Giokas v. Giokas

• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: PETER B. SKELOS
• Citation: Giokas v. Giokas, 73 AD3d 688, 900 N.Y.S.2d 370 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)
• Decision Date: 04 May 2010
• Parties: George GIOKAS, respondent, v. Eugenia GIOKAS, appellant.

900 N.Y.S.2d 370

73 A.D.3d 688

George GIOKAS, respondent,

v.Eugenia GIOKAS, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

May 4, 2010.

England & England, P.C., Centereach, N.Y. (Donna England of counsel), for appellant.

Castrovinci & Mady, Smithtown, N.Y. (Philip J. Castrovinci and Ruth Sovronsky of counsel), for respondent.

PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., JOSEPH COVELLO, RUTH C. BALKIN, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.

In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (MacKenzie, J.), entered October 3, 2008, as, upon a decision dated April 17, 2008, and upon a supplemental decision dated May 29, 2008, both made after a nonjury trial, directed the plaintiff to pay her maintenance in the sum of only $500 per week, nontaxable to her, only from April 24, 2008, and continuing until the earliest of her remarriage, whether valid or invalid, her attainment of age 62, or the death of either party, and awarded her only 10% of the value of the plaintiff's business interests.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, on the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, by deleting the provision thereof awarding the plaintiff maintenance in the sum of $500 per week, nontaxable to her, from April 24, 2008, and continuing until the earliest of her remarriage, whether valid or invalid, her attainment of age 62, or the death of either party, and substituting therefor a provision awarding her maintenance in the sum of $500 per week, nontaxable to her, from April 24, 2008, and continuing until theearliest of her remarriage, whether valid or invalid, her attainment of age 66, or the death of either party; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the defendant.

"[T]he amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and every case must be determined on its own unique facts"( Wortman v. Wortman, 11 A.D.3d 604, 606, 783 N.Y.S.2d 631; see Grumet v. Grumet, 37 A.D.3d 534, 535, 829 N.Y.S.2d 682). The Supreme Court must consider the factors enumerated in Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(6)(a), which include the pre-divorce standard of living of the parties, the income and property of the parties, the equitable distribution of marital property, the duration of the marriage, the present and future earning capacity of the parties, the ability of the party seeking maintenance to be self-supporting, and the reduced or lost earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance ( see Baron v. Baron, 71 A.D.3d 807, 897 N.Y.S.2d 456; Meccariello v. Meccariello, 46 A.D.3d 640, 641-642, 847 N.Y.S.2d 618; Griggs v. Griggs, 44 A.D.3d 710, 711-712, 844 N.Y.S.2d 351). The main purpose of a maintenance award is to give the nonmonied spouse economic independence ( see Griggs v. Griggs, 44 A.D.3d at 711-712, 844 N.Y.S.2d 351).

Contrary to the wife's contentions, the amount of maintenance awarded by the Supreme Court was consistent with the purpose and function of maintenance in light of her education, ability to be self-supporting, good health, lack of child-rearing responsibilities, and separate assets. However, in light of the parties' ages as well as their respective financial circumstances, the Supreme Court should have awarded the wife maintenance until the earliest of her eligibility for full Social Security benefits at the age of 66, her remarriage, or the death of either party ( see Hamroff v. Hamroff, 35 A.D.3d 365, 366, 826 N.Y.S.2d 389; Penna v. Penna, 29 A.D.3d 970, 971-972, 817 N.Y.S.2d 313; Taylor v. Taylor, 300 A.D.2d 298, 299, 751 N.Y.S.2d 282).

While the distribution of marital property must be equitable, there is no requirement that the assets be split evenly ( see Arvantides v. Arvantides, 64 N.Y.2d 1033, 1034, 489 N.Y.S.2d 58, 478 N.E.2d 199). Furthermore, "[t]rial courts are granted substantial discretion in determining...