Ginther v. Enzuri Grp.
| Decision Date | 05 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | A19-1303 |
| Parties | Christina Ginther, Plaintiff, v. Enzuri Group, LLC, et al., Appellants on Related Appeal, Independent Women's Football League, Respondent on Related Appeal. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Dakota County District Court
Jeffrey D. Metcalf, Loren M. Solfest, Dougherty, Molenda, Solfest, Hills & Bauer P.A., Apple Valley, Minnesota (for appellants on related appeal)
Peter M. Waldeck, Jason M. Stoffel, Waldeck Law Firm P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent on related appeal)
Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Slieter, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
This appeal is taken from the judgment entered following a jury verdict for plaintiff Christina Ginther on her business-discrimination claim against appellant Enzuri Group LLC d/b/a MN Vixen (the team) and respondent Independent Women's Football League (the league). The team operates a women's tackle-football team; from 2012 until 2017, the team contracted with and played in the league. Appellant Laura Brown is the team manager, president, and sole shareholder. Brown managed the recruitment and selection of players for the team. The jury found that Brown did not discriminate against Ginther.
On appeal, the only remaining issues arise from the district court's order denying appellants' posttrial motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on their common-law indemnity claims against the league for attorney fees incurred in defending against Ginther's lawsuit. We conclude the district court properly denied JMOL on the team's indemnity claim and thus we affirm in part. But because the district court erred in denying JMOL on Brown's indemnity claim and did not determine whether Brown tendered her defense to the league, we reverse in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
These facts summarize the evidence received during the jury trial. In October 2016, the team held tryouts for the 2017 season, and Ginther tried out for the team. Brown contacted Ginther and told her she could not join the team because league policy requires that all players be "born female." Ginther is a transgender woman.
In March 2017, Ginther sued the team, Brown, and the league (collectively, defendants) for business discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. § 363A.17(3) (2018). Ginther's complaint alleged that defendants "intentionally refused to do business with," "contract with," and "discriminat[ed]" against her because ofher sexual orientation. Id.; see Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 44 (2018) (). Ginther sought money damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees and costs.
The team and Brown retained the same counsel, who prepared an answer and denied Ginther's allegations. They also cross-claimed against the league seeking common-law indemnity or contribution for any sum owed to Ginther, including attorney fees and costs. The league also denied the allegations in Ginther's complaint and cross-claimed against the team and Brown, seeking indemnity or contribution for any judgment for Ginther.
In April 2018, Brown moved to dismiss Ginther's complaint for failure to state a claim under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e), arguing that Ginther did not allege sufficient facts to support a business-discrimination claim against Brown individually. While that motion was pending, all parties moved for summary judgment. The district court denied Brown's motion to dismiss and all motions for summary judgment, stating first that the amended complaint sufficiently alleged facts about Brown's individual liability. The district court then determined that genuine issues of material fact remained for trial, including: the league's player-eligibility policy, whether a legitimate business purpose justified their actions, whether an agency relationship existed between Brown, the team, and the league, and, if so, what was the scope of the agency relationship.
The case proceeded to a jury trial, starting on December 10, 2018. The district court conducted the trial in three phases: liability, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. The jury found for Ginther and Brown in phase one and against the team and the leagueduring all phases. Because the jury found that Brown was not liable to Ginther, the district court declined to submit Brown's indemnity claim to the jury during phase two and decided to address it during posttrial motions.1 The team asked the district court to submit its indemnity claim to the jury during phase two, and the district court agreed.
The jury's special-verdict findings are relevant to the issues on appeal, so we describe them in some detail. At the close of phase one, the jury found: (1) Brown did not intentionally refuse to do business or contract with Ginther because she is transgender; (2) Brown acted as the league's agent in recruiting and selecting players for the team; and (3) Brown acted within the scope of her agency. The jury also found: (4) the team intentionally refused to do business or contract with Ginther because she is transgender; (5) the team had no legitimate business purpose for doing so; (6) the team acted as the league's agent in recruiting and selecting players; and (7) the team acted within the scope of its agency. And the jury found (8) the league intentionally refused to do business or contract with Ginther because she is transgender.
During phase two on damages, the jury found that Ginther sustained "mental anguish or suffering as a result of discrimination by [the team] and/or [the league]," and awarded $10,000 in compensatory damages. The jury denied the team's indemnity claim against the league, determined contribution was appropriate, and attributed 55% of the damages to the league and 45% to the team. Also during phase two, the jury found, inseparate interrogatories, that the team and the league "acted with deliberate disregard for the rights of [Ginther]."
During phase three on punitive damages, the jury awarded Ginther $10,000 in punitive damages solely against the league and awarded no punitive damages against the team. After the trial, the district court issued written findings of fact in an order that also stayed entry of judgment, pending the resolution of all posttrial motions.
While the parties filed several posttrial motions, only one is relevant in this appeal. The team and Brown moved for JMOL on their cross-claims for indemnity against the league. The team sought indemnity for the judgment, and both the team and Brown requested indemnity for the attorney fees incurred in defending Ginther's complaint. The district court denied all posttrial motions except Ginther's motion for attorney fees and costs. Thus, the district court directed entry of judgment for Ginther for (a) $10,000 in compensatory damages against the team and the league, allocating $4,500 to the team and $5,500 to the league, and (b) $10,000 in punitive damages solely against the league. The district court also awarded Ginther $100,000 in attorney fees and $15,324.68 in costs, allocating 45% to the team and 55% to the league.
This appeal follows.2
A party may move for JMOL during trial, seeking judgment on a claim or defense "that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue." Minn. R. Civ. P. 50.01(a). A party also may move for JMOL after trial, making or renewing the request in the alternative to its motion for new trial. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 50.01-02; see Moore v. Hoff, 821 N.W.2d 591, 595 (Minn. App. 2012) (). "In applying this standard [for JMOL], (1) all the evidence, including that favoring the verdict, must be taken into account, (2) the evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and (3) the court may not weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses." Kedrowski v. Lycoming Engines, 933 N.W.2d 45, 55 (Minn. 2019) (quoting Lamb v. Jordan, 333 N.W.2d 852, 855 (Minn. 1983)). Thus, we review a district court's decision to grant or deny a motion for JMOL de novo. 650 N. Main Ass'n v. Frauenshuh, Inc., 885 N.W.2d 478, 486 (Minn. App. 2016).
As long as we can harmonize the jury's special-verdict answers "on any theory consistent with the evidence and the fair inferences drawn from the evidence, the verdict will not be disturbed." Frauenshuh, Inc., 885 N.W.2d at 486 (quotations omitted); see Kelly v. City of Minneapolis, 598 N.W.2d 657, 662 (Minn. 1999) (). But appellate courts "may not sit as fact finders" and "are not empowered to make or modify findings of fact." Dunn v. Nat'l Beverage Corp., 745 N.W.2d 549, 555 (Minn. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted).
Both issues on appeal involve indemnity, an equitable claim at common law. Rice Lake Contracting Corp. v. Rust Env't & Infrastructure, Inc., 616 N.W.2d 288, 292 (Minn. App. 2000) (), review denied (Minn. Oct. 25, 2000). Indemnity claims, like other equitable claims, may be submitted to the district court or to the jury. "[A] district court has the discretion to decide whether the fact finder in an equitable action will be the judge or a jury." Olson v. Synergistic Techs. Bus. Sys., Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142, 153 (Minn. 2001); see also Melrose Gates, LLC v. Chor Moua, 875 N.W.2d...
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