Gilreath v. Allen

• Decision Date: 31 August 1849
• Citation: 32 N.C. 67,10 Ired. 67
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: PENEL GILREATH v. JOEL R. ALLEN.

10 Ired. 67

32 N.C. 67

PENEL GILREATH

v.JOEL R. ALLEN.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August Term, 1849.

In an action of slander, the jury may, if they please, give exemplary damages.

The case of Duncan v. Stallcup, 1 Dev. & Bat. 440, cited and approved.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Henderson County, at the Spring Term 1849, his Honor Judge BAILEY presiding.

This was an action of slander. It was in proof, that there was an action of ejectment, pending in the Superior Court of Henderson County, between the present plaintiff, Gilreath, and one George Allen, the father of the present defendant: that Gilreath, in support of his title in that suit, relied upon a grant from the State of North Carolina for the land in controversy, appended to which grant was a certificate of survey, signed by Thomas D. Clayton, the County surveyor; that the defendant, shortly before the trial of the said suit, to-wit, in March 1847, said of the plaintiff that he had better make up the suit with his father, before Court, for, that the plaintiff had forged the name of the County surveyor, Thomas D. Clayton, to his title. The defendant offered evidence for the purpose of shewing, that, at the time of publishing the words, he was the friend of the plaintiff; that the witness, to whom he spoke the words, was also the intimate friend of the plaintiff; that the communication was confidential, made in good faith, and for the sole purpose, that it should be communicated to the plaintiff, so that the controversy between them might be compromised and friendship restored.

The Court charged the jury, that, if they were satisfied that the words had been spoken by the defendant, and that he meant to convey the idea, that the plaintiff had forged the name of Thomas D. Clayton, the County surveyor, to a certificate of survey, which certificate was appended to the grant for the tract of land in controversy, then the plaintiff would be entitled to recover, unless they were satisfied, that the inference of malice was repelled by the confidential communication relied upon by the defendant; that if the communication, made by the defendant to the witness, was not confidential and in good faith, and for the purpose alleged by him, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover, and the measure of damages was solely for them to determine; that, in making up their estimate, it was proper for them to take into consideration the nature of the offence, charged upon the plaintiff, to-wit, the offence of forgery, and the mental suffering, arising from such a charge; that if the suffering was great, they were to give him damages by way of compensation; that, in cases of this kind, the question was, how much the plaintiff was entitled to receive, and not how much the defendant could pay; that the damages should always be commensurate with the injury; but that, beyond this, they had no right to add any amount to the damages, which the plaintiff was entitled to receive, for the purpose of punishing the defendant. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff and assessed his damages to five dollars. The plaintiff...