Gill v. State of Rhode Island

Decision Date12 July 1996
Docket NumberNo. CA 94-0331B.,CA 94-0331B.
Citation933 F. Supp. 151
PartiesDonald GILL, Joseph Carlevale, Sr., Joseph F. Devine, Anthony Almonte, Robert Plante, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, Barbara Leonard in her official capacity as Secretary of State, the members of the General Assembly in their official capacity, Bruce Sundlun in his official capacity as Governor, Joseph Distephano in his capacity as Chairman of the Rhode Island Board of Elections, Guy Dufault in his capacity as Chairman of the Rhode Island State Democratic Committee and John Holmes in his capacity as Chairman of the Rhode Island Republican State Committee, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Donald Gill, West Warwick, RI, pro se.

Joseph Carlevale, Sr., West Greenwich, RI, pro se.

Joseph F. Devine, Providence, RI, pro se.

Robert Plante, West Warwick, RI, pro se.

Anthony Almonte, Cranston, RI, pro se.

Thomas A. Palumbo, Attorney General's Office, Providence, RI, Katherine A. Merolla, Pucci, Golden & Merolla, Providence, RI, Peter P.D. Leach, Updike Kelly and Spellacy, Providence, RI, Anthony Bucci, Robert Fine, Richard Licht, Patrick Guida, Tillinghast, Licht & Semonoff, Providence, RI, Robert E. Craven, Giannini & Craven, Providence, RI, for Defendants.

OPINION

FRANCIS J. BOYLE, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiffs have filed a blunderbuss constitutional challenge to the election laws of the State of Rhode Island. For the following reasons the laws are found to be constitutional.

I. BACKGROUND:

Plaintiffs ran for various public offices in the 1992 Rhode Island general election as "independent" or "unaffiliated" candidates under a collective platform they dubbed Reform '92. Joseph Devine ran for Governor, Anthony Almonte ran for Attorney General, Joseph Carlevale ran for Secretary of State, Robert Plante ran for Senator in the 19th District and Donald Gill ran for Mayor of West Warwick. All lost to either Democratic or Republican candidates. Plaintiffs filed this action in June of 1994 claiming that all of the election laws of the State of Rhode Island were unconstitutional. The main contention that can be gleaned from the rambling, nearly 30 page complaint, which cites among other things George Washington's farewell address and the Federalist Papers, is that the election laws unconstitutionally discriminate against unaffiliated or "minor" party candidates in favor of Republican and Democratic party candidates. Shortly after the action was filed, and before the 1994 election, plaintiffs Gill, Carlevale, Devine and Plante claimed either Democratic or Republican affiliation and filed declaration papers with the Secretary of State.

At the time this action was commenced, plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction asking that the court enjoin the 1994 Rhode Island general election. The motion was denied on July 25, 1994. In December of 1994, the plaintiffs filed another motion for a preliminary injunction asking that the court enjoin the State of Rhode Island from swearing in all political candidates who won office in the 1994 general election. This motion was also denied.

On February 28, 1996 a non-jury trial was held.1 While the original complaint cited over 150 different laws that the plaintiffs contended were unconstitutional, for purposes of the trial, plaintiffs agreed to pare that number down to seven representative laws on which the court would rule.2 The specific laws under scrutiny are:

R.I.G.L. § 17-8-1, Local Canvassing Authorities, Appointment of bipartisan authority;
R.I.G.L. § 17-8-5(2), Local Canvassing Authorities, Local boards — powers and duties;
R.I.G.L. § 17-14-4, Nomination of Party and Independent Candidates, Preparation of nomination papers for candidates — Combination of endorsed candidates — Furnishing of nomination papers to candidates;
R.I.G.L. § 17-15-1 et. seq., Primary Elections;
R.I.G.L. § 17-15-8, Primary Elections, Listing of candidates on ballots and ballot labels;
R.I.G.L. § 17-25-20, Campaign Contributions — Expenditures Reporting, Eligibility criteria for matching public funds;
R.I.G.L. § 17-1-2(f), General Provisions, Definitions — "Political Party" or "Party".
II. ANALYSIS:

"Voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure." Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2063, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (quoting Ill. Bd. Of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184, 99 S.Ct. 983, 990, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979)). However, the right to vote and the right to "associate for political purposes through the ballot" are not absolute. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433, 112 S.Ct. at 2063. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that States retain the power to regulate elections. E.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647, 93 S.Ct. 2842, 2850, 37 L.Ed.2d 853 (1973); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217, 107 S.Ct. 544, 550, 93 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986). The Court has specifically stated that "as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process." Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433, 112 S.Ct. at 2063 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1279, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974)). Recognizing that each provision of an election code will inevitably affect First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the Court has stated that the mere fact that a State election code "creates barriers tending to limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose does not of itself compel close scrutiny." Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143, 92 S.Ct. 849, 856, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972). Accordingly, in instances in which the constitutionality of voting regulations is called into question, the Court has eschewed a strict scrutiny standard in favor of a flexible standard. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433, 112 S.Ct. at 2063.

Under this flexible approach, the rigorousness with which a court inquires into the propriety of a challenged election law is dependent upon the extent to which that law is found to burden First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. Thus, when such rights are severely burdened, the regulation must be "narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance." Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288, 112 S.Ct. 698, 705, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992). On the other hand, when a state election law imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the State's regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433-36, 112 S.Ct. at 2063-64. Thus, the constitutional claims of the plaintiffs will be examined by parsing them in light of this flexible standard.

1. R.I.G.L. §§ 17-8-1, 17-8-5(a)(2), 17-1-2(f).

The constitutionality of these related provisions must be examined in conjunction. Title 17 chapter 8 of the Rhode Island General Laws is entitled Local Canvasing Authorities. Section 17-8-1 provides:

Appointment of bipartisan authority. — The legislative body of each city and town shall appoint a bipartisan canvassing authority of three (3) qualified electors of the city or town, not more than two (2) of whom shall belong to the same political party and may appoint two (2) alternate members, not more than one of whom shall belong to the same political party.... The mayor or president of the town council shall nominate the members of the canvassing authority from lists of party voters submitted by the respective chairmen of the city or town political committee, which lists shall contain the names of five (5) times the number of persons to be appointed. If the legislative body shall refuse to approve the nomination of any person to the canvassing authority, the mayor or the president shall submit to the legislative body another person named on one of the lists, and so on until a person shall be appointed; provided, however, if the chairman of the city or town committee of a political party entitled to an appointment shall fail or refuse to submit a list as aforesaid, the mayor or the president shall nominate any party voter of the political party entitled to the appointment.

R.I.G.L. § 17-8-1 (Michie 1994).

Section 17-8-5(a)(2) defines the powers and duties of the local canvassing authority. It states that the board shall:

Have and discharge all of the functions, powers, and duties of the town council concerning nominations, elections, registration of voters and canvassing rights, the preparing and correcting of voting lists, and other matters relating thereto, which powers are transferred to the local board.

R.I.G.L. § 17-8-5 (Michie 1994).

In addition, the election laws define political party as "any political organization which at the preceding general election nominated a candidate for governor, and whose candidate for governor at the election polled at least five percent (5%) of the entire vote cast in the state for governor." R.I.G.L. § 17-1-2(f) (Michie 1994). These provisions are not discriminatory on their face. The fact is, however, that in Rhode Island, as elsewhere, the Democratic and Republican parties dominate the political scene. Thus, while in theory a party other than the Democratic and Republican party could be represented on a canvassing authority such has not been the case. This fact, however, does not necessarily mean that the provisions are unconstitutional.

The process for the appointment of canvassing authority members is facially nondiscriminatory. The statutory provisions do not specifically refer to any particular political party. What the statutes do is condition a political party's right to nominate members of the local canvassing authority upon its prior success at the polls. The United States Supreme Court has held that the practice of distinguishing between political parties based upon past electoral accomplishment is not per...

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