Gill v. Snow

• Decision Date: 30 December 1982
• Docket Number: No. 2-82-056-CV,2-82-056-CV
• Citation: 644 S.W.2d 222
• Parties: H.C. GILL and Fort Worth Publishers, Inc., Appellants, v. H.D. SNOW, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 222

644 S.W.2d 222

H.C. GILL and Fort Worth Publishers, Inc., Appellants, v. H.D. SNOW, Appellee.

No. 2-82-056-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Fort Worth.

Dec. 30, 1982.

Wynn, Brown, Mack, Renfro & Thompson, and William M. Schur, Garrett & Stahala, and Steve M. King, Fort Worth, for appellants.

Frank W. Sullivan, III, Fort Worth, for appellee.

Bishop, Lamsens & Brown, and Thomas J. Williams, Fort Worth, for amicus curiae.

Before HUGHES, HOLMAN and RICHARD L. BROWN, JJ.

OPINION

RICHARD L. BROWN, Justice.

This is an invasion of privacy case. Appellee H.D. Snow (hereinafter referred to as "Snow"), sued appellants H.C. Gill ("Gill") and Fort Worth Publishers for invasion of his privacy based on an advertisement paid for by Gill and printed in the Observer, a community newspaper, printed by Fort Worth Publishers. Following a jury verdict in favor of Snow and its finding of compensatory and exemplary damages, the trial court entered judgment against Gill and Fort Worth Publishers in the amount of $25,000.

Snow originally filed two separate suits for invasion of privacy; one against Gill and Fort Worth Publishers, and the other against Gill and Churchman-Kent Inc. (publishers of the Northeast Community newspaper). The trial court consolidated the two cases but Churchman-Kent, Inc. is not involved in this appeal.

We reverse and render.

Snow and Gill owned adjoining property bordered by Little Fossil Creek in Haltom City, Texas. For several years, the property had been used as a gravel pit. Snow refilled his portion of the old gravel pit and approximately two years later, the creek flooded. Gill blamed Snow for his flooding problems, and despite attempts by Snow to correct the problem, Gill was not satisfied. As a result, Gill caused a full page advertisement to be placed in the Observer in which Gill reproduced a letter sent to Snow by the Texas Water Development Board regarding the landfill and Gill's lack of compliance with the Texas Water Code. Gill made various comments in the Observer based on his research of public records and asked open questions concerning Snow's complicity with the mayor and city council and whether there were any other "privileged" people to be found on the city records. Finally, Gill asked the voters to elect four new council members.

We find it necessary to summarize briefly the tort concerning invasion of privacy. Privacy is generally defined as the right of a person to be left alone, to live a life of seclusion and to be free from any unwarranted publicity. Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex.1973). Moore v. Charles B. Pierce Film Enterprises, 589 S.W.2d 489 (Tex.Civ.App.--Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd. n.r.e.). The Restatement of Torts recognizes four different and distinct violations under Invasion of Privacy:

a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another;

b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness;

c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life;

d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 652A (1977).

Here we need only consider three of the four alleged invasion of privacy violations, those that were pleaded by the appellee Snow, and that upon which the trial court submitted its special issues. In Snow's petition, his first cause of action alleges the intrusion upon his seclusion, solitude and into his private affairs. The elements for intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion, solitude and into his private affairs require that there be an intentional intrusion, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns that is highly offensive to a reasonable person. Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 652B (1977). This type of invasion of privacy is generally associated with either a physical invasion of a person's property or by eavesdropping on another's conversation with the aid of wiretaps, microphones or spying. Gonzales v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 555 S.W.2d 219 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi 1977, no writ). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 652B, comments b, c, and d (1977). We find no evidence to support a recovery under this form of invasion of privacy.

The second allegation was that Gill placed Snow in a false light. There are no Texas cases directly on point, but the Restatement of Torts sets out the elements of false light as:

a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly...