Gilmer v. Shell Oil Co., 75--448
| Decision Date | 19 December 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 75--448,75--448 |
| Citation | 324 So.2d 171 |
| Parties | Ben S. GILMER et al., Appellants, v. SHELL OIL COMPANY, etc., et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert Gibbons and S. Thomas Ullman of Gibbons, Tucker, McEwen, Smith, Cofer & Taub, Tampa, for appellants.
Howard P. Ross of Battaglia, Parker, Ross, Parker & Stolba, St. Petersburg, for appellee Shell Oil Co.
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered in favor of the appellee on March 12, 1975. The record on appeal shows that on March 7, 1975 the circuit judge who entered the final judgment had on the court's own motion entered an order recusing herself from 'hearings on the above styled cause.' This order further directed the clerk to re-assign the cause to another circuit judge.
The question on appeal is whether or not a judge may recuse himself on his own motion and thereafter enter further orders or final judgment. It is well settled that a judge who is disqualified can proceed no further in the case. Vaughn v. State, Fla.App.3d 1969, 226 So.2d 443; Kells v. Davidson, 1951, 102 Fla. 684, 136 So. 450. The appellee suggests that there is a distinction between a disqualified judge and a judge who on his own motion recuses himself. We are not persuaded that there is a distinction which would remove a recused judge from the law applicable to a disqualified judge.
Webster's Dictionary defines 'disqualify' as 'To deprive of the qualities necessary for any purpose; to render unfit.' In the same dictionary, 'recuse' is defined as 'To reject; esp., to except to (a judge), as interested or incompetent.'
The order of recusal and transfer on the court's own motion does not state the reasons therefor. However, we must assume that while the reason or reasons might not be sufficient to disqualify under the applicable statutes, they were sufficient to preclude the judge from proceeding further in the case.
The appellees also take the position that the judge heard the final arguments of counsel on appellees' motion for summary judgment and had reserved her decision in order to deliberate on the oral arguments and the authorities cited by counsel prior to the entry of the court's own motion of recusal. This being so, the court merely entered its final judgment in written from, subsequent to her recusal, after having reached her decision prior to her recusal. To support this contention, the appellees rely heavily on the order of recusal wherein the...
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Beckord v. District Court of Larimer County in Eighth Judicial Dist.
...of the parties to file an affidavit of prejudice is obviated by the judge's certificate of disqualification); Gilmer v. Shell Oil Co., 324 So.2d 171 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975) (although judge, who by her own motion entered an order of recusal, may have disqualified herself for reasons insuffici......
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Fischer v. Knuck
...his judgment on the merits. Similar holdings appear in Weiner v. Weiner, 416 So.2d 1260 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), and Gilmer v. Shell Oil Co., 324 So.2d 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). We find it appropriate to restate the principles governing disqualification of judges, as set forth in Livingston v. St......
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Schwartz v. Schwartz
...thereafter are void, Rogers v. State, 341 So.2d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 953 (Fla.1977); Gilmer v. Shell Oil Co., 324 So.2d 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Weiss v. Miami National Bank, 320 So.2d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), it is also the rule that a trial judge who recuses him......
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...Regardless of his reasons for recusing himself, they are sufficient to prevent further involvement in the case. Gilmer v. Shell Oil Co., 324 So.2d 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Any order he entered after his recusal would be void. Bolt. Similarly, any order entered simultaneously with the order o......