Giles v. Hindsman
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-00256-MR-WCM |
| Decision Date | 14 April 2022 |
| Parties | ERIC GILES, Plaintiff, v. JOHN STEPHEN HINDSMAN, JR., Individually and in his capacity as Assistant District Attorney for the Thirtieth Judicial District now Judicial District 43, ASHLEY WELCH, Individually and in her capacity as District Attorney for the Thirtieth Judicial District now Judicial District 43 Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5), which has been referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 for the entry of a recommendation.
On August 27, 2021, Plaintiff Eric Giles (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of Clay County, North Carolina. Doc. 1-1. Plaintiff's Complaint named John Stephen Hindsman, Jr., “individually and in his capacity as Assistant District Attorney for the Thirtieth Judicial District (now Judicial District 43)” (“Hindsman”) and Ashley Welch, “individually and in her capacity as District Attorney for the Thirtieth Judicial District (now Judicial District 43)” (“Welch”) as defendants and alleged violations of his federal constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
On September 27, 2021, Hindsman and Welch (collectively, “Defendants”) removed the case to this court. Doc. 1.
On October 4, 2021, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss along with a supporting memorandum. Docs. 5, 6. Plaintiff has responded, and Defendants have replied. Docs. 7, 8.
Plaintiff has been employed by the Sheriff's Departments in Macon, Graham, Clay, and Cherokee Counties as a “certified law enforcement officer and/or as a Jailer.” Doc. 1-1 at ¶10.
During 2018, Plaintiff was employed as a Deputy Sheriff with Cherokee County. Id. at ¶11. That year, Plaintiff, a Democrat, filed to run for Sheriff of Macon County, North Carolina against the incumbent Sheriff, Robbie Holland, who is a Republican. Id. at ¶12. Plaintiff alleges that Welch “is a Republican and was a vocal supporter of Robbie Holland as a candidate for Sheriff.. .during the 2018 election.” Id. at ¶23.
In March of 2018, Plaintiff attended a “Sheriff's candidate forum, ” during which he stated that he had been a member of the Cherokee County drug task force. Id. at ¶¶13-14. This was a misstatement because Plaintiff had actually been a member of the drug task force in Graham County. Id. at ¶15.
On May 9, 2018, Brittany Lofthouse, a reporter for the Macon County News and Shopping Guide, accused Plaintiff on social media of lying about being on the drug task force in Cherokee County and about being a victim advocate for Clay County. Id. at ¶¶13, 16-17. Plaintiff alleges that later the same day, he posted a response acknowledging that he had misspoken regarding being on the drug task force in Cherokee County and that he also posted a letter verifying that he had been the victim witness coordinator for the Clay County Sheriffs Department. Id. at ¶18. Thereafter, Ms. Lofthouse “circulated untruthful rumors about [Plaintiff] having affairs with young women when he worked in Graham County and in Clay County.” Id. at ¶20. Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Lofthouse's husband was employed by Sheriff Holland, Plaintiff's opponent in the 2018 election. Doc. 1-1 at ¶22.
On August 28, 2018, Hindsman sent two letters, one to Plaintiff and one to Plaintiff's supervisor, the Sheriff of Cherokee County, Derrick Palmer, citing Giglio v. Unites States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Id. at ¶¶32-35 (the “Giglio Letters”).[1] The Giglio Letter sent to Sheriff Palmer advised that:
In compliance with our procedures, prosecutors in our office recently reviewed materials and information in our possession regarding substantial violations by Deputy Giles. Unfortunately, a review of these materials and information revealed that he has on more than one occasion misrepresented his duties as a law enforcement officer in his employment with both the Clay and Cherokee County Sheriff's Office in public forums. I am disheartened to inform you that Deputy Giles's ethical and moral breaches have caused us to conclude that the District Attorney's Office for the 30th Prosecutorial District will no longer be able to use him as a witness for the State of North Carolina in any criminal or traffic case. The burden of the State having to disclose his breaches each time he is called as a State witness and then attempting to rehabilitate him in front of a judge and/or jury is simply insurmountable. Our staff will be reviewing all pending cases in which he is a witness to determine whether he is an essential witness in those cases.
Doc. 1-1 at 26.[2]
Plaintiff contends that the Giglio Letters were sent by Hindsman “at the direction of and/or with the express approval” of Welch, who was Hindsman's “supervisor and superior, ” and that the Letters were sent for the improper purpose of influencing the outcome of the Macon County Sheriff's race and helping Sheriff Holland win reelection. Id. at ¶¶39-43.
Thereafter, Plaintiff was suspended with pay from the Cherokee County Sheriff's Department while the Department conducted its own investigation of the allegations contained in the Giglio Letters. The Department found “no wrongdoing on the part of' Plaintiff and he was put back on patrol duty. Id. at ¶¶45-47.
On February 2, 2019, while on patrol, Plaintiff came upon an automobile accident within the city limits of the Town of Murphy, North Carolina. Id. at ¶48. Plaintiff noticed that the driver of the automobile smelled of alcohol and was unsteady, and therefore Plaintiff contacted Officer Brandon Morgan of the Murphy Police Department. Id. at ¶49. After forming “his own independent opinion' regarding the driver's impairment, Officer Morgan sought a warrant on the driver before Cherokee County Magistrate Cliff Owl. Id. at ¶50-53. Magistrate Owl, however, declined to find probable cause to issue the warrant because Plaintiff “was involved and the Magistrate had been told ‘not to accept any charges involving the Plaintiff...due to the ‘Giglio Order''” Id. at ¶53.
Later, Plaintiff was “involuntarily transferred from patrol duty to bailiff duty at the Cherokee County Courthouse.” Id. at ¶55. “Several months” after that, Plaintiff was informed that he could either transfer to the Cherokee County Detention Center (the “Detention Center”) to work as a jailer or be terminated from employment with the Cherokee County Sheriff's Department. Id. at ¶56. Plaintiff was transferred to the Detention Center but resigned his position as a detention officer several weeks later. Id. at ¶¶57-58.
Plaintiff contends that he was transferred to the Detention Center as a direct result of the Giglio Letter that was sent to his employer (Sheriff Palmer) and that he can no longer obtain employment as a law enforcement officer in North Carolina due to the Giglio Letters. Id. at ¶¶59-60. Plaintiff further contends that Defendants conducted “little or no investigation” prior to sending the Giglio Letters, that he was given no meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to the dissemination of the Giglio Letters, that the reason cited for his disqualification was invalid, and that other officers who have received “oral ‘Giglios'” have been used as witnesses in criminal cases. Id. at ¶¶61-69.
When considering a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, determines “whether the complaint on its face states plausible claims upon which relief can be granted.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 189, 192 (4th Cir. 2009); accord Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009).
The court, however, is not required to accept “legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d at 255; see Giacomelli, 588 F.3d at 192. That is, while “detailed factual allegations” are not required, the complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d at 255. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); accord Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d at 255. In short, the well-pled factual allegations must move a plaintiff's claim from conceivable to plausible. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d at 256.
The question of absolute immunity may be appropriately considered on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) “where the issue presented is purely a legal determination based on the facts alleged in the complaint.” Hyatt v. Town of Lake Lure, 225 F.Supp.2d 647, 656 (W.D. N.C. 2002) (citing Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1114-16 (6th Cir. 1997) ()); see also Savage v. Maryland, 896 F.3d 260, 268 (4th Cir. 2018) ().
Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his due process, equal protection, and First Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. Id. at ¶¶75-78. He seeks a “permanent injunction mandating that the Defendants rescind” and nullify the Giglio...
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