Gillespie v. Northridge Hosp. Foundation
Decision Date | 28 October 1971 |
Citation | 98 Cal.Rptr. 134,20 Cal.App.3d 867 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Richard T. GILLESPIE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. NORTHRIDGE HOSPITAL FOUNDATION, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 38058. |
Albert I. Kaufman, Woodland Hills, for plaintiff and appellant.
Early, Maslach, Foran & Williams, and Harry Boyd, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.
Plaintiff's wife was injured while in the employ of defendant. She has recovered the appropriate benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Plaintiff then sued the employer for loss of his wife's services, 1 alleging the employer's negligence. A motion for a summary judgment was granted; plaintiff appeals from the resulting judgment. We affirm.
Defendant relies on the language in section 3600 of the Labor Code that liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act is 'in lieu of any other liability whatsoever to any person' (except in cases under section 3706, which is not here applicable). We agree that that language is controlling.
The parties have cited us to no cases in California dealing with the problem before us, and we have found none. We have been cited to sundry cases from other states. Some deal with the right of a parent to pursue the common law action of Per quod servitium amisit, some deal with the right of a husband to pursue the common law actions for loss of services and consortium of a wife, some deal with the right of a wife (in states permitting such actions against tort feasors generally) to pursue similar actions for loss of the services or consortium of her husband. Although, as plaintiff points out, there are important differences between the action here brought and the parental action and between the present action and actions by a wife for loss of consortium, those differences do not seem to us to be significant here, where the basic issue is whether or not the employee's remedy under a workmen's compensation scheme operates to bar collateral actions by non-employees for their personal damages flowing from the employee's injury or death.
In many of the cases cited to us, holdings adverse to the non-employee were based on language much more specific than that in the California statute and, for that reason, are not helpful to us in the case at bench. 2 Cases from jurisdictions with less specific statutes are divided. The earlier cases, following the lead of the Massachusetts court in King v. Viscoloid Co. (1914) 219 Mass. 420, 106 N.E. 988, Ann.Cas. 1916D 1170, held that the omission from the Workmen's Compensation Act of any mention of parental recovery indicated a legislative intent not to abolish the common law action. 3 However, the later cases have taken the opposite view, reasoning that the workmen's compensation law was intended to provide a complete and all inclusive scheme for recovery from an employer for industrial injuries. Thus in Bevis v. Armco Steel Corp (1951) 156 Ohio St. 295, 102 N.E.2d 444, a wife's action for loss of consortium (available under Ohio law against tort feasors generally) was held to be barred by section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, which read: 'Such compensation shall be in lieu of all other rights to compensation, or damages, for such death, injuries, or occupational disease.' To the same effect are the holdings, under similarly general language, in: Ellis v. Fallert (1957) 209 Or. 406, 307 P.2d 283; Bigby v. Pelican Bay Lbr. Co. (1944) 173 Or. 682, 147 P.2d 199; Guse v. A. O. Smith Corp. (1952) 260 Wis. 403, 51 N.W.2d 24; Ash v. S. S. Mullen, Inc. (1953) 43 Wash.2d 345, 261 P.2d 118.
We conclude that these later cases represent the correct view. The whole scheme of workmen's compensation contemplates that, in exchange for imposing on the employer a liability without fault and denying to him the common law defenses of contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule, he is assured of a single liability, limited by a statutory scheme, which provides for medical expenses and which allots a scheduled sum in lieu of both lost earnings and general damages. We can see no reason why the employer should also be held liable for collateral damages to third persons whose rights, at common law, were derivative from those of the employee.
In Danek v. Hommer (1952) 9 N.J. 56, 87 A.2d 5, the court said:
We concur in that reasoning. The judgment is affirmed.
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Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist.
...295; Williams v. State Compensation Ins. Fund (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 116, 123, 123 Cal.Rptr. 812; Gillespie v. Northridge Hosp. Foundation (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 867, 871, 98 Cal.Rptr. 134.) Although the cause of action for loss of consortium is not merely derivative or collateral to the spouse......
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