Giles v. Whitaker, 22956

• Decision Date: 09 December 1988
• Docket Number: No. 22956,22956
• Citation: 297 S.C. 267,376 S.E.2d 278
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Carolyn Sue GILES, Appellant, v. Willie Louis WHITAKER and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, of whom State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company is Respondent. . Heard

Page 278

376 S.E.2d 278

297 S.C. 267

Carolyn Sue GILES, Appellant, v. Willie Louis WHITAKER and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, of whom State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company is Respondent.

No. 22956.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Dec. 9, 1988.

Decided Feb. 6, 1989.

R. Eugene Pruitt, Jr., of Hite and Pruitt, Abbeville, for appellant.

David A. Brown, of Henderson & Salley, Aiken, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant (Giles) brought this declaratory judgment action to determine whether automobile liability coverage under three insurance policies issued by respondent (State Farm) could be stacked. The trial judge held Giles was not entitled to stack the automobile liability coverage and that State Farm's liability was limited to $15,000. We affirm.

On April 4, 1986, Whitaker purchased a Jeep. At his request, State Farm deleted a Chevrolet from one of his insurance policies and substituted the Jeep in its place. This "Chevrolet policy" provided bodily injury coverage in the amount of $15,000.

While driving his Jeep four days later, Whitaker was involved in an automobile accident with Giles. Subsequently, Giles brought a personal injury action against Whitaker and obtained a verdict of $100,000. State Farm tendered Giles $15,000, the maximum bodily injury coverage available in the "Chevrolet policy."

In addition to the "Chevrolet policy," Whitaker had two other automobile liability insurance policies with State Farm in effect on the day he purchased the Jeep and on the day of the accident. One of these policies provided $15,000 bodily injury coverage and the other provided $25,000 bodily injury coverage. Neither of these policies listed the Jeep as a described vehicle. Except for the limits of coverage, the language in all three of Whitaker's policies are identical.

Giles brought this action to recover additional sums from State Farm. Giles first sought to stack the liability coverage available in Whitaker's two other policies. She claimed certain provisions in the insurance policies were invalid because they limited stacking of liability coverage.

The trial judge held Giles was not entitled to stack the coverage of the three liability insurance policies. We agree.

Stacking is defined as the insured's recovery of damages under more than one policy until all of his damages are satisfied or the limits of all available policies are met. An insurance policy provision which attempts to limit stacking of statutorily-required coverage is invalid. Jackson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 288 S.C. 335, 342 S.E.2d 603 (1986).

South Carolina Code Ann. § 56-9-820 (1976) ¹ establishes the policy minimums for automobile liability insurance. This statute has been interpreted as not requiring the insurer to provide liability coverage for...