Gilewicz v. Home Indemnity Company, 2312.

• Decision Date: 01 May 1959
• Docket Number: No. 2312.,2312.
• Citation: 150 A.2d 627
• Parties: Hanna Marie GILEWICZ, Appellant, v. HOME INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Page 627

150 A.2d 627

Hanna Marie GILEWICZ, Appellant, v. HOME INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 2312.

Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Argued January 12, 1959.

Decided May 1, 1959.

Robert L. Harmon, Washington, D. C., with whom Daniel L. Gribbon, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.

William J. Donnelly, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom Richard W. Galiher and William E. Stewart, Jr., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before ROVER, Chief Judge, and HOOD and QUINN, Associate Judges.

ROVER, Chief Judge.

The complaint alleged that appellant is a licensed real-estate salesman both in the District of Columbia and in Maryland; she was employed as such by one W. B. Wright, who was a licensed real-estate broker in both jurisdictions; that under the terms of her employment she was entitled to a commission on all sales of real estate consummated by her on his behalf; that as a result of her efforts she effected the sale of certain real property for him located in Maryland; that Wright paid her a portion of the commission due her because of this sale and upon his refusal to settle for the balance she secured judgment against him in the Municipal Court.

Appellant further alleged that appellee was surety on the real-estate broker's bonds of Wright in both jurisdictions and that as the latter had failed to satisfy her claim she was entitled to recover the amount of the judgment from appellee as surety.

The court granted appellee's motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to the provisions of Municipal Court Rule 12(c). Appellant contends here that she was entitled to prevail either under the provisions of D.C.Code 1951, § 45-1405 or Article 56, Section 217(b) of the Maryland Code. We do not agree.

Both statutes require that real-estate brokers, before being licensed, shall furnish a corporate bond. The pertinent provisions of the two statutes are set forth below.¹ The question we are called upon to decide is whether, under the circumstances here, appellant is either a "person aggrieved" under the District statute or a member of the "public" under the Maryland law.

We think the non-applicability of the local statute to appellant is answered by our decision in Eberman v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., D.C.Mun.App., 41 A. 2d 844. The facts in that case are strikingly similar to the facts here. Eberman, a licensed real-estate salesman, was employed by a licensed real-estate broker; he negotiated certain sales of real estate for which he was entitled to commissions from the broker; the latter failed to pay the entire amount due and was thereafter adjudicated a bankrupt. Eberman sued the surety on the broker's bond for the balance of the commissions due. In deciding for the surety, we said:

"The purpose and design of the [Real Estate License] Act primarily are, as stated in its title, `to protect the public against fraud in real-estate transactions.' [Citations omitted.] The protection of the public interest is the basis for the exercise of the police power in the enactment of such a law. [Citations omitted.] The bond required by the Act is, therefore, for the protection of the public, and the question here presented is whether a real estate salesman is within the general public intended to be protected by the Act and the bond given pursuant to it. The provisions of the Act must be construed in the light of the purpose of the Act and the evils it was designed to protect against. When the legislature enacts a statute regulating a business for the purpose of protecting the public against existing or potential evils in that business, those engaged in the business are not generally regarded as a part of that public. The public is protected against them and not they against their fellow businessmen." (Emphasis supplied.)²

The only Maryland decision we have been referred to is Century Indemnity Company v. State of Maryland, D.C.Md., 144 F.Supp. 671; our independent research discloses no others. While in that case the court allowed recovery against the surety on the real-estate broker's bond in favor of other brokers, we feel, for the reasons hereafter stated, that the decision does not support appellant's position. In Century, Bowman, a...