellant's house and Langham's.Langham had not seen his hogs for about a month and a half before the appellant put them up.Langham had forty-seven head on the range and lost twenty-six.He got nine head of his hogs from the appellant on the 5th of November.If the hogs had gone straight, they would have gone over some prairie.Part of appellant's pen was walled up on three sides and the other side was wire.The hogs could not be seen from the highway.The appellant did not make any claim for the hogs.The hogs were not fresh marked, and they had not been in any way disfigured.One of the hogs was not marked at all.
The testimony for the appellant tended to prove that on one Sunday, while appellant and his brother were hunting, on returning home they noticed some hogs.Appellant thought the hogs belonged to one Mr. Brewer, and they drove them home and put them in the pen Sunday evening.Appellant killed two hogs on Monday, but they were his own hogs and marked with his own mark.
Brewer testified that he had some hogs to stray away, and that he met the appellant and told him about these hogs and about the mark.It was only a few months afterward that he heard about the appellant getting into this trouble.Witness told the appellant about this mark, but didn't know whether appellant remembered what he said the mark was or not.
Another witness testified that he met appellant in the fall of 1919 and the appellant inquired of him in regard to a mark that he was certain about and asked witness if witness knew Brewer's mark.Appellant said to witness, "I believe I have got a bunch of his (Brewer's) hogs in the pen," and described the mark, and asked witness if that was Brewer's mark, and witness told him that he didn't know, but it was something like that.
The court, in instruction No. 3, defined the word "feloniously" as follows:
InstructionsNo. 6andNo. 7 are as follows:
The appellant presented the following prayers for instructions:
1.Under the evidence the issue as to whether or not appellant was guilty of the larceny of Langham's hogs, as charged in the indictment, was one of fact for the jury, but this issue was not submitted upon correct instructions.The indictment in the first count charged the appellant with the crime of grand larceny committed as follows: "Eight hogs, the personal property of Wade Langham, unlawfully and feloniously did take, steal, and drive away."The court, in its third instruction, defined the word "feloniously" used in the indictment as follows: Under our statute larceny "is the felonious stealing, taking, and carrying, riding or driving away, the personal property of another."Sec. 2483, C. & M. Digest.The word "felonious," as used in the statute, means that at the time of the taking and asportation there must exist in the mind of the taker the intent to convert or appropriate permanently to his own use the property of the other person.In other words, to constitute larceny the taking and asportation must be animo furandi.
The term "felonious," as employed in our larceny statute, is not used with reference to the kind and value of the property taken, nor to designate the punishment therefor.It is not for the purpose of distinguishing crimes that are punishable in the State Penitentiary and those not so punished, but it is used here to characterize the intent that must exist in the mind of the taker at the time of the taking and asportation.It must be a felonious intent as above defined.SeeMason v. State,32 Ark. 238;Douglass v. State,91 Ark. 492;Gooch v. State,60 Ark. 5, 28 S.W. 510--9;Fulton v. State,13 Ark. 168;Jones v. State,85 Ark. 360;Bailey v. State,92 Ark. 216, 122 S.W. 497;Little v. State,119 Ark. 430, 178 S.W....
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Anderson v. State
...but will apply it to the whole scope of the charge, against the accused and to every fact essential to the crime. Gilcoat v. State, 155 Ark. 455, 462, 244 S.W. 723, 726 (1922) (quoting Section 19, p. 35, UNDERHILL ON CRIMINAL EVIDENCE)4 In 1990, we restated the fundamental nature of the pre......
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Chaviers v. State
...is not significantly different from the previous requirement of specific intent in cases of larceny and embezzlement. See Gilcoat v. State, 155 Ark. 455, 244 S.W. 723; Mason v. State, 32 Ark. 238; Heath v. State, 207 Ark. 425, 181 S.W.2d 231; State v. Guthrie, 176 Ark. 1041, 5 S.W.2d 306. B......
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Mays v. State
... ... presumption of guilt. Other cases holding to this effect are ... cited in Long v. State, supra. The latter ... part of the instruction is a correct statement of the law, ... but it did not cure the vice of the language of the first ... part, just quoted." See also, Gilcoat v ... State, 155 Ark. 455, 244 S.W. 723; Spivey ... v. State, 133 Ark. 314, 198 S.W. 101; Long ... v. State, 140 Ark. 413, 216 S.W. 306; ... Alexander v. State, 128 Ark. 35, 193 S.W ... 78; Mitchell v. State, 125 Ark. 260, 188 ... S.W. 805; Sons v. State, 116 Ark. 357, 172 ... S.W. 1029; ... ...
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Underwood v. State
... ... that convinces you; and it is also true that if you are not ... so satisfied it is not necessary that you should be able to ... point out the particular matter giving rise to your mental ... condition in that respect.'" ... In the ... case of Gilcoat v. State, 155 Ark. 455, 244 ... S.W. 723, the court had under consideration an instruction ... relating to reasonable doubt, and Mr. Justice Wood, speaking ... for the court, there said: "Judge Riddick, speaking for ... this court in Bell v. State, 81 Ark. 16, 98 ... S.W. 705, in an ... ...