Gipson v. Maner
| Decision Date | 13 February 1956 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 5-757,5-827,5-758,s. 5-757 |
| Parties | J. A. GIPSON, Appellant, v. Ernest MANER, Judge, Appellee. J. A. GIPSON, Appellant, v. David YOUNG, Treasurer, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Kenneth C. Coffelt, Little Rock, for appellant.
H. B. Means, Malvern, J. M. Smallwood, Russellville, for appellees.
Harry P. Daily, Ft. Smith, L. Weems Trussell, Fordyce, Arnold M. Adams, Harrison, Emery D. Curlee, Mountain Home, Fred M. Pickens, Jr., Newport, W. D. Murphy, Jr., Batesville, Tompkins, McKenzie & McRae, Prescott, Shaver & Shaver, Wynne, Ned Stewart, Texarkana, Jay W. Dickey, Pine Bluff, on the briefs amici curiae.
The question in these cases is whether Acts 109 and 142 of 1955 are contrary to § 4 of Amendment 37 to the state constitution, which places a limitation upon the salary and expenses of circuit judges and chancellors.
It was provided by Amendmant 15, approved in 1928, that the annual salary of these judges should be $3,600 each. Amendment 15 was superseded in 1946 by Amendment 37. Section 4 of the amendment now in force reads: 'The General Assembly of Arkansas shall by law determine the amount and method of payment of salaries and expenses of Circuit Judges and Chancellors of the various Circuit and Chancery districts; provided that the salary and expenses of any Circuit Judge or Chancellor shall not be less than $4,800.00, nor more than $7,200.00 per year.' At its first session after the adoption of the present amendment the legislature fixed the annual salary of these officers at the maximum figure of $7,200, and that amount is now being paid to each of them. Ark.Stats.1947, § 22-348.
These cases involve the seventh judicial circuit, of which the appellee Ernest Maner is judge. By Act 109 of 1955 the legislature found that 'the judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit must provide the costs of travel and other costs incident to the holding of court in such district, and that such costs reduce the income of such judge to approximately $3,600 annually--a sum much less than that received by other public officials who fill less responsible positions'. The Act then directs the judge to relieve the burden of current business by holding pretrial conferences and adjourned days of court. It is next ascertained and declared that the expenses occasioned by duties imposed since the adoption of Amendment 37 amount to $200 a month, which sum is declared to be a necessary expense of the counties within the circuit. The Act directs the counties to pay to the circuit judge the sum of $200 monthly, of which $85 is to be paid by Hot Spring County, a like amount by Saline County, and $30 by Grant County. The other statute in question, Act 142 of 1955, is of more general application. It amends Ark.Stats. § 22-349, by authorizing any circuit judge or chancellor to determine mileage and other expense occasioned by duties imposed since the adoption of Amendment 37 and to direct that such expense be paid by the counties comprising the circuit or district.
On February 26, 1955, under the authority of Act 109, Judge Maner entered a circuit court order directing Saline County to pay $85 monthly to the circuit judge for necessary expenses. Two days later the appellant, as a citizen and taxpayer, filed his notice of appeal from that order; that appeal has been docketed here as Case No. 5-757. Later on Judge Maner set aside the brief order of February 26 and entered a more detailed order by which it was found that expenses attributable to duties imposed after the adoption of Amendment 37 amounted to $200 a month, which was apportioned among the three counties in the ratio specified by Act 109. Gipson's appeal from that order is Case No. 5-758.
In addition to appealing from the above orders, neither of which seems to have been preceded by the taking of testimony, Gipson filed a separate suit in the chancery court to enjoin the county treasurer from making the payments in question and from providing a telephone for the circuit judge's chambers. Trial of that case resulted in a decree denying all relief, it having been stipulated that the county should not pay for personal long-distance calls made by Judge Maner or anyone else. Gipson's appeal from that decree is Case No. 5-827.
The appellee in the first two cases has filed a motion to dismiss the appeals, upon the ground that there was no litigation in the trial court from which an appeal could be taken. This position is not well taken, for if the orders direct an unconstitutional expenditure of public funds they can be set aside either upon appeal or by certiorari. We need not determine which method of review is technically correct, for the real questions at issue are equally well presented by the third case and must in any event be decided. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied.
The appellant's objection to the county's furnishing a telephone for the judge's clambers can be answered quickly. This outlay does not constitute a personal expense for which the judge is being reimbursed; it is a payment made to the telephone company for a service reasonably necessary to the transaction of the court's official business. No one doubts the county's authority to provide a courtroom and judge's chambers, nor its duty to supply furniture, heat, light, stationery, and other ordinary requirements for the operation of a public office. Not long ago we approved the installation of air-conditioning as a proper county expenditure. McArthur v. Campbell, Ark., 280 S.W.2d 221. There is no sound basis for drawing a distinction between telephone service and the many other facilities that are regarded as necessary to the conduct of a modern business office.
With respect to the principal question a number of able briefs have been filed in...
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Campbell v. State, 89-25
... ... in this state." Since our precedents constrain us to interpret language of the constitution according to its plain and common meaning, Gipson v. Manor, 225 Ark. 976, 287 S.W.2d 467 (1956); Morley v. Remmel, 215 Ark. 434, 221 S.W.2d 51 (1949), we deem it necessary to determine in what sense ... ...
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...the argument, but it is not persuasive. The issue is one not of expediency, but one of constitutional law. See Gipson v. Maner, 225 Ark. 976, 287 S.W.2d 467 (1956). II. Circuit court has subject-matter jurisdiction of illegal exaction suits. Jones v. Clark, 278 Ark. 119, 644 S.W.2d 257 (198......
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