Gilroy v. Standard Oil Co.

• Decision Date: 22 October 1930
• Docket Number: No. 66.,66.
• Citation: 151 A. 598
• Parties: GILROY v. STANDARD OIL CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

151 A. 598

GILROY

v. STANDARD OIL CO.

No. 66.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Oct. 22, 1930.

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Action by Edward N. Gilroy against the Standard Oil Company, a New Jersey corporation. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Lindabury, Depue & Faulks, of Newark (J. Edwars Ashmead and Frederick J. Faulks, both of Newark, of counsel), for appellant.

Francis A. Gordon, of Elizabeth, for respondent.

KAYS, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered in the Supreme Court on November 8, 1929, by had the company any claim on him. The fact that the highway was near the company's plant or that it came in close contact with the company's equipment has no effect in continuing or establishing the relation of master and servant between the plaintiff and the defendant. The Employers' Liability Act only applies where the accident arises out of the employment and occurs in the course thereof. The accident did not arise out of the employment, for the reason that the defendant was traveling along a public road at the time it occurred and was not on the premises of the defendant when it happened. The accident did not occur in the course of the plaintiff's employment, for he had ceased the work for which he was employed before the accident and had left the premises of the defendant and was proceeding on his way home. Counsel for the defendant refers to a number of cases in his contention that the common-law courts had no jurisdiction over this case. They refer especially to the case of Bolos v. Trenton Fire Clay, etc., Co., 102 N. J. Law, 479, 133 A. 764, which was affirmed by this court on the opinion below in 103 N. J. Law, page 483, 135 A. 915. The case referred to is entirely different in its legal aspect from the case before us here. In the Bolos Case the employee during the noon hour was eating his lunch in a barn on the employer's property. Just after he had finished his lunch the factory whistle blew recalling all the employees to their work. The barn in which Bolos was at that time was near the company's garage, in which garage the company kept its trucks. As Bolos started back upon the blowing of the whistle to another part of the premises where he was working, one of the employer's trucks came from the garage near the barn and he jumped on the running board to ride a few hundred feet to that part of the factory where his work was carried on. The truck traveled over a public road from the garage entrance to the entrance into the employer's property. As it turned into this entrance from the public road Bolos fell off and was injured. Bolos was still in the course of his employment. He was going from one part of his employer's plant to another for the purpose of resuming his work. Consequently the Bolos Case came within the Workmen's Compensation Act. There are a number of other cases cited by defendant's counsel on this point such as Terlecki v. Straus, 86 N. J. Law, 708, 92 A. 1087, and Zabriskie v. Erie R. R. Co., 86 N. J. Law, 266, 92 A. 385, L. R. A. 1916A, 315. In these cases the employee was either still in the course of his employment or had not left the premises of the employer and are not controlling the case under review.

The other point argued by the appellant is that the trial court erred in stating to the jury that this was a case in which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable. We think the learned trial judge was right in declaring that this doctrine applies to the present case. The explosion of the gas at the pumphouse and the ignition of oil which followed the explosion caused the injury to the...