Girard Inv. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Decision Date | 22 August 1941 |
Docket Number | No. 7696.,7696. |
Citation | 122 F.2d 843 |
Parties | GIRARD INV. CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Jackson R. Collins, of New York City, and James D. McHugh and Frank F. Truscott, both of Philadelphia, Pa. (Robert I. Staples, of Philadelphia, Pa., and Reginald H. Smith, Jr., of New York City, on the brief), for petitioner.
Louise Foster, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen. (Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sewall Key, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen., on the brief), for respondent.
Before BIGGS, MARIS, and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
This is a second attempt to construe away the effect of some quite unambiguous language. We say second because now one more closely held small loan company seeks to avoid the application of the "incorporated pocketbook" provision of the Revenue Act of 1934.1 In the first case2 the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in an able opinion by its presiding judge, refused relief. Learned counsel, who argued as amicus curiae in that case, may have given and no doubt has given some polish to his earlier contentions. They are, however, in essence the same and, we think, should receive the reception previously accorded. Counsel maintained then and now: first, that the return charged for the use of money loaned in small amounts is not interest; second, that the plain and specific words of the Act are overridden by a general intention not to apply them to operating companies; and third, that a subsequent amendment is clarifying rather than altering.
The petitioner's interpretation of interest seems to us a curious one. It is unnecessary to set down the depressing history of the small loan industry. It seems to be a discouraging example of human cupidity.3 We had occasion to note it in a recent opinion.4 The regulation of these companies turns on what rate of interest is excessive and so usurious.5 The authors of the Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences define "interest" as follows:
8 Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences 131 (Italics ours).
With many small loans to the kind of people who need small sums the "effort of administration" and the "insecurity of payment" is more pronounced. The small loan companies have advocated and been granted rates covering this increased cost and risk. It is a non sequitur to use this justifiable excess in nominal interest as an argument in support of its own exclusion from the general word interest and the limitation of that word to pure interest.
The "general intention" versus "specific language" theory has this basis. The incorporated pocketbook became a quite scandalous device for tax avoidance.6 The recipient of a large income incorporated himself and so took advantage of legal ghost lore.7 In the average case the person thus desiring taxwise invisibility was of the "rentier" class. Undoubtedly that most usual instance was predominantly in the legislative mind. That is not to say, however, that the Congress approved any individuals paying the low corporate rates on what was in substance individual income. Such an approval would be to import into our law the English distinction between earned and unearned income.8 Because that is the only difference between the incorporation of income from your investments and the incorporation of income from the operation of your business, small loan or otherwise.9 We think, therefore, that petitioner has failed to bring his case within the "occasions when words may be interpolated."10 This may be done only when the statutory language is equivocal11 or where literal interpretation leads to absurdity "so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense."12
If the existing is obscure anything subsequent can be interpreted either as a clarification or as a change. If the former, the effect is retrospective and therefore to be eschewed. It can, of course, be so stated and if it is, governs. One might prescribe this the sine qua non. In any event, caution has been indicated:
13 1 Paul and Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 3.15, pp. 46, 47.
Certainly a three years' rejection of the later language betokens a change. We hesitate to alter but hasten to explain. In 1935,14 193615 and 1937,16 a plea for exemption was unsuccessfully pressed. In preparing the Revenue Act of 1936, the House bill omitted Section 351 entirely. The Senate Finance Committee rewrote the section and attempted to specifically exempt small loan companies. This insertion in the provision was eliminated by the Conference Committee.17 Finally in 1938 counsel for a body of which the petitioner was a member was persuasive.18 Personal finance companies that met certain specified conditions were exempted.19 But the amendment of 1938 is to be given no retroactive effect.20
The petitioner also resists the imposition of a 25 per cent penalty for failure to file a separate return on Form 1120 H as required by Article 351-8 of Regulations 86. Section 351(c) of the Revenue Act of 1934 incorporates the administrative provisions (including penalties) applicable in respect to the tax imposed by that section. One of those administrative provisions reads:
"In case of any failure to make and file a return required by this title, within the time prescribed by law or prescribed by the Commissioner in pursuance of law, 25 per centum of the tax shall be added to the tax, except that when a return is filed after such time and it is shown that the failure to file it was due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect no such addition shall be made to the tax. * * *" 26 U.S.C.A. Internal Revenue Act of 1934, § 291, page 750. (Italics ours.)21
Petitioner's taxes for 1934, 1935 and 1936 were returned on Form 1120. This Form is entitled "Corporation Income and Excess-Profits Tax Return." The fourth question at the top of this return reads: Petitioner answered the question in the negative and so did not disclose either its stock ownership or the percentage of its gross income from interest. In the space provided for remarks on page 2 of this Form, we find the following:
Exhibit C, Appendix to Petitioner's brief, p. 60.
The return was prepared by a firm of accountants, Snyder and McAlpine. On June 3, 1939, and two years after the last of these Forms 1120 were filed, petitioner made his return on Form 1120 H, "Return of Personal Holding Company." This was done at the suggestion of the revenue agent concerned.
We agree with the respondent that the filing of Form 1120 does not constitute a sufficient return.22 The information therein contained is clearly not adequate. Petitioner fails to mention that the case on which he relies23 is under an earlier Act24 which contains much the broader phraseology "In case of any failure to make and file a return or list * * *."25 That being so, we must determine, first, whether the penalty is mandatory and second, if it is not mandatory whether the facts disclose "reasonable cause" for the failure to file. Since there was ultimately a correct return, the very words of the statute preclude any mandatory impact. The principal case falls within the facts of Edmonds v. Commissioner,26 Sabatini v. Commissioner,27 and Plunkett v. Commissioner,28 rather than Helvering v. Boekman29 and Noteman v. Welch.30 It is interesting, perhaps, to observe that the harsh language of the 1934 Act31 has since been modified.32
The burden of establishing reasonable cause is on the taxpayer.33 The rule as to "reasonable cause" has been well stated by a leading authority:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb
...2 Cir., 88 F.2d 430;Merrick v. American Security & Trust Co., 71 App.D.C. 72, 107 F.2d 271, 278;Girard Investment Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 3 Cir., 122 F.2d 843, 848;Groninger v. Fletcher Trust Co., Ind.Sup., 41 N.E.2d 140;Bump v. District Court of Polk County, Iowa, 5 N.W.2d......
-
United States v. Boyle
...Commissioner, 178 F.2d 769, 770 (CA2 1950); Southeastern Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 205 (CA5 1946); Girard Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 843, 848 (CA3 1941); see also n. 1, supra. The Commissioner does not contend that respondent's failure to file the estate tax return......
-
Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb
... ... Rankin, ... 295 U.S. 123, 131; Higgins v. Commissioner of Internal ... Revenue, 312 U.S. 212) now called the Tax ... 107 F.2d 271, ... 278; Girard Investment Co. v. Commissioner of Internal ... Revenue, ... ...
-
Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 1201–97
...105 S.Ct. 687, 83 L.Ed.2d 622 (1985); see also Hatfried, Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir.1947); Girard Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 843, 848 (3d Cir.1941); Estate of Young v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 297, 317, 1998 WL 235975 (1998). The good faith reliance on the advice ......