Giovanetti v. Johns-Manville Corp.
| Decision Date | 31 March 1988 |
| Docket Number | JOHNS-MANVILLE |
| Citation | 372 Pa.Super. 431,539 A.2d 871 |
| Parties | Louis GIOVANETTI, Appellant, v.CORPORATION, Amatex Corporation, H.K. Porter Company, Southern Asbestos Company, Eagle-Pitcher Industries, Celotex Corporation, Owens-Corning Fiberglas, Inc., General Refractories Company, GAF Corporation, Unarco Industries, Inc., Fibreboard Corporation, Forty-Eight Insulations, Certainteed Corporation, Keene Corporation and Pacor Corporation. Louis J. GIOVANETTI, Appellant, v.CORPORATION, Amatex Corporation, H.K. Porter Company, Southern Asbestos Company, Eagle-Pitcher Industries, Celotex Corporation, Owens-Corning Fiberglas, Inc., General Refractories Company, GAF Corporation, Unarco Industries, Inc., Fibreboard Corporation, Forty-Eight Insulations, Certainteed Corporation, Keene Corporation and Pacor Corporation. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
John W. Haigis, III, Philadelphia, for appellant.
John P. Kelly, Philadelphia, for appellees.
Before CIRILLO, President Judge, and McEWEN and MONTEMURO, JJ.
This is an appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in which a jury relieved various corporations of liability to Louis Giovanetti for injuries allegedly resulting from his exposure to asbestos. We affirm.
Louis Giovanetti, a New Jersey resident, initiated this action in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas to recover for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of exposure to asbestos. The exposure allegedly occurred during his employment as a tinsmith and a welder in both New Jersey and Pennsylvania over the course of nearly thirty years. Giovanetti named various manufacturers and distributors of the asbestos products as defendants. The trial was conducted in reverse bifurcated form, with the questions of damages and causation being determined before liability.
On the second day of trial, the defendants indicated for the first time that they were seeking the application of New Jersey law to the facts of the case. The court complied, and the jury was told to disregard any of counsel's opening arguments that were based on the application of Pennsylvania law. The jury determined that Giovanetti suffered no compensable injury as a result of his exposure to asbestos, thereby obviating the need to proceed to the second phase of the trial. Giovanetti filed for post-trial relief, which was denied. This appeal followed.
Giovanetti contends that he should be granted a new trial for the following reasons: (1) the inherently prejudicial effect of the court's application of New Jersey law at the appellee's behest when both parties had completed a portion of the trial with the tacit understanding that Pennsylvania law would apply; (2) the internally inconsistent nature of the jury's verdict, as evidenced by their answers to special interrogatories; and (3) the impropriety of the verdict as against the weight of the evidence.
Giovanetti first contends that he was prejudiced by the application of New Jersey law to the facts of his case. Although he does not suggest that the choice of New Jersey law was invalid, he maintains that Pennsylvania law should have been chosen in light of the tacit agreement among the parties that Pennsylvania law would apply. This agreement, according to Giovanetti, was evidenced by the fact that before the conflict of law issue was raised, twenty-three of the twenty-nine points for binding instruction submitted to the court by the appellees referred to Pennsylvania cases, and none referred to New Jersey law. Additionally, counsel for both parties based their opening statements on Pennsylvania law and Giovanetti had already presented his first witness, whose testimony was based on Pennsylvania law.
When faced with choice of law questions, Pennsylvania courts have abandoned the rule of lex loci delicti in favor of a less restrictive approach combining the methodologies of a "government interest analysis" and the "significant relationship" approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 145 (1971). See also Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). The paramount consideration under this analysis is:
the extent to which one state rather than another has demonstrated, by reason of its policies and their connection and relevance to the matter in dispute, a priority of interest in the application of its rule of law.
McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 94, 215 A.2d 677, 682 (1966). Furthermore, in reviewing the relative interests of each jurisdiction in a cause of action, Pennsylvania courts will weigh their respective contacts qualitatively, rather than quantitatively. See Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970).
In weighing the relative interests of Pennsylvania and New Jersey in this particular litigation, we conclude that New Jersey law is more appropriately applied. Because six of the appellee corporations are Pennsylvania-based, Pennsylvania can certainly be viewed as possessing a legitimate interest in ensuring that Pennsylvania companies do not manufacture or distribute hazardous products which cause injury. That interest, however, is clearly eclipsed by the numerous contacts between New Jersey and the present cause of action. Giovanetti, a resident of New Jersey, spent twenty-seven of his working years in New Jersey, as opposed to only two years working in Pennsylvania. Any relationship he had with the manufacturers and distributors of the asbestos products was centered in New Jersey. Considering the fact that asbestos-related disease is proportionally related to the extent and duration of exposure, it is not unreasonable to assume that any injury he may have suffered as a result of exposure to asbestos occurred primarily in New Jersey. Furthermore, all of the appellees were doing business in New Jersey at the time of his alleged exposure. New Jersey, then, has a compelling interest in seeing that its citizens are compensated for injuries which occurred within its borders, allegedly as a result of the appellees' business there.
In light of the quality and number of contacts between New Jersey and Giovanetti's exposure to asbestos, it is clear that the trial court properly applied New Jersey law. In so holding, we reject Giovanetti's initial contention that either New Jersey or Pennsylvania law could have been applied under a Griffith analysis. Giovanetti further argues, however, that his case was prejudiced by the timing of the appellees' request. Specifically, he suggests that the defense's belated request that New Jersey law be applied confused the jury, hampered him in the presentation of his case, and prejudiced his right to recover.
Regardless of the theorized effect of the appellees' mid-trial request that New Jersey law should apply, Giovanetti's claim must fail for the simple reason that the application of New Jersey law to the facts of the case put him in no worse a position than he would have been in had Pennsylvania law been applied. In fact, an analysis of the respective laws of the two states reveals that Giovanetti actually benefits from the application of New Jersey law.
The primary difference between the laws of Pennsylvania and New Jersey with respect to the litigation of asbestos-related suits is fundamental. Pennsylvania treats all injuries arising from the same tortious conduct of a defendant as one cause of action subject to the standard limitations period. See Cathcart v. Keene Industrial Insulations, 324 Pa.Super. 123, 471 A.2d 493 (1984). Because of the constraints such an approach imposes on a plaintiff's ability to obtain compensation for foreseeable, but distant injuries arising from the same tortious conduct, Pennsylvania courts allow an injured plaintiff to produce expert testimony as to the possible future effects of that conduct. See Schwegel v. Goldberg, 209 Pa.Super. 280, 228...
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