Giove v. Holden
| Decision Date | 10 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 11-735-SLR-SRF |
| Parties | GUY D. GIOVE, Plaintiff, v. DWIGHT F. HOLDEN and COL. ROBERT COUPE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
In this action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff Guy D. Giove ("plaintiff") seeks relief for alleged civil rights violations committed by defendants Dwight F. Holden ("Holden") and Col. Robert Coupe ("Coupe") (together with Holden, "defendants"). Pending before the court is a motion for judgment on the pleadings, filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). (D.I. 30) For the following reasons, it is recommended that the court grant defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Plaintiff is a 61-year old resident of Rehoboth, Delaware. (D.I. 28 at ¶ 3) Coupe was the Superintendent for the Delaware State Police of the Department of Public Safety at all times relevant to the present action. (Id. at ¶ 4) Holden was the Chairperson of the State of Delaware Board of Parole at all times relevant to the present action. (Id. at ¶ 5)
In 1993, plaintiff pled guilty to Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the Third Degree. (Id. at ¶ 6) On July 1, 2008, the Delaware Sex Offender Registration Law, 11 Del. C. § 4120, et seq., changed with respect to an offender's Tier designation for convictions prior to 1996. (Id. at ¶ 7)Following the change in the law, public notification is not required for a sex offender assigned a Tier I designation, but is required for offenders with Tier II or Tier III designations. (Id. at ¶ 8)
Coupe is the custodian of the Delaware Sex Offender Registry (the "Registry") and is responsible for its accuracy. (Id. at ¶ 9) On August 24, 2009, Coupe provided notice to plaintiff that he was required to register under the new law. The notice indicated that plaintiff's name would not appear on the Registry until his registration and Tier designation were complete. (Id.)
Plaintiff registered with the Delaware State Police on September 28, 2009. (Id. at ¶ 11) The registration form only identified the offense charged, and not the actual disposition. (Id., Ex. B) Also, on September 28, 2009, plaintiff was sent an Initial Notice providing that plaintiff's risk level had not yet been assessed. (Id. at ¶ 12, Ex. C)
On October 1, 2009, a Rehoboth Beach Neighborhood Watch bulletin was published, providing notification to the community that plaintiff was a sex offender. (Id. at ¶ 14, Ex. D) The bulletin listed plaintiff's address and indicated that plaintiff had been convicted of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree. (Id.)
On October 7, 2009, plaintiff received notification from the Delaware Department of Justice that he had received a Tier II designation based on his prior conviction for Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the Third Degree. (Id. at ¶ 15, Ex. E) Plaintiff appealed his designation to the Board of Parole. (Id. at ¶ 16) The Board of Parole granted plaintiff's request to reduce his designation to Tier I, which requires no public notification, on July 28, 2010. (Id. at ¶ 17, Ex. F)
Plaintiff alleges that the erroneous publication caused him to suffer damage to his reputation and his business, which involved property maintenance contractor work for homeowners during the summer vacation off-season. (Id. at ¶¶ 18-19) Plaintiff claims that hewas no longer hired for such work after publication and was "ostracized by the community." (Id. at ¶ 19)
Plaintiff initiated the present action by filing a complaint in this court on August 19, 2011. (D.I. 1) Plaintiff named Holden, the Parole Board of the State of Delaware, Coupe, and the State of Delaware Department of Public Safety as defendants. (Id.) On October 3, 2011, plaintiff filed his first amended complaint against the same defendants. (D.I. 5) In the amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated his civil rights by erroneously publishing information identifying him as a sex offender. (Id.) The defendants answered the complaint and moved for judgment on the pleadings. (D.I. 15; D.I. 16) The undersigned Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the defendants' motion be granted on June 19, 2012 (D.I. 22), and the court issued an order adopting the Report and Recommendation on July 26, 2012 (D.I. 23).
Plaintiff obtained new counsel and filed a second amended complaint on October 22, 2012, alleging causes of action for violation of the Delaware Sex Offender Registration Law ("SOR Law"), defamation, and violation of plaintiff's procedural due process, substantive due process, or right to privacy against defendants Holden and Coupe. (D.I. 28) Holden and Coupe answered the second amended complaint and moved for judgment on the pleadings on October 31,2012. (D.I. 29; D.I. 30)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), "[a]fter the pleadings are closed - but early enough not to delay trial - a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). When deciding a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings based on an allegation that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim, the motion "is analyzed under the same standards thatapply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." Revell v. Port Autk, 598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 995, 178 L. Ed. 2d 825 (Jan. 18, 2011).
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although detailed factual allegations are not required, the complaint must set forth sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). Under this standard, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Turbe v. Gov't of Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991). This determination is a context-specific task requiring the court "to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
As a preliminary matter, plaintiff does not contest defendants' assertion that claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (D.I. 33 at 2 n.1) Plaintiff brings his claims against defendants in their individual capacities. (Id.)
The court first addresses the parties' dispute regarding whether a private right of action exists under the SOR Law. The court finds that a private right of action does exist under the statute.
To determine whether a private right of action exists, courts must evaluate the legislative intent of the statute based on the statutory language.1 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001) (). "It is the duty of the court to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed." Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 153 (1883). A private right of action cannot be implied when the statute contains no explicit or implicit evidence of a private remedy. Brett v. Berkowitz, 706 A.2d 509, 512 (Del. 1998).
The disputed statutory provisions in this case are 11 Del. C. §§ 4120(j) and 4121(l)(1)-(2). Section 4120(j), provides:
11 Del. C. § 4120(j) (emphasis added). This provision demonstrates the legislature's intent to provide a civil remedy for any grossly negligent discretionary decision to release information or bad faith conduct in releasing such information. However, the legislature expressly excluded civil remedies for the failure to release information. Similarly, § 4121(l)(l)-(2) provides:
11 Del. C. § 4121(l)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). Again, the legislature's intent to provide a private right of action is evident from the statutory language expressly providing a civil remedy for a grossly negligent discretionary decision to release relevant information or for bad faith conduct in releasing such information.
Defendants allege that plaintiff fails to state a claim under the SOR Law because the second amended complaint contains no facts...
To continue reading
Request your trial