Giles v. Ackerman, Civ. No. 81-4151.

• Decision Date: 09 February 1983
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 81-4151.
• Citation: 559 F. Supp. 226
• Parties: Julie Ann GILES, Plaintiff, v. Richard (Dick) J. ACKERMAN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Idaho

559 F. Supp. 226

Julie Ann GILES, Plaintiff, v. Richard (Dick) J. ACKERMAN, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 81-4151.

United States District Court, D. Idaho.

February 9, 1983.

Hopkins, French, Crockett & Springer, Larry L. Goins, Idaho Falls, Idaho, American Civil Liberties Union, Stephen L. Pevar, Denver, Colo., for plaintiff.

Lund & Associates, Lynn J. Lund, Salt Lake City, Utah, Fanning & Radin, John Radin, Idaho Falls, Idaho, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

CALLISTER, Chief Judge.

Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment regarding plaintiff's claim of deprivation of constitutional rights arising out of the strip search conducted by Bonneville County Sheriff's employees on October 26, 1981. Plaintiff's complaint also alleges that the defendants failed to fully explain bail procedures following her arrest, but that issue is not addressed by the present motions.

The plaintiff in this action is a young, married woman. The gist of her complaint is that, when arrested pursuant to a warrant for failure to appear and pay parking tickets, Bonneville County authorities failed to adequately explain bonding procedures and conducted a strip search. The parties have stipulated to certain facts which have been filed of record. The parties have not asserted any material issues of fact involving the search of the plaintiff, and the Court finds, as the record reflects, that none exist. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

The starting point in any Fourth Amendment analysis is the standard of reasonableness. "The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of `reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law enforcement agents ...." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-96, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).

The United States Supreme Court, in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1976), stated

the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.

Id. at 559, 99 S.Ct. at 1884.

In Bell, the court further observed that a detention facility is a unique place fraught with serious security dangers. Smuggling of money, drugs, weapons, and other contraband is all too common an occurrence. And inmate attempts to secrete these items into the facility by concealing them in body cavities are documented in this record, and in other cases.... That there has been only one instance where an MCC inmate was discovered attempting to smuggle contraband into the institution on his person may be more a testament to the effectiveness of this search technique as a deterrent than to any lack of interest on the part of the inmates to secrete and import such items when the opportunity arises.

We do not underestimate the degree to which these searches may invade the personal privacy of inmates. Nor do we doubt, as the District Court noted, that on occasion a security guard may conduct the search in an abusive fashion. Such abuse cannot be condoned. The searches must be conducted in a reasonable manner. But we deal here with the question whether visual body-cavity inspections as contemplated by the MCC rules can ever be conducted on less than probable cause. Balancing the significant and legitimate security interests of the institution against the privacy interests of the inmates, we conclude that they can.

Id., at 559-60, 99 S.Ct. at 1884-85 (citations omitted).

The federal courts have at times sustained strip searches as a matter of routine, see, e.g., Inmates of Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754 (3rd Cir.1979); United States v. Klein, 522 F.2d 296 (1st Cir.1975); United States v. Bradford, 496 F.Supp. 366 (D.Conn.1980), aff'd 645 F.2d 115 (2nd Cir. 1981); Armstrong v. Borie, 494 F.Supp. 902 (E.D.Pa.1980), and at other times have limited strip searches as a matter of routine. Often, the courts have ruled that the manner in which a strip search is conducted renders the search constitutionally impermissible.

In Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir.1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 942, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982), cited by the plaintiff, the court noted that the strip search was conducted in an improper manner because it was conducted in a place open to the view of people who might be passing by the window of the room where the search occurred. In Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F.Supp. 486 (E.D.Wis.1979), also cited by plaintiff, the district court there felt that, under all the circumstances, the search of non-misdemeanor defendants charged with traffic offenses who were incarcerated because they could not post bond was not justified without some probable cause to believe that the arrestees might have weapons or contraband on their person. The court did not discuss the security problems of the jail or the problems facing the officers who managed the jail, but only the problems with the manner of the strip searches.

In this case, the plaintiff has not argued that the manner in which she was searched was unreasonable. No search was conducted until it was determined that the plaintiff did not intend to make bond, and that she would be entering the perimeter of the jail until her case came up for hearing. The Court notes that the search here did not include a cavity search and that issue is not before the Court; that the search was conducted in privacy and that there was no touching of the individual; and that every reasonable courtesy was extended to the plaintiff.

The Court recognizes that it is customary in this state, on all minor traffic violations, to permit the violator to sign the citation in agreement to appear at the time specified, and be released upon that signature. The Court also recognizes it is the practice to give those who are arrested on minor petty offenses the opportunity to post bond in a reasonable amount before they are processed or searched with regard to incarceration in the jail. In fact, Idaho has adopted a uniform bail schedule for misdemeanor offenses. Idaho Misdemeanor Criminal R. 13.

The Court recognizes the unusual conditions of this case. The plaintiff was arrested on a warrant for failure to pay parking ticket violations. Plaintiff maintains that she was unaware that the tickets had been issued because her husband, who was driving the car at the time, allowed them to accumulate and neglected to pay them. Therefore, the...