Gill v. Bradley
| Decision Date | 06 August 1874 |
| Citation | 21 Minn. 15 |
| Parties | ABRAHAM R. GILL <I>vs.</I> JAMES A. BRADLEY. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
L. M. Stewart, for appellant.
Cooley & Lowry, for respondent.
On September 27, 1860, defendant, being owner of certain land in the county of McLeod, bargained the same to Helen E. Savage for $432. One hundred dollars was paid in hand, and defendant executed and delivered to said Helen a bond, of the date aforesaid, conditioned for a conveyance of the land to her, upon payment of the residue of the purchase money with interest, in one year, according to the terms of her promissory note of even date. The bond was executed in this state, and on October 23, 1860, was duly recorded. Immediately after its execution, the obligee went into possession of the land, and continued in the occupation thereof until about January 24, 1872, when she assigned her rights to the plaintiff, by a proper instrument in writing, at the same time delivering to him possession of the premises, which he has ever since retained. During the whole time between the execution of the bond and making of the tender hereinafter mentioned, (October 3, 1872,) defendant has been a non-resident of this state, and has resided in North Carolina, and, as the complaint alleges, has been inaccessible to the said Helen, who is alleged to have been kept in ignorance of his whereabouts by the prevalence of the late civil war. All taxes levied upon the premises since the execution of the bond have been paid by the said obligee and the plaintiff.
Said Helen and the plaintiff have ever been ready to pay the residue of the purchase money. On October 3, 1872, at Minneapolis, the plaintiff tendered to the defendant the principal and interest of the note, and the costs and expenses of executing a deed of the premises, with a demand of such deed, and also caused a deed thereof to be prepared and presented to defendant for execution, with a demand that he execute the same, upon payment of the amount due on the bond; but defendant refused and still refuses to execute the deed or accept the money. Plaintiff avers that he is willing and ready to pay the amount due on the bond, and brings the necessary money into court for that purpose. The complaint prays that the defendant may be decreed to convey the premises to plaintiff, upon being paid the principal and interest due under the conditions of the bond.
Defendant demurred to the complaint upon several grounds, only two of which are urged here. The first ground is that the complaint shows that the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action. This has reference to the fact that this action is brought in Hennepin county, which is designated as the place of trial in the title of the cause found in the complaint, while the land to which the action relates is in the county of McLeod. This being an action for the determination of a right or interest in real property, McLeod county was its proper place of trial; Gen. Stat., ch. 66, § 38, but by § 42 of the same chapter, it is provided that "if the county designated for the place of trial in the complaint is not the proper county, the action may, notwithstanding, be tried therein, unless the defendant, before the time for answering expires, demands in writing that the trial be had in the proper county, and the place of trial is thereupon changed by consent of parties, or by order of the court," etc. This provision of statute shows two things: first, that the district court of the designated county has jurisdiction in a case like this at bar, unless the written demand for a trial in the proper county is made before the time for answering expires, and unless the place of trial is thereupon changed as above provided, neither of which appears to have been done in this instance; and, second, that the objection to the place of trial designated in the complaint is not to be taken by demurrer.
The other ground of demurrer urged here is that the complaint does not state facts constituting a cause of action. The first point made by defendant's counsel, in support of this ground of demurrer, is not stated with his usual perspicuity; but we understand him to claim, first, that this is a case of "a unilateral contract, which must be strictly complied with in order to preserve any rights thereunder," and that, therefore, the failure of the obligee in the bond and of her assign, the plaintiff, to perform or attempt to perform on their part until more than eleven years after the note was due, is fatal to plaintiff's prayer for a specific performance; and, second, that there is no mutuality in the contract in this case, and that, therefore, it ought not to be specifically enforced. The answer to these two claims, (which are perhaps substantially one,) is that this is not a unilateral contract. On the part of the defendant, there was an agreement to convey,...
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Snyder v. Pike
...relating to the place of trial of civil actions are substantially the same as the statute of this state; and in the case of Gill v. Bradley, 21 Minn. 15, which an action involving an interest in real estate which was situated in McLeod county, the action was brought in Hennepin county. The ......
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Agricultural Credit Corporation, a Corp. v. Land Investment Company, a Corp.
...and Wisconsin are very similar, if not precisely similar, to ours." March v. Lowry, 16 How. Pr. 42; Lane v. Burdick, 17 Wis. 93; Gill v. Bradley, 21 Minn. 15; O'Neil O'Neil, 54 Cal. 187. Section 7415, Compiled Laws 1913, provides: "Actions for the following causes must be tried in the count......
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Agric. Credit Corp. v. Land Inv. Co.
...are very similar, if not precisely similar, to ours.” March v. Lowry, 16 How.Prac.(N.Y.) 41, 42;Lane v. Burdick, 17 Wis. 92, 95;Gill v. Bradley, 21 Minn. 15;O'Neil v. O'Neil, 54 Cal. 187. Section 7415, Comp.Laws 1913, as amended by Laws 1919, c. 3, § 1, provides: “Actions for the following ......
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Alderman v. N.Y. Underwriters' Ins. Co. of N.Y.
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