Ginn v. Cannon

• Decision Date: 13 February 1904
• Parties: GINN et al. v. CANNON.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

46 S.E. 631

119 Ga. 475

GINN et al. v. CANNON.

Supreme Court of Georgia

February 13, 1904

Syllabus by the Court.

1. In view of the language of the deed, it was necessary to resort to parol evidence to determine where the proposed strip was to begin and end, and where the bed of the track was to lie. The evidence on this subject was conflicting, and the case falls within the well-established rule that this court will not interfere with the chancellor's finding on disputed questions of fact.

2. There was sufficient evidence to sustain the finding that one of the defendants was subject to the jurisdiction of the superior court of Rabun county; it appearing that he was unmarried, had no fixed abode, and had been in Rabun county for 18 months. Under the Civil Code of 1895, § 1825, he could, as to third persons, be treated as a resident of the county in which he was temporarily domiciled.

Error from Superior Court, Rabun County; J. J. Kimsey, Judge.

Action by R. E. Cannon against Gus Ginn and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error. Affirmed.

J. J Bowden and H. H. Dean, for plaintiffs in error.

J. W H. Underwood, W. S. Paris, W. A. Charters, and L. E Bleckley, for defendant in error.

LAMAR J.

The petition for injunction was brought, not against the company claiming to be the owner of the strip, but against the persons actually engaged in the work of blasting and digging. Its deed, therefore, ought not to be construed in a case to which it is not a party, unless such construction is necessary to determine the question raised on the application for temporary injunction. It is enough to say that an inspection of the deed shows that it was necessary to resort to parol evidence to determine what land was conveyed, by fixing the point where the road was to enter and leave the land of Cannon, and also where the bed of the track was to lie. The evidence on this issue being conflicting, the case comes within the well-settled rule that this court will not interfere with the finding of the chancellor on disputed facts.

The same is true as to the finding that Ginn was a resident of Rabun county. While he claimed to live in Bartow, there was evidence that he was unmarried; that he had no fixed place of abode, and was engaged in a business which caused a frequent change of residence. It appeared that the partnership property had been returned for taxation in Rabun, and that Ginn for...