Giles v. Royal Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 17 June 1901 |
| Citation | 60 N.E. 786,179 Mass. 261 |
| Parties | GILES v. ROYAL INS. CO. et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Wm M. Priest, for appellant.
A. E Pillsbury and F. W. Brown, for appellees.
The plaintiff having had a loss by fire and having claims against various insurance companies, signed an agreement intended to be a reference to arbitration under Pub. St. c. 188, with three of the companies that had insured furniture and fixtures. A little later he signed another similar agreement with eight other companies that had insured buildings. The arbitrators made an award single in form, upon the two submissions, the plaintiff moved for judgment, his motion was denied, and the case is here by appeal.
Notwithstanding the language in Monosiet v. Post, 4 Mass. 532, we are disposed to deal as little technically as possible with what seems a very good contrivance for reaching a judgment by a summary process when the parties are willing to agree to it. See Strong v. Strong, 9 Cush. 560, 564. The case of Miles v. Schmidt, 168 Mass. 339, 47 N.E. 115, has no application, as it did not concern a submission under the statute.
The joinder of defendants against whom the causes of action were several and distinct in a single instrument does not seem to us fatal. Each submission may be regarded as in substance equivalent to as many submissions as there are defendants, although there are reasons to be mentioned which made it desirabe to bring the policies on a single subject matter into a single proceeding. If it should be urged that there must be several judgments and that, as the submission is to be the foundation of record upon which each judgment is to rest, when the cause of action is distinct the submission should be distinct also to the same extent as the writ and pleadings of which it takes the place (Whitney v Cook, 5 Mass. 139, 143), the answer is that the submission may be entered as many times as there are separate defendants. But, further, the misjoinder of defendants severally liable in contract and severally capable of submitting their case to the jurisdiction of the court in this form does not affect the jurisdiction of the arbitrators or of the court, and it would not be going very far to say that by consenting to a single submission the several defendants have estopped themselves to object to the joinder, which is their own act, and that no one else can complain.
However, we do not mean to stop here. It is evident that the joinder of parties was with an intelligent design which we see no reason for not carrying out. It is true that the claims against different insurance companies are distinct. But if all policies are on the same risk it is at least convenient, and may be important, that all the companies should be represented in any adjustment that takes place. Their burdens may have to be equalized in one way or another. Wiggin v. Insurance Co., 18 Pick. 145, 153; May, Ins. (4th Ed.)§ 13; Massachusetts Standard Form (St. 1894, c. 522, § 60). The statute allows 'all controversies which might be the subject of a suit in equity' to be submitted to arbitration as well as those which would end in a personal action at law. Pub. St. c. 188, § 1. All demands of a personal nature between the parties may be submitted at once, and the 'submission may be varied in this respect in any other manner, according to the agreement of the parties.' Section 3. It seems to us that taking these provisions together we fairly may regard it as within the scope of the statute, in such a case as we have supposed, to submit all the rights of the parties to a single award which shall determine not merely the primary legal right of the plaintiff under his several contracts but also the subsidiary equities of all the parties, at least so far as they affect the amount ultimately to be paid by each to the plaintiff, without the many proceedings which but for this short cut might be necessary before the whole matter was at rest. We also are of opinion that the submissions by implication have this end in view. As the Superior Court now has general Equity jurisdiction, some of the reasoning in Brown v. Evans, 6 Allen, 333, no longer applies.
If we are right so far, the main difficulties are out of the way. In the opinion of a majority of the court the agreements in the submissions which go beyond the statute do not invalidate them. If there is any objection to the parties' waiving a portion of their rights, at least there is no question of illegality. So far from attempting to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts, the root of the whole matter is that the parties submit themselves to the judgment of the court. But further, the words add little to what would have...
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