Gilford v. Watkins
| Decision Date | 06 June 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 15,15 |
| Parties | Fred A. GILFORD and Joseph M. Spalter, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Donald WATKINS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Guy C. Conkle, Jr., Boyne City, for appellant.
Albert T. Washburne, Petoskey, for appellees.
Before the Entire Bench.
This is an action of ejectment. The decision of the trial court was in favor of plaintiffs. Judgment was entered thereon, granting plaintiffs possession of certain premises in Boyne City. Motions for new trial and to set aside judgment were denied, appellant taking a general appeal therefrom. The record discloses that considerable time has elapsed in the various steps taken, both in the court below and on appeal, a practice we do not condone, but the appeal has not been challenged by reason thereof and we will proceed to a determination of the issues presented.
The appellant's principal contention is that the court erred as a matter of law and fact in finding that plaintiffs were entitled to possession of the property. A statement of the material facts involved is therefore necessary.
The plaintiffs had acquired title to the lands in question by warranty deed on April 10, 1943. They subsequently appointed one John Wilkinson of Chicago, Illinois, their agent to sell the property. In August, 1943, he negotiated with, and orally agreed to sell to, Fred Binder and his wife, of Detroit. The consideration was a cash payment of $3,150. The Binders tendered, as down payment, a check in the sum of $500, which was accepted and cashed by the agent. They then went into possession of the property, having been given the key to the premises by the agent. Subsequently, and in the month of August, 1943, the Binders contracted to sell the property to defendant Watkins by a written contract. On August 27, 1943, defendant notified the agent of the plaintiffs in writing that he had acquired the interest of the Binders and requested that the abstract of title be sent to the Charlevoix State Savings Bank to be held in escrow and, if title was found to be satisfactory, that the balance of $2,650 would be paid directly to the agent by the bank. Defendant further requested that the deed be made out directly to him. Agent Wilkinson acknowledged this letter, stating that he saw no objection to Binder's transfer of his interest, providing he was satisfied as to the consideration, and stated that the deed would be made out as requested. It should be noted that defendant's letter to Wilkinson did not disclose that the terms of the Binder-Watkins deal were materially different from those of the plaintiff-Binder transaction in that the latter purported to provide for transfer of title upon Watkins' completion of FHA financing, 'a time limit of 90 days, or as long after as would be necessary.'
On September 1, 1943, a deed to the property and the abstract of title were forwarded to the bank by plaintiffs' attorneys, with a covering letter relating to the escrow agreement, which made the requirement of immediate payment. In due course the bank acknowledged receipt of the deed and abstract of title, but notified plaintiffs' attorneys that, although their letter stipulated immediate payment, 'the transaction needs to be held open pending certain mortgage arrangements.' To this communication plaintiffs' attorneys replied, on September 23, 1943, that the deed and abstract of title were delivered to the bank upon condition that payment was to be made immediately, and they requested either the return of the deed, or payment. This letter also terminated, as of September 25, 1943, the bank's authority to deliver the deed. On such date the deed was returned by the bank to plaintiffs' attorneys, with the comment that the abstract disclosed doubtful title and that the defendant had a contract with the Binders, which gave defendant 90 days within which to consummate the transaction. The bank also sent plaintiffs, on October 7, 1943, an opinion of title as to the property. Thereafter, and on November 15, 1943, agent Wilkinson wrote Binder, stating that the agreement had been that Binder was to pay the balance within 30 days thereof, or as soon as title was delivered, that he, Wilkinson, had made no deal with the defendant Watkins. He demanded return of the key and also stated, in substance, that if Binder did not 'straighten out the mess (he had) created in Boyne City in connection with this matter' that the matter would be turned over to attorneys and the $500 deposit retained as liquidated damages.
Correspondence continued between Binder, Wilkinson and the defendant in regard to the property. It was lengthy and we will not summarize. The result was that the parties were unable to straighten out their difficulties and the correspondence terminated on June 22, 1944. On July 21, 1944, plaintiffs commenced an action in ejectment which resulted in judgment for plaintiffs as aforedescribed.
Despite the profustion of offers and counter-offers between the parties, Wilkinson and Binder, Binder and Watkins, and Watkins and Wilkinson, extending over a period of several months and through some 25 written exhibits, as they attempted to work out their problems, certain facts emerge with clarity from the record as a whole. It is clear that plaintiffs orally agreed to sell their property to the Binders for cash, which cash they have never received from anyone, Binders or the defendant. Clear, also, is the fact that, regardless of whether or not the offer to the Binders was withdrawn in fact or by operation of law at any earlier date, it was definitely and unequivocally withdrawn on December 23, 1943, when plaintiffs' agent wrote to Binder:
'We have never had a contract so I am through with this entire mess, and as stated above, if I do not hear from you immediately, I shall not consider your purchaser or anyone else in this matter.'
So far as the record discloses, the immediate response demanded was not forthcoming. Defendant Watkins himself seems finally to have recognized the futility of placing any further reliance upon the plaintiff-Binder transaction, for, on April 23, 1944, he wrote Wilkinson in part:
'I want you to know that I feel nothing can be done with Binder and I am willing to forget him if we can get together on some kind of deal.'
He also, in this...
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New Prods. Corp. v. Harbor Shores BHBT Land Dev., LLC., Docket No. 317309.
...parties who each claimed legal title to the property—as opposed to an equitable interest in the property. See Gilford v. Watkins, 342 Mich. 632, 637–638, 70 N.W.2d 695 (1955) (refusing to recognize the equities involved between the parties because the plaintiff sued in an action for ejectme......
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Ligon v. City of Detroit
...in the real estate. Darr v. First Fed. S. & L. Ass'n of Detroit, 426 Mich. 11, 19-20, 393 N.W.2d 152 (1986); Gilford v. Watkins, 342 Mich. 632, 637, 70 N.W.2d 695 (1955). A land-contract vendee accordingly is the equitable owner of the property. Pittsfield Charter Twp. v. City of Saline, 10......
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Vereyken v. Annie's Place, Inc., 91-1174
...entitled to a conveyance of the legal title. Barker v. Klingler, 302 Mich. 282, 4 N.W.2d 596, 599 (1942); see also Gilford v. Watkins, 342 Mich. 632, 70 N.W.2d 695 (1955). The nature of the vendee's "equitable title" is analogous to the vendor holding the legal title in trust for the vendee......
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In re Britton, Bankruptcy No. 83-00208
...is entitled to a conveyance of the legal title." Id., 302 Mich. at 288, 4 N.W.2d 596 (emphasis added). See also Gilford v. Watkins, 342 Mich. 632, 70 N.W.2d 695 (1955). Second, while the district court rule referred to above does create a remedy for vendors different than those available to......