Gilman Paper Co. v. James, 30202
| Citation | 235 Ga. 348,219 S.E.2d 447 |
| Decision Date | 01 October 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 30202,30202 |
| Parties | GILMAN PAPER COMPANY v. Carroway JAMES. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Robert W. Harrison, Jr., Saint Marys, for appellant.
Jack J. Helms, Homerville, for appellee.
This litigation began with an equitable complaint filed by the appellee in the Superior Court of Clinch County, alleging that appellant had wilfully and maliciously entered upon the appellee's land, felled and removed the timber and had continued acts of trespass thereon for which the appellee sought actual and punitive damages and injunctive relief. The appellee alleged that he was, and had been for more than 23 years, the owner and possessor of the 1.10 acres of land described in the complaint. The appellant denied, in its answer, that the appellee owned the land described and alleged that it owned the land in dispute and also alleged it had not trespassed on land owned by the appellee.
The case went to trial before a jury and it returned a verdict in favor of the appellee whereupon judgment was entered thereon granting a permanent injunction and awarding the appellee $1,000 actual damages and $5,500 punitive damages. A direct appeal followed to this court after some delay in the preparation and filing of the transcript of evidence in the trial court.
The appellee moved in the trial court to dismiss the appeal because the transcript was not timely filed. It was four days late. The trial court denied the motion and appellee now seeks to dismiss the appeal in this court upon the same ground urged in the trial court. We decline to do so. 'Since March 2, 1972, the cause for delay in the processing of the appeal is a fact issue for determination in the trial court.' Southeastern Plumbing Supply Co. v. Lee et al., 232 Ga. 626, 629, 208 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1974). See also, Taylor et al. v. Whitmire, 234 Ga. 449, 450, 216 S.E.2d 310 (1975). Appellee earnestly insists that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to dismiss. The denial of the motion by the trial court, in effect, determined that the four-day delay in filing the transcript was not unreasonable and was excusable. We have reviewed the evidence considered by the trial court on the motion to dismiss and conclude there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion.
We note the appellee filed no appeal from the trial court's order refusing to dismiss the appeal but rather filed in this court a new motion to dismiss the appeal as suggested in McDonald v. Rogers, 229 Ga. 369, 376, 191 S.E.2d 844 (1972), and Gilmore v. State, 127 Ga.App. 249, 253, 193 S.E.2d 219 (1972). After a thorough reconsideration of that suggested procedure, we have determined that it must be disapproved. The basic function of appellate courts is to correct errors of law committed in trial courts. If a trial court commits an error of law by abusing its discretion in ruling on a motion to dismiss an appeal under Code Ann. § 6-809, an appeal should be filed from the order of the trial court by the losing party as provided by law. The language in McDonald, supra, and Gilmore, supra, to the contrary is expressly disapproved. As stated by Justice Hall in his special concurrence in Southeastern Plumbing Supply Co. v. Lee et al., supra: 'The only way to raise the question of the late filing of a transcript is under the provisions of the statute (Code Ann. § 6-809) and the losing party has a right to appeal the trial court's ruling on this question to the appropriate appellate court.' (Emphasis supplied.) See, e.g., Johnson v. Clements, 135 Ga.App. 495, 218 S.E.2d 109 (1975).
Appellant first contends the evidence is legally insufficient to suthorize the verdict and judgment in favor of the appellee. The appellee first argues that this court should not review the sufficiency of the evidence because the trial court did not pass on it in a motion for new trial and therefore this court cannot reach it as an error of law for correction. We disagree with this argument. The appeal is from the judgment entered on the verdict by the trial court and when the trial court entered its judgment on the verdict it necessarily approved the legal sufficiency of the evidence. 'The entry of judgment on a verdict by the trial court constitutes an adjudication by the trial court as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, affording a basis for review on appeal without further fuling by the trial court.' Code Ann. § 6-702(a). See, Hickman v. Frazier, 128 Ga.App. 552(2), 197 S.E.2d 441 (1973).
The appellee urges that if the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewable on direct appeal it is more than adequate to support the verdict. Thus we look next to the evidence and measure it by the rule that, . . .' after rendition of a verdict, all of the evidence and every presumption and inference arising therefrom, must be construed most favorable towards upholding the verdict.' American Appraisal Co. v. Whitley Const. Co., 126 Ga.App. 398, 399, 190 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1972).
The parties are adjoining landowners in Land Lot 335, 12th District of Clinch County and the principal dispute between them is the location of the common line dividing their properties on the ground since their paper titles show no encroachment. Appellant's land is on the west side of the Jamestown-Argyle Road and appellee's land is on the east side of the road. The problem arose because of the relocation of a section of the road to a new location east of the old road bed to the location where the present road lies. Appellee claims westerly to the old road and appellant claims easterly to the new road. The area in between the old and new roads, which is the property in dispute, consists of the 1.10 acres where the timber was cut and removed by appellant. We have reviewed the transcript of the evidence and find it legally sufficient to support the jury's verdict in favor of appellee's claim of ownership to the disputed area and the actual damages resulting from the cutting of the timber thereon by appellant. However, the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that the appellant wilfully and maliciously trespassed upon the disputed land.
To authorize the imposition of punitive damages there must be evidence of wilful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, or oppression, or that entire...
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...claim by amendment. McDonald v. Rogers, 229 Ga. 369, 378(7), 191 S.E.2d 844 (1972), overruled on other grounds, Gilman Paper Co. v. James, 235 Ga. 348, 349, 219 S.E.2d 447 (1975); Cooper v. Mason, 151 Ga.App. 793, 794(1), 261 S.E.2d 738 (1979). The Association filed the amendment before ent......
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