Gill v. Board of Registration of Psychologists

• Decision Date: 23 April 1987
• Citation: 399 Mass. 724,506 N.E.2d 876
• Parties: Peter L. GILL v. BOARD OF REGISTRATION OF PSYCHOLOGISTS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 876

506 N.E.2d 876

399 Mass. 724

Peter L. GILL v. BOARD OF REGISTRATION OF PSYCHOLOGISTS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Jan. 9, 1987.

Decided April 23, 1987.

Donald K. Stern (Paul G. Gitlin, Boston, with him), for plaintiff.

Stephen S. Ostrach, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff, Peter L. Gill, seeks a judgment declaring that he had the right voluntarily to resign his license to practice psychology in the Commonwealth and an injunction restraining the defendant Board of Registration of Psychologists (board) from refusing to dismiss its order to show cause and from continuing any further investigation of him. G.L. c. 231A, § 1, and G.L. c. 214, § 1 (1984 ed.). A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County reserved and reported the case to the full court on a statement of agreed facts. We conclude that the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for failure to exhaust the available administrative remedies before the board.

We summarize the statement of agreed facts. The plaintiff was first licensed by the board on December 31, 1973. His license was most recently renewed by the board effective July 1, 1984. In September, 1983, the board received a complaint from a former patient of the plaintiff, alleging improper conduct on the part of the plaintiff. In November, the board forwarded this complaint to the plaintiff, who filed a timely answer denying the allegations. The board subsequently issued an order to show cause on August 3, 1984, to which the plaintiff responded by denying the allegations of the complaint and by filing a motion for a more definite statement, which was granted. When the board failed to amend the complaint by filing a more definite statement, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. On January 25, 1985, the board issued an amended order to show cause, and again the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss in addition to his answer. The case was referred to an administrative magistrate who recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted. On July 12, 1985, the board dismissed the amended order to show cause, although it concluded that the dismissal did not "prohibit the issuance of a future Order to Show Cause, even one that is the result of further investigation of [the] original complaint."

On July 16, 1985, the plaintiff wrote to the board and "resigned" his license to practice psychology. The board responded in a letter signed by Joseph R. Autilio, counsel to the board, stating that "[t]he dismissal of your case without prejudice together with the current review of this matter make[s] it inappropriate for the Board to accept your attempt to resign your license in this manner." The board subsequently issued a new order to show cause on November 21, 1985, to which the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the board's action was beyond its jurisdiction. The administrative magistrate did not rule on that motion, but granted the plaintiff's motion to stay proceedings pending a decision by this court on the plaintiff's request for declaratory and injunctive relief.

Under G.L. c. 112, § 128 (1984 ed.), and 251 Code Mass.Regs. § 3.09 (1978), the board may suspend or revoke a license granted pursuant to G.L. c. 112, §§ 119-121, and 251 Code Mass.Regs. §§ 3.02-3.08 and 3.10. As framed by the plaintiff, the question of the board's jurisdiction is ultimately contingent on a determination of the effectiveness of the purported "resignation." The plaintiff argues that his resignation was effective when the board received his letter of July 16; that because he was no longer licensed when the order to show cause was issued, the board possesses no power which can be exercised in this instance; and that thus it is without jurisdiction to proceed in this case. The plaintiff however, has not presented this argument before the board.

We have long followed the rule that "[i]n the absence of a statutory directive to the contrary, the administrative remedies should be exhausted before resort to the courts." East Chop Tennis Club v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 364 Mass. 444, 448, 305 N.E.2d 507 (1973), quoting Gordon v. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co., 361 Mass. 582, 587, 281 N.E.2d 573 (1972), and cases cited. "To permit judicial interference with the orderly administration by the [board] of matters entrusted to it by the Legislature before it has commenced to exercise its authority in any particular case or before it has had an opportunity to determine the facts and make a final decision, would in effect transfer to the courts the determination of questions which the Legislature has left in the first instance to the [board], and would result in the substitution of the judgment of the court for that of the [board]. Courts must be careful not to invade the province of an administrative board. The instances are rare where circumstances will require such interference." Saint Luke's Hosp. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 320 Mass. 467, 470, 70 N.E.2d 10 (1946). In this case, the board has not had the opportunity to consider the plaintiff's argument. Certainly, the board should consider the questions raised and determine whether under its interpretation of the relevant statutes, it may properly exercise jurisdiction in this case. See Hathaway Bakeries, Inc. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 316 Mass. 136, 140, 55 N.E.2d 254 (1944) ("It was the duty of the commission in the first instance to decide whether it possessed the power to entertain the union's petition for certification and, if it found it lacked the power, to dismiss the petition"). In previous cases in which we have dispensed with the requirement that further administrative remedies be exhausted and have reached the jurisdictional issue, the agency involved has also had the opportunity to consider and has decided the same question. See, e.g., Lahey Clinic Found., Inc. v. Health Facilities Appeals Bd., 376 Mass. 359, 367, 380 N.E.2d 675 (1978); Ciszewski v. Industrial Accident Bd., 367 Mass. 135, 137, 325 N.E.2d 270 (1975).

Not only should the board have the opportunity to address the issues raised by the plaintiff, but allowing the board this opportunity will also avoid the occurrence of untimely and piecemeal litigation. "The requirement that parties exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking review in this court is not a mere procedural device to trap the...