Giobbi v. Bramson

Decision Date06 July 1989
Citation560 A.2d 1079
PartiesFernando GIOBBI v. Udell BRAMSON.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Jack L. Schwartz, Stephen J. Schwartz, Schwartz, Wilson, Fernald & Foley, Portland, for plaintiff.

Udell Bramson, Portland, pro se.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and WATHEN, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, HORNBY and COLLINS, JJ.

McKUSICK, Chief Justice.

In Fernando Giobbi's quiet title action against Udell Bramson, the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Perkins, J.) has entered summary judgment declaring Giobbi the owner of Lot 32 on Tax Map U-32 in the Town of Falmouth. The Superior Court set aside as void the default judgment entered in 1979 in Bramson's favor in Bramson v. Lang, a quiet title action involving the same lot. In the case at bar, Bramson presented no written response to Giobbi's motion for summary judgment nor has he filed an answer to Giobbi's complaint; he has rested entirely on the 1979 default judgment in his favor. At the time that judgment was rendered, however, Giobbi's grantor, the Town of Falmouth, was the true owner of Lot 32 and had never been made a party to Bramson v. Lang. The Superior Court properly found in the record a solid basis for Giobbi's claim of title and none at all for Bramson's. We affirm the judgment.

It is undisputed that Lot 32 was once owned by the defendants in Bramson v. Lang (the "Lang family"), successors in interest to Edward Lang, Jr., who acquired the lot on December 21, 1905. Giobbi's chain of title is straightforward. The Lang family were named as the owners in tax liens on Lot 32 recorded by the Town on April 24, 1973, and on April 17, 1974, as well as in several other liens recorded in previous years but discharged by the Town. On October 24, 1974, more than four years before the entry of default judgment against the Lang family in Bramson v. Lang, the Town foreclosed the 1973 tax mortgage pursuant to 36 M.R.S.A. § 943 (1978). The Town sold Lot 32 to Giobbi on April 26, 1984.

Bramson's claim to Lot 32 is more complex, being based on both a void judgment and a wild deed. On June 12, 1972, some five months before he commenced his quiet title action against the Lang family, Bramson obtained a quitclaim deed to Lot 32 from Christian G. Kragelund. Kragelund's only colorable source of title, itself not recited in his deed to Bramson, was an invalid tax deed from the Town that Kragelund first disavowed and then recorded.

The deed from the Town to Kragelund was a quitclaim deed executed on January 13, 1961, conveying to Kragelund "any interest the [Town] may have in [Lot 32] by virtue of unpaid taxes for the tax year(s) to and including 1960." At that time, however, the Town had no interest to convey: there was no tax lien of record on Lot 32, nor do the assessor's records show the Lang family owed any delinquent taxes on Lot 32 for any tax year to that date.

It remains a mystery why the Town executed the deed to Kragelund. The attorney who represented the Town in its sale to Giobbi conjectured that the reference to Lot 32 on Map U-32 was a clerical error. The deed remained...

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1 cases
  • Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Wilk
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • September 12, 2013
    ...Powers, 2005 ME 62, ¶ 4, 873 A.2d 361 (providing that “a deed may convey only property that was owned by the grantor”); Giobbi v. Bramson, 560 A.2d 1079, 1080 (Me.1989) (holding that a quitclaim deed is a nullity when it purports to convey real property not then owned by the purported grant......

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