Gipson v. Brown

• Decision Date: 09 May 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-253,87-253
• Citation: 295 Ark. 371,749 S.W.2d 297
• Parties: John GIPSON, Bill Hefley, M.D., Coolidge Faulkner, Richard Conder, James Dixon, A.J. Tomme, and Jack Case, Appellants, v. Joe BROWN, Bob Scott, and Tip Nelms, D.D.S., Appellees.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 297

749 S.W.2d 297

295 Ark. 371

John GIPSON, Bill Hefley, M.D., Coolidge Faulkner, Richard Conder, James Dixon, A.J. Tomme, and Jack Case, Appellants, v. Joe BROWN, Bob Scott, and Tip Nelms, D.D.S., Appellees.

No. 87-253.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

May 9, 1988.

William H. Sutton, Diane S. Mackey, Little Rock, for appellants.

Cliff Jackson, Little Rock, for appellees.

HOLT, Chief Justice.

This is the second time we consider whether there is a conflict between the requirements of our code provisions on nonprofit corporations and the tenets of the Sixth and Izard Church of Christ, of which appellees are members and appellants are elders. The dispute concerns appellees' efforts to obtain various financial records of the church by virtue of its status as a nonprofit corporation and to secure an election of directors by the church membership. The elders, with the apparent support of other members within the church, resist appellees' efforts on the grounds that application of our state nonprofit corporation laws would interfere with the religious doctrine and practice of the church in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and art. 2, §§ 24 and 25 of the Arkansas Constitution.

When the case was first before us, Gipson v. Brown, 288 Ark. 422, 706 S.W.2d 369 (1986), we granted relief from an interlocutory order of the chancery court compelling discovery of the records and financial information which had been the object of the suit. We remanded to the chancellor with instructions to conduct a hearing to determine whether application of Ark.Code Ann. § 4-28-218 (1987), formerly Ark.Stat.Ann. § 64-1913 (Repl.1980), would override the religious doctrine, polity or practice of the church as protected by the federal and state constitutions. On remand, the chancellor entered an order appointing a special master "to investigate and [make] findings of fact and conclusions of law over all relevant matters pertaining to this action." The chancellor entered an order adopting the report and recommendations of the master by which the elders were required to conduct an election and "make available ... all financial and business records of the corporation." From that order comes this appeal.

While the chancellor was proceeding beyond his authority when he appointed the special master, and in some cases we have held that this mandates that the appeal be dismissed as premature, State v. Nelson, 246 Ark. 210, 438 S.W.2d 33 (1969), this court generally reviews matters appealed from chancery court on a de novo basis, Lynch v. Brunner, 294 Ark. 515, 745 S.W.2d 115, (1988). In addition, there is a policy in favor of bringing litigated matters to an end. Taggart v. Moore, 292 Ark. 168, 729 S.W.2d 7 (1987). On that basis we proceed with the merits of this appeal.

In Gipson I we stated that it was a close question whether this action could be maintained at all. In view of the record before us, we now conclude that the appeal should be dismissed. The underlying dispute between the elders and the members of the church is essentially religious in nature, and its resolution is more properly reserved to the church. The evidence of record clearly shows that the code provisions governing nonprofit corporations interfere with the doctrine and polity of the church and infringe upon its guaranteed religious liberties--while at the same time the record fails to reveal a compelling state interest which would justify application of our laws in light of the constitutional proscriptions against interference with the free exercise of religion. In that setting we find that our examination of the issues

before us results in the impermissible entanglement of this court in ecclesiastical matters.

USE OF A SPECIAL MASTER

In Nelson, supra, this court's discussion of the appointment of a special master was as follows:

[T]he chancellor appointed a Special Master, and instructed him to prescribe rules for the expeditious and orderly progress of the tasks with which he was charged, and to proceed with hearing of evidence and ruling upon all matters of fact and law incident thereto.... In this respect, the trial court was proceeding illegally.... [T]he chancellor should hear the cause upon the pleadings and such evidence as may enable him to determine the principles to be applied in adjusting the equities of the parties and then make a reference to a master for such special inquiries or statements of accounts as may aid the court in making a definite decree.... [T]he United States Supreme Court [has] stated that the use of masters was to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties as they arise and not to displace the court. [The Court] held that the appointment of a master and a reference at the inception of the case to take evidence and to report the same to the court with his findings of fact and conclusions of law was an action beyond the court's powers. [Emphasis added.]

We stated in Nelson that to support the reference by reason of anticipation of a lengthy trial, complexity of the issues and congestion of the court's calendar does not constitute sufficient grounds for the virtual displacement of the court by a special master.

While we can conceive of situations in which a reference of particular matters may be made to a master during the course of litigation, a reference as broad as the one involved here is clearly in excess of the court's jurisdiction and in that respect the court proceeded without authority of law.

Id. 246 Ark. at 219-220, 438 S.W.2d 33.

Rule 53(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure specifies that the reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule and, except in matters of accounting and difficult computation of damages, the reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it. No such showing was made here.

While we reaffirm our position in Nelson, the result reached in that case--dismissal of the appeal as "premature"--is not appropriate here in light of our policy in favor of bringing litigated matters to an end and our ability to review matters appealed from chancery court on a de novo basis.

CHURCH VS. STATE

One proposition is clear and certain--courts, absent fraud or collusion, do not interfere in purely ecclesiastical matters. As early as Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872), the United States Supreme Court stated that when civil courts get involved in matters of church discipline or ecclesiastical government, it requires looking into the customs, usages, written laws, and the fundamental organization of religious denominations, which deprives these bodies of the right to interpret their own church laws and opens the door to all sorts of evils.

The rule requiring deference to decisions of ecclesiastical bodies on matters of internal church governance is stated in Gonzales v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 50 S.Ct. 5, 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929), where Justice Brandeis wrote for the majority:

In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive....

In Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976), and later in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979), the Supreme Court recognized that when religious organizations establish rules for their internal governance, and tribunals for adjudicating disputes over such matters, "the constitution requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding upon them." In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952), the Supreme Court said that religious freedom encompasses the power of religious bodies:

[T]o decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.

In Gipson I we emphasized that "internal church disputes relating to the disclosure of church business should not be subject to the legal concern of this court" and that "state courts can only become involved in church disputes when 'neutral principles' of law can be applied to resolve the dispute." Here, the underlying dispute between the appellee members and the elders is of a long-standing, ongoing, heated nature extending beyond application of our code provisions to an explicit attempt by appellees to convince the church membership that they have a biblically based right to access the records of the church and to determine who the elders of the church will be. To achieve this end, incorporation of the church was accomplished through the services of one of the appellees.

It does not take much to see that incorporation greatly facilitated appellees' efforts to access church records, while at the same time it had little to do with anything which might implicate state interests or warrant intervention in the dispute under the guise of determining whether our laws on nonprofit corporations apply to the church. As such, and in light of the proscriptions against interference in ecclesiastical matters, interference which is necessarily implicated by the facts and issues before us, we find the appropriate course to be dismissal.

That result finds additional support. In Gipson I we emphasized that the religious beliefs of all citizens are zealously protected from government interference under both the state and federal constitutions. Article 2, § 24 of the Arkansas Constitution expressly provides that "[a]ll men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences" absent interference with the right of conscience by any human authority. Remand was specifically for the purpose of conducting a hearing on the "claim of first amendment protection versus the disclosure...