Giles v. Manser
| Decision Date | 11 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 17-15018,17-15018 |
| Parties | OLIVER GILES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J.B. MANSER, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
Non-Argument Calendar
D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-04215-LMM
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
Oliver Giles appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment and intentional infliction of emotion distress ("IIED") under Georgia law. On appeal, Giles argues that he met the pleading requirements for his IIED claim under both Georgia and federal law. Giles also appeals the denial of his motion to amend his complaint for a second time, arguing that the motion should have been granted because the amendments would not have prejudiced J.B. Manser, the defendant below, and would not have been futile. Finally, Giles argues that his claims for malicious prosecution and false arrest should not have been dismissed because Manser lacked arguable probable cause when he swore out a warrant for Giles's arrest and therefore was not entitled to qualified immunity.1 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and vacate in part.
We first consider whether the District Court properly dismissed Giles's IIED claim. We review a district court's order granting a "motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Murphy v. DCI Biologicals Orlando, LLC, 797 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2015). A plaintiff'scomplaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" in order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)). This standard requires more than labels, conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65. Moreover, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
Under Georgia law, a claim of IIED has four elements: (1) the defendant's conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) there was a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the plaintiff's emotional distress; and (4) the plaintiff's emotional distress was severe. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Mosley, 634 S.E.2d 466, 470 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
The IIED-related allegations in Giles's first amended complaint are threadbare2 and lack enough detail to properly allege IIED under Georgia law. Nevertheless, Giles argues that his IIED claim should not be dismissed for tworeasons. First, Giles argues that, under Georgia case law, improper imprisonment constitutes severe emotional distress. Thus, all Giles had to do to survive the motion to dismiss was plead that he was improperly imprisoned, which he did. While it is certainly true that improper imprisonment can produce severe emotional distress under Georgia law, the two cases Giles cites do not establish that an allegation of improper imprisonment suffices to allege all the elements of IIED. Neither of Giles's cited cases concerns the sufficiency of pleadings, and in both cases the plaintiffs relied on more than their improper imprisonment to establish the elements of IIED. See Turnage v. Kasper, 704 S.E.2d 842, 849 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (); Gordon v. Frost, 388 S.E.2d 362, 365 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (). Unsurprisingly, Georgia courts dismiss IIED claims when plaintiffs fail to allege facts supporting the elements of IIED. See, e.g., Thompson-El v. Bank of Am., N.A., 759 S.E.2d 49, 53 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss under Georgia IIED law, Giles was required to plead more than the conclusory allegation that he suffered IIED.
Giles's second argument is that Georgia's pleading standard should apply instead of Rule 8(a)(2) and that, under Georgia's standard, his complaint is not subject to dismissal. Giles is correct to note that Georgia's pleading standard is more lenient than the federal standard. See Babalola v. HSBC Bank, USA, N.A., 751 S.E.2d 545, 549 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) . But Giles filed his pendant IIED claim in federal court, so the applicable standard is Rule 8(a)(2). See Palm Beach Golf Ctr.-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, 781 F.3d 1245, 1259-60 (11th Cir. 2015); Caster v. Hennessey, 781 F.2d 1569, 1570 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).3 Giles was thus required to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974, consisting of "more than labels and conclusions," id. at 545, 127 S. Ct. at 1965-66. This he did not do.4
We next consider whether the District Court properly denied Giles's motion to amend his complaint a second time. We review a district court's denial of a motion to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion where the district court had discretion to deny the motion as futile. Coventry First, LLC v. McCarty, 605 F.3d 865, 869 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). But "we review de novo a decision that a particular amendment to the complaint would be futile." Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
Rule 15(a)(1) gives a plaintiff the right to amend a complaint once as a matter of course, so long as no responsive pleading has been filed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1).5 After that, a plaintiff must seek the consent of the opposing party or the court's leave to amend. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). By the time he moved to amend his first amended complaint, Giles had already amended his complaint once. Thus, the question here is whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying a second amendment under Rule 15(a)(2).
In analyzing this question, this Court has held that a proposed amendment may be denied for futility "when the complaint as amended would still be properly dismissed." Coventry First, 605 F.3d at 870 (quoting Cockrell, 510 F.3d at 1310).Here, Giles's proposed second amended complaint asserts nothing factually different from his first amended complaint; it merely introduces new legal arguments. Because the proposed second amended complaint alleges the same facts as the first amended complaint, which the District Court dismissed, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Giles's motion for futility.6
Finally, we come to Giles's § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution and false arrest. The District Court dismissed both of these claims, holding that Manser was protected by qualified immunity. For the reasons discussed below, this was error.
As a preliminary matter, we agree with the District Court that the false arrest claim should be dismissed, but for a different reason. Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, the issuance of a warrant constitutes legal process, and so a plaintiff who claims false arrest pursuant to a warrant is making a claim of malicious prosecution rather than false arrest. See Calero-Colon v. Betancourt-Lebron, 68 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995) () ( ). Because Giles was arrested pursuant to a warrant, his claim is properly one of malicious prosecution rather than false arrest.
To establish a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, Giles must prove the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution and a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.7 Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010). The elements of malicious prosecution are: "(1) a criminal prosecution instituted or continued by the present defendant; (2) with malice and without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff accused's favor; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiff accused." Id. (quoting Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 882 (11th Cir. 2003)). "When [a] malicious prosecution [claim] is brought as a federal constitutional tort, the outcome of the case does not hinge on state law, but federal law, and does not differ depending on the tort law of a particular state." Wood, 323 F.3d at 882 n.17.
As to the second requirement—the allegedly violated Fourth Amendment right—it is well established that an arrest without probable cause is an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Grider, 618 F.3d at 1256. But "a police officer cannot be liable for malicious prosecution if the arrest warrant was supported by probable cause." Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2016). Put another way, "the existence of probable cause...
To continue reading
Request your trial