Gill v. Vill. of Melrose Park
| Decision Date | 27 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 12 C 2963,12 C 2963 |
| Citation | 35 F.Supp.3d 956 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | Tanya Gill, Plaintiff, v. Village of Melrose Park, et al., Defendants. |
David M. Hundley, Hundley Law Group, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
Michael D. Bersani, Anthony George Becknek, Zrinka R. Davis, Hervas, Condon & Bersani, P.C., Itasca, IL, for Defendants.
The plaintiff, Tanya Gill, filed this civil rights lawsuit against Melrose Park police officers Vito Migliore, Mike Recinos, Leonard Bartemio, Adam Gibson, Dennis Natale, and the Village of Melrose Park (the “Village”), alleging claims of excessive force and false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state-law claims of battery and false arrest and imprisonment against Officer Migliore and the Village (under the respondeat superior theory).1 Gill alleges that the officers who responded to a reported battery against Gill at a bar in Melrose Park unreasonably seized her and used excessive force after she made incidental physical contact with Officer Migliore when describing the alleged battery. The defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that, as a matter of law, the seizure and the amount of force used were reasonable. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
The Court's summary of undisputed facts is taken from the parties' Local Rule 56.1 statements to the extent they comply with the rule and are material to the motion. Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Local Rule 56.1 Statement, however, is littered with new facts, legal arguments, and attempts to dispute facts without citations to the record.2 Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) requires the party opposing summary judgment, when disputing a fact, to include “specific references to the affidavits, parts of the records, and other supporting materials relied upon,” and a separate and additional statement for “any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment, including references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.” N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B), (C). Rather than submitting a statement of additional facts under Local Rule 56. 1(b)(3)(C), however, the plaintiff simply folds new facts in to her responses. These additional facts will be disregarded. See Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir.2004) (). Further, any disputed facts that do not include citations to the record, or that simply recharacterize the defendants' facts without actually disputing them, will be disregarded. See Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1119, 127 S.Ct. 2947, 168 L.Ed.2d 272 (2007) (). And to the extent Gill fails to effectively dispute facts properly set forth and supported by the defendants, those facts are deemed admitted for purposes of the motion. See Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir.2009) (citing Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir.2003) ). The summary below reflects those facts that are undisputed in light of these principles.
On April 2, 2011, Tanya Gill and her friend Tanya Frizell went to I–Bar, a tavern in Melrose Park. Shortly after arriving, Frizell called 911 to report that another patron had struck Gill in the face. Melrose Park Police Officers Migliore, Recinos, Bartemio, Gibson, and Natale responded to the call.
Officer Migliore interviewed Gill outside the bar, away from the entrance and toward the corner of the building. Gill, at 6' 0? and wearing 3? heels, id. at ¶ 30, is taller than Officer Migliore.3 Numerous people were also standing outside the bar including Frizell, Kevin Dixon (another friend of Gill's), the alleged assailant and her companion, I–Bar employees, multiple police officers, and other patrons waiting to enter the bar. There was “a lot of commotion outside the bar.”4 People, including Frizell, were interrupting Officer Migliore and Gill's conversation, and trying to say different things. Ms. Frizell, was “very emotional and agitated and loud toward the police.”
Officer Migliore asked Gill to describe the assault. Gill did not interpret this question to mean that she should physically show the officer on his person how a woman in the bar allegedly pushed Gill.5 However, when responding to this question, Gill's left forearm made contact with Officer Migliore's chest.6 Following this action, Officer Migliore took the Plaintiff's arm and wrist, executed an arm bar maneuver—putting Gill's arm behind her back and then pushing her own elbow into the middle of her back in an upward thrust—and then moved her six to seven steps over to a nearby car, which Migliore used to further restrain Gill's movement.
Although Gill says that Migliore forcefully pushed her into the side of the car, that assertion is clearly belied by video from a security camera at the bar, the evidentiary foundation of which the plaintiff does not dispute. Officer Migliore's interview with Gill, her contact with him, and his placement of Gill in the “arm bar technique” take place just off camera; when Officer Migliore and Gill enter the frame, her arm is already behind her back. Migliore can be seen guiding Gill toward the car, and both Migliore and Gill are standing upright. At no point does Officer Migliore slam or push Gill into the car.7
Officer Migliore kept Gill in this position for approximately thirty seconds and then released her. Gill then calmly walked away without apparent distress, physical or otherwise. Gill never informed Officer Migliore that he was hurting her, or that she was in any pain during the encounter. Within 45 seconds of being released, Gill left the premises, undeterred by the officers.
Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment, the facts are “viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” unless those facts are “blatantly contradicted by the record.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The party who bears the burden of proof at trial—here, the plaintiff—“may not rest on its pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial.” Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.Com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir.2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). To dispute a fact, the plaintiff “must identify with reasonable particularity the evidence upon which [she] relies. Id. at 490. As the non-moving party, the plaintiff's evidence, if properly presented, must be believed, and the court must draw all justifiable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Id.
To prevail on her § 1983 claim for false arrest, Gill must prove that (1) a seizure occurred and (2) the seizure was unreasonable. See Carlson v. Bukovic, 621 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir.2010). The defendants concede, for summary judgment purposes, that a seizure occurred when Officer Migliore restrained Gill, and the evidence leaves no room for doubt. Therefore, the only question is whether it can be determined as a matter of law that Officer Migliore acted reasonably.
To determine reasonableness, the Court must “weigh[ ] the governmental need to seize ‘against the investigation into one's privacy that the ... seizure entails.’ ” Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400 F.3d 1070, 1091 (7th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Sechrist, 640 F.2d 81, 86 (7th Cir.1981) (alterations in original)). The reasonableness of the seizure also depends on its nature and duration. The defendants maintain that, following Gill's physical contact, Officer Migliore briefly detained her in order to ensure his own personal safety, akin to a brief investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In the alternative, they claim even if a full “arrest” occurred, Officer Migliore had probable cause to believe Gill had committed a battery on him, and thus, the seizure was objectively reasonable. Gill contends that the existence of probable cause is an issue of fact because in his affidavit Officer Migliore did not explicitly state that he believed he was a victim of a battery and because “the brush/touch contact was unintentional and without force.” Although she does not say so explicitly, Gill appears to contend that this was a formal arrest because she discusses only probable cause.
It matters not whether Migliore's action is considered an “arrest” or some lesser form of seizure, if, as a matter of law, the action was supported by the highest justification, probable cause. “Probable cause is an absolute bar to a § 1983 claim for false arrest.” McBride v. Grice, 576 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir.2009). Probable cause to arrest exists “if a reasonable person would believe, based on the facts and circumstances known at the time, that a crime had been committed.” Id. at 707 ; Neiman v. Keane, 232 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir.2000) (). The determination of probable cause is objective—“an arresting officer's state of mind (except for the fact that he knows...
To continue reading
Request your trial